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ABSTRACT 
This research began as an examination of the problem 
solving strategies of individuals who believe they can control 
reinforcements they recelve (internals) and those who believe 
that outside forces control reinforcements (externals) under 
different conditions of skill and chance. This developed into 
a study of the cognitive functioning of internals and externals 
in concept formation tasks. Internal and external persons 
were identified using the internal-external locus of control 
scale developed by J.B. Rotter and his colleagues. 
Three studies were conducted uSlng different tasks 
and groups of SUbjects. The subjects of the first study were 
required to find a principle relating one of two response 
words to a list of five stimulus words. There were fifty trials 
uSlng different sets of words. Three groups of subjects were 
used, each made up of internals and externals. The group under 
the skill condition was instructed that their performance 
depended primarily on their own skill; the group under the chance 
1 condition (quasi chance) was instructed that their performance 
on the task would probably be no better than chance due to 
the extreme difficulty of the task; and the group under 
chance 2 (pure chance) were told that their performance on the 
task was totally controlled by chance as the arrangement of the 
111 
words was purely arbitrary. It was expected that internals 
would perform better than externals under the skill condition 
while externals would perform better than internals under 
chance 2. Subjects' perception of, and reactions to, the.task 
were measured by a post-task questionnaire. The results did 
not uphold the predictions. Externals, relative to internals, 
utilised, produced and changed significantly more solution 
hypotheses while working on the task. The two groups did 
not differ in the number of correct answers and both of them 
were unsuccessful in deciphering the principle. In terms 
of subjects' reactions to the task, it was found that the 
internals reacted differently to the skill and chance 2 
conditions, while externals were stable across these conditions. 
Moreover, subjects construed the chance 1 condition as 
resembling a skill condition. 
The different ways ln which internals and externals 
handled their solution hypotheses was further investigated 
in the second study 0 Two groups, one of internals and one of 
externals, were asked to scan a list of characteristics describing 
an object, and then to scan another list containing objects, one 
of which was best described by the characteristics. Thet~ 
lists were presented separately to the subjects in order to 
discover whether subjects needed to switchback between the two 
lists while attempting to identify the correct object. The 
lV 
subjects' reaction times in studying the characteristics 
(preparation time) and in naming the appropriate objects 
(solution time) were recorded. The subjects' perception of and 
reactions to the task were measured by a post-task questionnaire. 
The results strongly supported the predictions~ the internals 
preparation and solution times were significantly faster than 
those of the externals who also used more switchbacks than 
internals. Moreover, both groups performed equally well on 
the task (in terms of naming the appropriate objects). 
Analysis of the subjects' perception of the task indicated that 
internals perceived the task to be more skill controlled than 
externals. 
The third study was conducted to clarifY some 
methodological problems associated with the first study and to 
further investigate the problem solving behaviour of internals 
and externals. Subjects were presented with a series of sets 
one per trial for twenty four trials, each of which consisted 
of two letters and two numbers. Certain sets were 
constructed uSlng a common principle and subjects were required 
to identifY the principle. Subjects perception of and , 
reactions to the experiment were measured by a post task 
questionnaire. The results showed that more externals were 
successful at finding the principle than internals. Externals 
used less trials per solution hypothesis and guessed on more trials 
v 
than internals. Both groups had similar numbers of correct 
answers. More internals than externals, however, employed 
complex solution hypotheses. It was also found that the 
internals confidence in finding the principle before commenc1ng 
the task was higher than that of the externals. 
Taken in conjunction the three studies indicate that 
finding the solution per se to the tasks did not differentiate 
internals from externals as readily as their different approaches 
to the tasks. The internals were more cautious and systematic 
1n handling their solution hypotheses and processed information 
more efficiently and thoroughly. The externals, on the other 
hand, adopted a "butterfly" approach to testing their solution 
hypotheses, readily switching between them and returning to 
previously rejected hypotheses. They were less able than 
internals to process simultaneously two aspects of the task. 
It was concluded that the different problem solving 
behaviours of internals and externals resemble distinctive 
cognitive styles. Whether these cognitive styles are 
effective in terms of identifying the solution to a problem 
seems to depend largely on three main factors: the skill element 
of the task, the type of task, and the level of task difficulty. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
1.1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is an attempt to eXamlne the effects of 
people's beliefs about their ability to control their life events 
on the way they solve problems. More specifically, the research 
~s concerned with the relationship between perceived locus of 
control and actual behaviour in concept formation tasks. Locus 
of control is a personality variable concerning the generalised 
beliefs (or expectancies) people hold about their ability to 
determine the reinforcements they experience. This variable 
was formulated by Rotter and his colleagues (Rotter, 1966), and 
based on Rotter's own social learning theory of personality 
(Rotter, 1954). 
Humans are always encountering new exper~ences ~n 
society which presents them with established values and rules 
of conduct. One remarkable aspect of human beings is their 
desire and willingness to be the initiators of their behaviour 
despite these cultural and social constraints. The extent to 
which a person's activities derive from external causes or 
autonomous functioning ~s a recurring question in psychology 
and philosophy because of its important implications in under-
standing human behaviour. 
1 
2 
There is no doubt than when people are deprived of the 
ability to exercise control over what happens to them, grave 
consequences can occur. In such conditions a person can be rendered 
almost lifeless. The Seligman studies (Seligman, 1975; Seligman 
and Maier, 1967), for example, have shown the alarming effect of 
feelings of "helplessness" on animals and humans. In a helpless 
situation (where the organism cannot control aversive stimuli) 
the organism can become anxlous, frustrated, and completely passive. 
Such a condition can be regarded as an extreme example of external 
control. People lose a sense of the effectiveness of their 
behaviour when the rewards and punishments which they experience 
are not directly related to their actions. Under these circumstances 
they can become automatons, passively accepting wha~ is demanded 
of them. 
External control of behaviour may lead to a blind 
acceptance of authority. Milgram (1963; 1974) has shown how 
people can be made to ob€y orders from sources of authority even 
to the extent of them ostensibly inflicing severe pain on other 
persons. While the human desire to be autonomous is strong, 
people frequently prove very susceptible to influence attempts 
by others. Before individuals can become effective in life 
situations' they must first perceive themselves as being able to 
influence their individual circumstances. 
Of course extreme beliefs about internal control in 
situations where such control is not possible, can have negative 
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consequences for an individual in the same way that strong beliefs about 
external control do, in situations where internal control 1S possible. 
However, a realistic belief in one's ability to control one's 
~ate is certainly essential for coping with stress and meeting 
the demands of the environment. In fact the main a1m of much 
psychotherapy is to bring about in clients a belief 1n their 
ability to control their lives. Thus the exerC1se of control 
and the ability to predict the occurrence of certain events can 
have a profound influence on people's sense of well being and 
personal worth. It is not surprising then that the issue of 
control is a recurring one in psychology. 
Researchers have attempted to investigate this issue 
from a number of different, but overlapping orientations. The 
way people perceive others and their environment is contingent 
upon their beliefs and valueso They construe the 'outside' 
world in such a way as to minimise perplexity by assimilating 
new experiences that are congruent with their past experience. 
The work of Fritz Heider (1958), for example, examined the 
effect of people's perception of others on their relationship 
with others. Heider views people as being the initiators of 
their behaviour. His ideas were extended by Jones and Davis 
(1965) and Kelley (1961 ; 19(1) in the form of what has become 
known as attribution theory. Attribution theory, however, 1S 
not primarily concerned with internal-external control, but with 
a person's tendency to attribute causal ability to people. 
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Attribution theory postulates that there are two kinds of perceived 
causation: environmental and personal. Environmental causation 
ar~ses from the attribution of responsibility for events, to 
forces and circumstances outside the control of the people 
participating in those events (i.e. an external attribution). On 
the other hand, personal causation involves attribution of 
responsibility for events to one or more of the persons involved 
(i.e. an internal attribution). Moreover, Heider's concept 
of people being the locus of causality of their own behaviour 
was extended by De Charms (1964) into the origin-pawn dimension. 
According to De Charms, an or~g~n ~s a person who feels that he 
~s the causal source of the outcomes of his actions, while a 
pawn is a persoq who considers outside forces as being beyond 
his control and as being responsible for what happens to him. 
Witkin, Dyke, Faterson, Goodenough, and Karpe (1962) 
have identified a somewhat different but still relevant 
dimension concerning people's perceptions of their world, namely 
that of field dependence-field independence. Field independent 
people are characterised by their ability to decompose a figure 
into its separate segments, and are more selective in their 
cognitive functioning; while field dependent people treat 
both background and figure as one complex event and tend to be 
more global in handling cognitive exper~ences. 
In sociology Riesman (1950) distinguishes between persons 
who are primarily influenced by the wishes and actions of others 
5 
(other -directed); and persons whose values are inculcated 
in them by parents etc, through socialisation (inner-directed), 
and who can act independently of the immediate pressures of the 
environment. 
This thesis is based on Rotter's (1966) theory of 
internal versus external control of behaviour. Rotter employed 
both a cognitive and behaviourist orientation through the use 
of the concepts of expectancy and reinforcement. According 
to Rotter the internal is one who believes, generally speaking, 
that his behaviour causes the reinforcements he receives, while 
an external belives that these reinforcements are not contingent 
on his behaviour and are controlled by outside forces such as luck 
or fate. Hence Rotter's concept is referred to as the. internal-
external control of reinforcement. Rotter's theory is a social 
theory in that a person's expectancies about the nature of 
behaviour-reinforcement contingencies is seen as being socially 
acquired. The terms 'internal', 'external' and 'locus of 
control' are used in this thesis from now on in terms of 
Rotter's definitions. An internal-external scale (I-E scale) 
was devised by Rotter and his colleagues (Rotter, 1966) to 
measure generalised expectancies regarding the nature of 
behaviour-outcome contingencies. The measure establishes a 
personality continuum with 'internalty' versus 'externality' 
as the opposite ends. Rotter's scale will be referred to as 
the I-E scale hereafter. 
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Some of the above mentioned orientations concern1ng 
the agency of control are similar to the concept of locus of 
control. For example, De Charms's 'origins' are more likely 
to perceive themselves as controlling the rewards they rece1ve 
from the environment (i.e. are internals), while the 'pawns' 
are more likely to resemble ,the externals. Moreover, 
internals have been shown to make personal causation attributions 
while externals are more inclined to attribute environmental 
causes to their own or other persons' outcomes (e.g. Sosis, 1914). 
Further, Seeman in two studies (Seeman, 1963; Seeman and Evans, 
1962) have employed the I-E scale as a measurement of 
alienation or powerlessness (i.e. externals being more powerless 
than internals). It also seems logical to construe "helplessness" 
as an extreme sign of externality. Hiroto (1914) found that 
when internals and externals were placed in a helpless condition 
(using aversive tones), the externals were significantly more 
helpless than internals. 
However, locus of control differs from the other 
orientations to internal-external control. The scores on the 
I-E scale and Witkin et al's field dependent-independent measures 
are not significantly correlated with each other (e.g. McIntire 
and Dreyer, 1913). There is also some evidence to suggest that 
Riesman's and Rotter's concepts are different, i.e. an 1nner-
directed person may endorse external items on the I-E scale 
(Collins, Martin, Ashmore, and Ross, 1913). 
, 
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1.2 GENERAL STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Studies dealing with individual differences as a function 
of locus of control have shown that persons tend to behave ln a 
fashion consistent with their external or internal beliefs 
(Lefcourt, 1966, 1976; Phares,1976). The I-E scale has been 
used to study differences in'achievement motivation; attitude 
change; conformity; problem solving; socio-political activity; 
and performance in schools and professional occupations. The 
I-E scale is also being utilised in therapeutic settings, and ln 
research on controlling smoking and obesity. Many attempts 
have been carried out to find relationships between the I-E 
scale and varl0US personality and intelligence measures. 
Research on locus of control seems to have followed two 
maln lines: molar and molecular. The molar approach is more 
concerned with the relationship between locus of control and 
other personality variables and complex social behaviour (e.g. 
conformity; socio-political activity). The molecular approach, 
on the other hand, probes into more specific cognitive activities 
such as the processing and organisation of information, and 
problem solving in laboratory situations. The molar approach 
has produced inconsistent and ambiguous findings (Joe, 1971), while 
the majority of the findings from the molecular approach have 
been more successful in delineating differences in the performance 
of internals and externals (Lefcourt, 1976). 
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Generally, internals, as compared to externals, are 
found to be more motivated, and solve problems better by seeking, 
assimilating, organising, and utilising task relevant information 
in a more ef~icient way. The research literature has 
consistently shown that internals are more cognitively active 
than externals (Lefcourt, 1916; Phares, 1916), yet correlations 
between the I-E scale and conventional intelligence tests are 
low and non-significant (Rotter, 1966; Phares, 1916). Thus 
it seems that some kind of "cognitive activity", other than that 
measured by normal intelligence tests differentiates internals 
from externals. 
However, precisely 'how' and 'why' internals differ, 
cognitively, from externals and under what specific conditions 
. 
is still not clearly defined. For example, the cognitive 
styles of processing information in a problem solving situation, 
as a function of locus of control,have been explained by post 
hoc conjectures (e.g. Lefcourt and Wine, 1969; Wolk and DuCette, 
1914) . More important, the literature does not reveal a mode 
of problem solving behaviour, by internals and externals, that lS 
maintained across different situations and tasks. Previous 
work has concentrated on the solution of the tasks involved, and on that 
basis it has been inferred that different types of problem solving 
strategies were being used. It is useful to show that internals 
and externals differ in their handling of information, but it is 
also more important to determine whether these differences 
.. 
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generalise from one situatioL tc the other. The present 
research studies two different levels of cognitive functioning 
by internals and externals: one situation specific, and one 
trans-situational. Warr (1970) defined situation specific 
cognitive processing as representing a "response stYle" while 
cognitive activities manifested across different tasks and 
1 sit.ut:d .. =. om: ,yES EE'en by him as representing a "cognitive stYle" • 
Attempting to show that cognitive styles are a funtion of locus of 
control is important as it would provide an insight to the way 
internals and externals utilise and organ1se information. Modes 
of thinking and categorisation as a function of locus of control 
have not been properly investigated. As Weizman and Protter 
(1976) state: "Certainly the roles of general and specific 
internal-external factors in thinking are in need of much 
investigation" (p.863). 
Although the problems employed in this thesis take the 
form of concept formation tasks, the research is not primarily 
concerned with the particular solution hypotheses used by 
subjects to solve the tasks. The emphasis, in this thesis, 
is more on different ways of developing, testing and utilising 
solution hypotheses as a function of personality locus of control. 
1 This thesis adopted the same definition of 'response style' 
and 'cognitive style' as Warr's. The terms 'problem sol-ring 
behaviour' and 'cognitive style' refer to the same phenomena. 
Thus the present thesis is an examination of personality 
differences in the processing of information. 
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Three studies were conducted to examine problem solving 
behaviour as a function of locus of control,in an attempt 
to determine the nature of the cognitive activity that 
distinguishes internals from externals. The first study 
examined the problem solving behaviour of internals and externals 
under skill and chance defined conditions,as previous studies 
had provided inconsistent findings on the reactions of internals 
and externals to these conditions. The other two studies were 
designed on the basis of the results of the first study and 
were mainly concerned with the problem solving behaviour of 
internals and externals as a fUnction of the task at hand 
(i.e. no skill versus chance conditions were involved). 
1.3 AN OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS 
a) Chapter 2: This chapter is concerned with the 
background of the I-E scale and is divided into two sections. 
The first section presents the theoretical framework of the 
internal-external control of reinforcement concept. 
section deals with the nature of the I-E scale. 
The second 
b) Chapter 3: In this chapter a reVlew of the 
literature is presented. The review is divided into three 
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sections. The first section deals with the relationship between 
personality locus of control and situation locus of control 
(i.eo skill and chance defined situations) ~n an attempt to shed 
light on the inconsistencies of the findings in this area. Th~ 
second section is concerned with the cognitive components of locus 
of control and deals with information seeking and attention; 
utilisation and organisation of information; and learning. 
The third section presents the motivational correlates of locus 
of control. 
c) Chapters 4, 5, and 6: These chapters are devoted 
to the first, second, and third studie~ respectively. Different 
groups of subjects were used in each study. Each chapter contains 
four sections: introduction, method, results, and discussion. 
It is important to note that the rationale behind the present 
research is broadly stated in the review of the literature 
(chapter 3). However, the introduction to each of the three 
studies offers a detailed analysis of the problem at hand. The 
second and third studies evolved out of the results of the first 
study. 
d) Chapter 7: This chapter is divided into two sections. 
The first section presents a recapitulation of the results of the 
three studies ~n order to relate the cognitive styles of internals 
and externals to their interpersonal styles, and to other social-
cognitive research. The second section deals with the 
implications of the results of the present research for the 
concept of locus of control within a cognitive-social 
psychological context. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
2.1 ROTTER'S SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY OF PERSONALITY 
Rotter's social learning personality theory provides 
the theoretical framework for the internal-external dichotomy. 
The theory was developed by Rotter (1954; 1960; 1964) in an 
attempt to explain human behaviour in complex social situations. 
It is,therefore, a molar theory of personality which views human 
behaviour as changing perpetually when different exper1ences are 
encountered. The social learning theory may be considered as an 
attempt to integrate two diverse trends in American psychology, 
the behaviourist stimulus-response theories on the one hand and 
the cognitive theories on the other, by utilising expectancy 
and the empirical law of effect. 
Social learning theory deals with how a specific behaviour 
1S selected from a variety of potential behaviours available. The 
theory aims at predicting the behaviour that has the strongest 
potential for occurrence by considering three central variables: 
expectancy, reinforcement value, and the psychological situation. 
Expectancy is " ••• the probability held by the individual that a 
particular reinforcement will occur as a function of a specific 
behaviour on his part in a specific situation or situations" 
(Rotter, 1954, p.107). The value of reinforcement is defined 
as " ••• the degree of preference for any reinforcement to occur 
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if the possibilities of their occuring were all equal" (ibid, 
p.107). Finally, the psychological situation is one which 
14 
" ••• is composed of cues serving to arouse in the individual 
certain expectancies for reinforcement of specific behaviours" 
(Rotter, Chance and Phares, 1972, p.37). It is important to 
note that all of the three variables are relative to the 
individual at hand. 
Rotter's social learning theory v~ews expectancy, 
reinforcement, and the psychological situation as interrelated 
and shaping goal-directed behaviour. In order to predict such 
behaviour the following formula was proposed: 
This formula reads: "The potential for a behaviour x to occur 
in situation 1 ~n relation to reinforcement a, is a function of 
the expectancy of the occurrence of reinforcement a, following 
behaviour x in situation 1, and the value of reinforcement a in 
situation 1" (Rotter et al, 1972, p.14). If the potential of 
behaviour is to be increased both expectancy and reinforcement 
value should be high. The locus of control arose mainly from 
one variable ~n the above formula, namely "expectancy". 
According to the social learning theory, reinforcement 
strengthens an expectancy that an event or behaviour will be 
followed by that reinforcement ~n the future. The non-occurence 
of the reinforcement will weaken the already built expectancy. 
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Increase, or decrease of expectancy depends on whether or not a 
person views that reinforcement as contingent upon his own 
behaviour. Likewise, the non-occurence of reinforcement will 
reduce the expectancy more if he/she sees it as depending on his 
behaviour. 
The increase and decrease of expectancy as a function 
of reinforcement contingencies was the result of early studies 
by Phares (1957) and James and Rotter (1958) which manipulated 
reinforcement contingency by skill and chance instructions. A 
skill determined task was found to produce greater expectancy 
changes (in terms of betting behaviour) than ln a chance defined 
condition. The skill and chance conditions were regarded as 
"specific" situations so that differences in these conditions 
could be measured. 
Rotter (1966) attempted to extend these learning 
differences in specific situations into a personality variable 
that would apply to more general situations. He maintained 
that history of reinforcement would influence the extent to 
which a person percelves or attributes the internality or 
externality of his locus of control. Thus expectancies 
"generalize" from specific to other situations that the individual 
regards as similar or related. The internal-external dimension 
deals with generalised expectancies regarding behaviour-outcome 
relationship. The I-E scale is, thus, a measurement of these 
generalised beliefs. 
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It should be stated that this research was more concerned 
with the I-E scale (i.e. locus of control) than with Rotter's 
social learning theory as a whole. Thus the concept of generalised 
expectancies for locus of control is the one under focus more 
than reinforcement value or the psychological situation. This 
approach is in line with most of the studies utilising Rotter's 
I-E scale. The upsurge of academic interest in locus of control 
has over-shadowed interest in Rotter's social learning theory 
of personality, and researchers are talking now about "locus 
of control in personality". Phares (1976) maintained that 
" ••• while the locus of control concept arose from social 
learning theory, social learning theory itself ultimately under-
went some modification as a result of our increased understanding 
of locus of control" (p.lO). 
with 
The internal-external control of reinforcement deals 
••• the degree to which the individual perceives that 
the reward follows from, or is contingent upon, his 
own behaviour or attributes versus the degree to which 
he feels the reward is controlled by forces outside of 
himself and may occur independently of his own actions. 
The effect of a reinforcement following some behaviour 
on the part of a human subject, in other wordS, is not 
a simple stamping-in process but depends on whether 
or not the person perceives a causal relationship between 
his own behaviour and the reward. A perception of 
causal relationship need not be all or none but can 
vary in degree. When a reinforcement is perceived by 
the subject as following some action of his own but not 
being entirely contingent upon his action, then, in our 
culture, it is typically perceived as the result of luck, 
chance, fate, as under the control of powerful others, 
or as unpredictable because of the great complexity of 
17 
the forces surrounding him. When the event is 
interpreted in this way by an individual, we have 
labelled this a belief in external control. If the 
person perceives that the event is contingent upon 
his own behaviour or his own relatively permanent 
characteristics, we have termed this a belief in 
internal control. 
(ROTTER, 1966, p.l) 
It is important to note that the internal-external 
dichotomy 1S not a trait but rather a contemporary belief about 
the agency of control. This point is clarified in the next 
section. 
2.2 THE I-E SCALE 
A. Development of the I-E Scale 
The I-E scale measures different beliefs about a person's 
ability to influence his/her behaviour and milieu. The first 
attempts to measure these beliefs came from Phares (1955) who 
devised a Likert type scale consisting of 13 skill items and 13 
chance items. Phares predicted that those who endorse more skill 
(internal) items and those who endorse more chance (external) 
items will display a difference in the magnitude of expectancy 
increments and decrements similar to those differences exhibited 
under actual skill versus chance oriented conditions. The 
predictions were not upheld, although those related to the chance 
items approached significance. 
, 
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James (1957) improved and revised Phares's scale and 
made the same predictions. His results supported the hypotheses. 
Rotter, Seeman and Liverant (1962) modified the scales which 
had evolved from the works of Phares and James. Rotter et al 
using results from a study by Liverant (1958) decided that the 
measurement of locus of control should include as many different 
aspects of life as possible (i.e. social, academic, personal, 
political, etc.). The first version of the I-E scale' 
contained 100 forced-choice items with one item in each pa~r 
dealing with external and the other with internal beliefs. 
this scale was item and factor analysed, it was reduced to 60 
items. However, because of high correlations with social 
desirability measures and other psychometric problems the 60-
item scale was discarded. Rotter and his colleagues then 
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refined the 60 items and reduced them to 23 items where every 
effort was made to achieve internal consistency of items and low 
correlations with the Marlowe-Crowne social desirability scale. 
The final vers~on of the scale included 6 filler items to disguise 
partially the real purpose of the scale. The 29-item version 
(see Appendix 1) became known as the Rotter Internal External 
Control Scale. Most locus of control research uses this 
vers~on. 
The I-E scale is scored in the external direction (i.e. 
a high score implies an external locus of control and a low score 
implies an internal locus of control). The test-retest 
reliability measures reported by Rotter (1966) for different 
samples, varying from one to two months, ranged between .49 
and .83. Hersch and Scheibe (1967) reported test~retest 
reliability coefficients that ranged between .48 and .84 
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for a two month period. Recently, Zerega, Tseng and Greever 
(1976) found a test-retest reliability of .55 (N=306, p<.OOl) 
over an eight-month interval. Zerega et al also established 
the concurrent validity between the I-E scale and the MacDonald-
Tseng internal-external locus of control. 
Although the internal consistency estimates of the 
I-E scale (between .65 and .79 inClusive, Rotter, 1966) is 
not very high, it is nonetheless uniform, (all the correlations 
were ~n the .70s). 
The discriminant validity for the I-E scale was estab-
lished by low correlations with intelligence, social desirability, 
and political affiliation variables (Rotter, 1966). However, 
the I-E scale is not totally free from social desirability -
internal items being more socially desired - (Altrocchi, Palmer, 
Hellman and Davis, 1968; Hjelle, 1971). 
B. Multidimensionality of the I-E Scale 
There is always a danger in personality research of 
equating the variable being measured with the instrument 
measuring it resulting in the classification of people into 
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rigidly defined categories. People are not 'internals' or 
'externals' but are classified as internals or externals 
depending on whether they report that they construe events as 
being largely dependent on their own ability at the present time, 
or consider events as outside their control. The locus of 
control should be regarded as a working construct rather than 
a dispositional characteristic. Recently, Rotter (1975), in 
an attempt to clarify some misconceptions associated with the 
I-E scale, maintained that ,the internal versus external construct 
does not represent a typology or a bimodal distribution, for 
it is an approximate normal distribution describing particular 
populations. The I-E scale attempts to measure'control'beliefs 
in a variety of areas and situations; it is a broad gauge tool. 
For this reason Rotter (1966) described the scale as being 
"additive" • Thus this scale is not intended to be unidimensional 
and may involve many different types of control. Hersch and 
Scheibe (1967) argued that a person's endorsement of external 
items may either reflect physical or mental handicap or failure 
to cope with the fierce competitive nature of his environment. 
A number of studies have emerged that deal exclusively with 
the multidimensionality of the I-E scale. 
Gurin, Gurin, Lao and Beattie (1969) and Lao (1970) found 
two separate factors embedded in the I-E scale. These factors 
being: beliefs in personal ability and competence as determining 
outcomes (labelled personal control) and beliefs in hard work, 
skill, and opportunism (labelled control ideology). Mirels 
(1976) and Reid and Ware (1973) reported similar data; the 
former study labelled the factors as "felt mastery" versus 
"system control", and the latter study labelled the factors 
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as "self control" and "social system control". Schneider and 
Pearson (1970) presented five factors: "lllCk or fate" "respect" , , 
"politics", "academics and leadership", and "success". Levenson 
(1973a) reported three factors: "internality", "control by pow-
erful others", and "control by chance". Furthermore, Collins 
(1974) found four factors: "difficulty of world", "unjust world", 
"predictability-luck" and "political responsiveness II • 
Most of these researchers have extended the I-E scale 
to fit the needs of their particular research objectives. All 
these scales have not been as widely tested and standardised 
as Rotter's scale. However they may have considerable utility 
1n areas such as socio-political activism where the I-E scale 
proved to be unreliable (see Abramowitz, 1973; 1974). 
The present research did not involve a more molar approach 
(e.g. socio-political activism), but rather dealt with discrete 
behavioural responses or, in other words, with molecular 
behaviour. Since Rotter's I-E scale has proved to be a 
sensitive tool in delineating molecular responses, the standard 
I-E scale 1S employed in all the three studies reported in this 
thesis. It may seem ironical that the I-E scale, originally 
intended to be used as a 'broad gauge instrument', is more successful 
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In molecular situations than in molar ones. 
Since its first introduction in 1966 the interest in 
locus of control has been considerable. Recently two books 
(Lefcourt, 1976; Phares, 1976) have appeared which are devoted 
entirely to locus of control. The consistency of individual 
differences found in the studies adopting molecular approach 
to locus of control provides a strong buttress to the reliability 
and validity of the I-E scale. 
CHAPTER 3 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The problem solving (and performance in general) of 
internals and externals has been investigated either as a 
function of skill versus chance instructions and/or as a function 
of the task at hand. Studies employing the latter approach 
have been mainly concerned with cognitive activity of internals 
and externals, while studies utilising the former approach have 
been interested in the effects of reinforcement value on 
performance, and in reactions to low versus high conditions of 
control. 
-The first study of the thesis dealt with the influence 
of skill versus chance instructions on the problem solving 
behaviour of internals and externals, while the second and 
third studies (which evolved from the results of the first 
study) dealt exclusively with the cognitive responses of 
internals and externals in solving problems. The aim of the 
rev1ew of the literature is two-fold: firstly to provide a view 
of the current status of research on the relationship between 
personality and situation locus of control, in an attempt to 
shed light on the inconsistencies of the findings in this area; 
and secondly, to outline the different parameters that affect 
the problem solving behaviour of externals and internals 
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(besides those of skill versus chance instructions) in order 
to show that the emphasis of past research has been mainly on 
broad cognitive functioning. 
3.1 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERSONALITY LOCUS OF CONTROL AND 
SITUATION LOCUS OF CONTROL 
One of the ma1n reasons for studying behaviour as a 
fUnction of locus of control in a skill versus chance context 
is the value of reinforcement. This variable 1S one of the 
main ingredients of Rotter's social learning theory (see formula 
on page 14), and is expected to facilitate motivation. Moreover, 
as the social learning theory woul~ predict, this facilitation 
• 
of motivation acts differently on internals as compared to 
externals. In other words, since internals consider that 
reinforcement and other events in their life are related to their 
own.behaviour (or under their control), they are expected to 
value, and thus be more motivated in, situations that allow 
for more self-control (i.e. skill conditions). Externals, on 
the other hand, who see their behaviour as being independ~nt 
of reinforcement (or outside their control) feel more "at home" 
in chance defined conditions where reward is randomly received. 
Thus, because internals and externals value these situations 
differently, their behaviour should reflect this difference. 
As will be shown later, the literature does not offer a clear 
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picture of these differences. 
The personality parameter of the relationship between 
personality and situation locus of control has already been 
explained. Before ,attempting to discuss this relationship, 
the other parameter (situation locus of control) is elaborated. 
A) The Nature of Situation. Locus of Control 
Skill and chance are two different situations. The 
former allows the person to cope by inducing in him/her the 
expectancy that he/she can influence reinforcements. The latter 
situation impedes coping as reinforcement is random and the 
causal relationship between it and"behaviour is obscure or non 
existent. Thus behaviour will be different ln skill conditions 
than in chance. Phares (1962) presented subjects with a list 
of 12 nonsense syllables to establish their perceptual thresholds. 
The subjects were seated before a reaction time panel, and 
electrodes (through which painful electric shock could be delivered) 
were strapped to their fingers. The 12 nonsense syllables 
were projected on a screen (one at a time), 6 of which were 
accompanied by a 2-second shock and 6 which were not. Subjects 
were divided into skill and chance groups. The skill group 
were told that they could control the shock by pressing a button, 
while the chance group were told that the association between 
the button and the shock was arbitrary. The results showed 
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that, as predicted, perceptual threshold decrements were 
significantly greater under the skill conditions than in the 
chance condition (for both shock and nonshock syllables). 
I 
Persons 
who cannot exercise control over what happens to them fail to 
cope with a potentially threatening environment more than those 
who can. Situation locus of control involves skill versus 
chance conditions where the contingency between behaviour and 
reinforcement is different. 
Research on locus of control started as an investigation 
of situation specific expectancies. Rotter and Phares (1956) 
extended social learning theory by studying the effect of 
situational variables on value of reinforcement. They asked 
students to rank the importance of a list of activities chosen 
to represent three classifications of skills: academic, 
athletic, and manual. Subjects answered the questionnaires 
in different situations: some groups were In a gym class, 
some during an English class, and others during a shop period. 
There were highly significant differences in mean ratings as a 
function of the salience induced by the test situation (i.e. the 
situations subjects were under influenced their ratings). 
Phares (1957) predicted that the generation of expectancies, 
based on one's past experience, would be greater in a skill 
defined condition as opposed to a chance defined condition where 
the tendency to generalise from one~ early attempts is less 
probable. Subjects performed two series of tasks, one where 
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successful performance was presented as determined by skill, 
and the other where it was dependent on chance. The two series 
of tasks were presented under both conditions and were balanced 
~n order of presentation. The tasks were line and colour 
matching with subtle differences between the lines and colours. 
Reinforcements were held constant and subjects were asked to bet 
on their performance before each trialo Phares found that, 
as predicted, expectancy shifts were greater in magnitude as 
well as in frequency under skill conditions. The type of 
expectancy shifts that occurred in chance were mainly "unusual" 
in the sense that they decreased following success and increased 
after failure. This kind of behaviour is analogous to the 
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"gambler's fallacy" and is labelled as such by Phares. As 
will be demonstrated later on, gambler's fallacy is a typical 
response of externals under chance conditions. James (1957) 
and Walls and Cox (1971) obtained results similar to those 
of Phares (1957). Thus expectancies appear to differ as a 
function of situation locus of control (skill or chance). The 
ability to generalise from the past to the future is greater ~n 
skill condition because reinforcement is more under control. The 
implications of the past for the future are loose in the chance 
conditions thus allowing the build up of the "gambler's fallacy" 
conceptualisation. 
James and Rotter (1958) investigated the relationship 
between partial reinforcement and resistance to extinction. They 
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hypothesised that partial reinforcement would be most effective 
in chance situations, but less so under skill. Subjects 
performed on an extra sensory perception (ESP) type task, with 
one group instructed that success in guessing was controlled by 
ESP skill and another group was told that such guessing was 
totally a matter of luck. Four groups were run under two 
conditions each of which had two schedules of reinforcement. 
Preceding each trial, subjects made estimates of their 
performance. The dependent variable was the number of trials 
to extinction; extinction being defined as three consecutive 
trials estimated at 1 or 0 on the 10 point scale of performance 
expectancies. Following 50% schedule of reinforcement, the 
group under chance c.onditions was significantly slower to 
extinguiSh. This was consistent with traditional findings. 
On the other hand, the skill group extinguished less rapidly 
following 100% reinforcement, (this trend approached 
significance, p<.lO). James and Rotter interpreted their 
results in terms of stronger relationship between success and 
behaviour, as opposed to a weaker relationship between reward 
and behaviour. These findings were supported by Stabler and 
Johnson (1970) using children. 
Other schedules of reinforcement were investigated by 
Rotter, Liverant and Crown (1961) to determine their effects 
under skill and chance conditions. Four groups performed two 
tasks with 25%, 50%, 15% and 100% reinforcement respectively. 
The skill task was a hand steadiness task derived from Sky 
(1950) and the previously noted ESP task (without skill 
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instructions) was employed for the chance condition. Rotter 
et al found that verbalised expectancy was of greater magnitude 
under skill as compared with the chance condition. These 
findings were supported by Holden and Rotter (1962), and are 
consistent with that of Phares (1957). Blackman (1962) used 
a task involving a series of randomly appearing lights in which 
the subject had to predict the occurrence of a red or a green 
light. It was found that the sequence length and the number 
of sequences affected the number of red responses in the 
extinction condition and the expectancy associated with it. 
Moreover, uncontrollable aversive events have been shown to 
result in great stress and passivity in animals (Seligman, 
Maier and Solomon, 1971)0 
Situation locus of control, therefore, influences 
expectancies in different directions. The tendency to 
generalise from past experiences is more manifested in skill 
as compared to chance conditions. It seems that when the 
relationship between behaviour and reinforcement is obscured, 
behaviour becomes random and learning is also impaired. 
The relationship between personality locus of control 
and situational locus of control is central to the concept 
of locus of controlo The performance of randomly selected 
groups of subjects under skill conditions is analogous to the 
internal control dimension, while performance under chance 
conditions parallels the external control dimension. Thus 
when an internal is put under skill and an external under chance, 
these persons are said to be in congruent situations. Conversely, 
if an external is exposed to a skill condition and an internal 
to chance, then incongruency is created. Congruency, therefore 
occurs when personality and situation locus of control are the 
same. 
B) 1 Personality and Situation Locus of Control Congruency 
Rotter and Mulry (1965), in their classic study, tested 
the hypothesis that internals and externals perceive the value 
placed on the same reward differently in accordance with the 
nature of the situation (skill versus chance). Performance 
on the task (a very difficult-angle matching one) was presented 
to half the subjects as depending on their skill, while the other 
half received chance instructions. Rotter and Mulry found that 
internals took longer decision time in the skill condition as 
compared to internals in chance condition. Externals, on the 
other hand, showed the opposite trend (i.e. they took longer to 
decide on the correct stimUlUS under chance relative to externals 
1 Unless preceded by the word "situation" the term locus of 
control would always imply personality locus of control. 
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under skill). This trend, however, did not reach significance. 
Moreover, under skill condition internals' reaction time was 
significantly longer than that of the externals. Most of the 
variability was caused by the greater length of the time taken 
by internals in the skill condition. Rotter and Mulry explained 
their results in terms of value of reinforcement. Internals 
value self-determined outcomes because these outcomes are more 
congruent with their generalised expectancies regarding control. 
Thus they are motivated to do well (by taking more time to 
decide) under such conditions. Externals, on the other hand, 
are more motivated in chance situations because such conditions 
abound in external control properties. 
Julian and Katz (1968) extended the motivation model 
proposed by Rotter and Mulry by examining reward preferences of 
externals and internals. Julian and Katz carried out two 
experiments; the first one consisted of a competitive game 
presented under skill instructions. The task consisted 
ostensibly of jUdging which of 42 pairs of words were synonyms 
or antonyms. The difficulty of certain pairs was high to 
enable the experimenter to control feedback. The subject 
appeared correct on 60% of the items, while the opponent was 
seen as correct on 70% of the items. Subjects were given the 
option of relying on their opponent's knowledge to earn points. 
Julian and Katz predicted that, since internals value self 
determined rewards more than externals, they would rely on 
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themselves and avoid relying on others even if they lost 
points. The results supported such a prediction; internals 
displayed an obvious reliance on themselves more than did the 
externals, (these differences were significant at the .01 level). 
Moreover, Julian and Katz found that, although all subjects 
took longer decision time for difficult items, the difference 
was significantly more pronounced for internals. These results 
were interpreted by Julian and Katz as supporting Rotter and 
Mulry's motivation model. However, since a chance condition 
was not included in the Julian and Katz study, another 
experiment was run to test reversals in strategy preferences. 
The subjects had to choose the next number in an arbitrary 
series of numbers. The skill group was instructed that naming 
the correct numbers depended on their ability, whereas the 
chance group was told that the correct numbers were determined 
purely by chance (piCking them from a large hat containing many 
possibilities). The opponent's competence was increased by 
making him correct on 90% of practice items. Julian and Katz 
predicted that internals, relative to externals, would rely more 
on others 1n a chance defined condition as compared with a skill 
condition. The results contradicted the hypothesis. Internals, 
as compared to externals, relied more on themselves in both the 
skill and chance conditionso Thus, although internals and 
externals were characterised by a preference for different 
strategies, the difference was not affected by situation 
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locus of control. Julian and Katz argued that a longer 
decision time in the Rotter and Mulry's study was not an 
indication of exerting greater effort but rather a reflection 
of a cautious approach in order to do well. Julian and Katz 
maintained that the need to control their outcomes made internals 
rely more on themselves in the chance condition. This is also 
a motivational model, but one that seems to be stable across 
conditions (i.e. patterns of strategy preference displayed 
by externals and internals seem to hold constant despite task 
demand characteristics). This begs the question whether the 
parameters of the chance condition in the Julian and Katz's 
study were genuinely chance controlled. This point will be 
discussed in greater detail in the introduction to the first 
study. 
Julian, Litchman and Ryckman (1968) carried out two 
experiments based on the need to control concept. Julian et al 
hypothesised that internal or external controlled rewards would 
influence internals and externals differently due to the 
internals' preference for tasks that offer maximum control of 
outcomes. In the first experiment Julian et al gave internals 
and externals the choice of throwing darts at a target at closer 
or farther distances. If the subject chose a closer distance 
from the target he would be provided with less darts than if he 
chose farther distance. The prediction was that internals would 
choose a closer distance in order to exert greater control on 
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their performance. The results upheld Julian et al's 
prediction, and were explained in terms of motivational differences 
associated with the I-E dimension. Those authors carried out 
a second experiment to investigate the effects of lack of 
control on internals and externals, and predicted that internals' 
frustration would be more pronounced than that of the externals. 
Subjects were blindfolded while throwing darts at a target. 
Contrary to their predictions, the authors found out that it 
was the externals who manifested greater emotional reactions o 
Guided by Rotter and Mulry's conclusions, Julian et al asserted 
that by blindfolding their subjects, other-determined outcomes 
were created (i.e. a chance condition). They went on to 
argue that since externals value chance conditions, they would 
show greater concern in such situations; while internals would 
be indifferent to, or less concerned in, chance conditions due 
to their low level of motivations in such surroundings. It 
1S interesting to note that while Julian and Katz (1968) used 
Rotter and Mulry's findings as a basis for their study, Julian 
et al (1968) employed them as post hoc explanations. 
The rationale given by Julian et al (1968) for the 
results of their second experiment was confirmed by two studies 
(Rychman, Rodda, and Stone, 1971; Ryckman, Stone, and Elam, 
19(1). Internals exhibited more concern (or anxiety) when 
strongly criticised while they were throwing darts in a skill 
defined condition. Externals, on the other hand, showed more 
concern when criticised under a chance condition. Although 
these results fit nicely in the congruent model, the Ryckman 
studies were complicated by some sex differences. In one 
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study it was the females who confirmed tothe.predictions, while 
in the other study it was the males who did so. 
Lefcourt, Lewis, and Silverman (1968) gave further 
support to Rotter and Mulry's findings and also demonstrated 
the importance of the subject's own perception of skill versus 
chance defined tasks. In addition to predicting longer 
decision times by internals and externals under congruent 
conditions, Lefcourt et al also predicted better recall of, 
and greater attentiqn to, task relevant information. The task 
was a slightly modified version of the level of aspiration 
board (devised by Rotter, 1954) which involved the use of 
motor skills in obtaining points. The task was presented to 
one group of internals and externa~as depending on skill and 
to the other group as depending on chance. Lefcourt et al's 
predictions were not confirmed until the subjects' perceptions 
of the skill and chance instructions were analysed. It was 
found that the majority of subjects accepted the skill instruc-
tions while many suspected the chance instructions. This 
tendency to accept skill instructions and to question chance 
instructions was more pronounced in the internals than the 
externals. Basing their data on the subjects' own perception 
of skill versus chance conditions, Lefcourt et al obtained 
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strong support for the personality situation locus of control 
congruency (i.e. internals took more decision time, were more 
attentive to, and reported more task relevant information under 
perceived skill than perceived chance; while the externals showed 
the reverse trend - this trend however approached borderline 
significance). 
Direct support fOT Rotter and Mulry's results was 
recently reported by Dixit and Singh (1975). These authors 
replicated Rotter and Mulry's study with Indian subjects and 
found highly significant personality-situation locus of control 
interaction. 
This interaction, however, is not always so clear cut. 
A study by Watson and Baumel (1967) mad€ the notion of congruency 
more problematic by concentrating on the effect of anxiety on 
performance in an incongruent personality-situation locus of 
control setting. These authors hypothesised that internals 
and externals would display high rates of errors when placed 
in an incongruent situation due to high levels of anxiety. 
Subjects first learned a list of paired nonsense syllables, and 
were told to learn a second list which would contain both the 
learned pairs and new pairs. Subjects were then divided into 
skill and chance groups. Those in the skill condition were 
told that if they did not elicit the correct response when 
examlnlng the second list, they would receive a mild electric 
shock. Thus the situation was under their control in the sense 
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that by providing the correct response subjects could avoid 
the shock. The chance group received the same instructions 
as the skill group. However, even if subjects produced the 
correct response they may still get the shock. Thus subjects 
were also asked if they required more practice on the first 
list before attempting to ans~er the second one. The results 
supported Watson and Baumal's predictions: internals made more 
errors, took more trials to learn the list (p was not quite 
significant, <.10) and requested more practice trials in the 
chance condition as compared with skill condition. Externals 
displayed the opposite trend. Internals' estimation of 
confidence in learning the second list was significantly higher 
than that of the ext~rnalso Watson and Baumal explained their 
, 
results in terms of anxiety as a nonfacilitative level of 
motivation and concluded that the impairment of learning 1n 
incongruent situations was not caused, by low levels of 
motivation, but by high levels of anxiety. The results of 
Watso,n and Baumal, although paralleling those of Rotter and 
Mulry, did deviate from them indirectlyo For example, Watson 
and Baumal found that internals, as well as the externals, were 
stable across different conditions of skill and chance. The 
variability of scores was caused by both the internals and 
externals 0 The results also implied that internals and externals 
were more concerned (by being more anxious) with incongruent 
surroundings, a finding which contradicts that of Julian et al (1968)~ 
Petzel and Gynther (1970) extended the findings of 
Watson and Baumal in an interesting but intriguing study. 
argued that performance as a function of locus of control ln 
Watson and Baumal's study could have been affected by both 
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They 
motivation and anxiety or one of these variables. Petzel and 
Gynther employed a problem solving task to reduce the inhibiting 
effect of anxiety on performance. These authors formulated 
their predictions within Rotter's social learning theory 
framework (i.e. better performance by internals in skill 
conditions and by externals in chance conditions). The task 
employed consisted of 10 anagrams of average difficulty 0 These 
anagrams were presented to different groups of internals and 
externals under skill versus chance instructions. The results 
contradicted the social learning theory interpretation of the 
relationship between personality and situation locus of control. 
A strong and clear incongruent effect emerged: internals solved 
more problems (anagrams) when given chance instructions, and 
externals solved more anagrams under skill. Petzel and Gynther 
concluded that the performance of internals and externals under 
incongruent conditions in Watson and Baumal's study was not the 
result of anxiety alone, but also of motivation (i.e. externals 
were more motivated to perform well in skill situations, while 
internals were motivated under chance conditions). Petzel and 
Gynther's results pose an important question: is it possible to 
create a chance condition by using a task whose nature is more 
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skill oriented (i.e. anagrams)? Perhaps the elements making 
up anagram tasks leave little room for inducing a genuine chance 
condition. Moreover, the issue of personality-situation locus 
of control incongruency, though interesting, is still ~uite 
vague. Petzel and Gynther's study is the only one in the 
literature, so far, which produced such clear incongruent 
effects. 
It is interesting to note that Petzel and Gynther also 
found the same "unusual" shifts in expectancies (gambler's fallacy) 
as those reported by Phares (1957) in the chance condition, 
but only for externals. 
A study by McDonald, Tempone, and Simmons (1968) showed 
that high versus low control outcome did not have different 
effects on internals and externals. Subjects drove an automobile 
simulator and their control on the device was manipUlated by 
increasing the speed and errors (low control) or by decreasing 
both of them (high control)o Internals and externals did not 
differ in their performance (in terms of errors and eValuation 
of performance) although the manipulation of control was highly 
effective. 
A study by DuCette and Wolk (1973) showed a super~or 
performance by internals over externals in both the skill as 
well as the chance conditions. DuCette and Wolk (1973) argued 
that problem solving as a function of personalty-situation locus 
of control has not been ade~uately investigated. What DuCette 
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and Wolk did was to eXamlne the extraction of information under 
skill versus chance conditions. Two types of tasks were 
employed. The first type involved the estimation of grades a 
subject would get arter sitting the midterm and final exams. 
The second type of t-ask was a problem solving one, of such a 
nature as could be presented with either skill or chance 
instructions. The task was composed of two cards on which was 
printed either an "A" or a "B". In the skill condition 
subjects were told that the experimenter would hold a card 
(one at a time) and would emit a nonverbal cue which indicated 
whether the card had an "A" or a "B". The cue was the way 
ln which the experimenter held the card. The cards were held 
ln front of the subjects with either three fingers in front of 
the card (indicating an "A") or two fingers (indicating a "B"). 
Subjects in the chance condition were told to "read" the 
experimenter's mind while he was looking at a card and say 
whether the card was an "A" or a "Bn , (a sort of an ESP exercise); 
the experimenter was not emitting any cues. Thus the task under 
chance required more guesslngs. Subjects were also asked at 
the end of each experiment to estimate the number of trials on 
which they were correct, and were required to rate their liking 
of the tasks. Results showed that internals and externals were 
not significantly different ln their estimation of points for 
the midterm exam; however, internals made significantly closer 
estimates for the final exam than externals. There were no 
significant differences between internals and externals on the 
test scores themselves. Moreover, internals, as compared to 
externals, performed better on the extrasensory perception task; 
took fewer trials to ascertain the correct principle in the 
skill ,task; and liked the skill condition more than the chance 
condition. Externals liked the chance task more than the skill 
task and were poorer-in estimating the number of correct under skill 
than under chance. All these differences were significant. The 
DuCette and Wolk study, thus, showed that internals and externals 
did not react differently to the skill and chance instructions. 
Internals, relative to externals, extracted information more 
efficiently In both skill as well as chance situations. 
In an attempt to resolve the ambiguity and inconsistetJ.cies 
surrounding personality situation locus of control interaction, 
Srull and Karabenick (1975) investigated the effects of situation 
locus of control on the cheating behaviour of externals and 
internals. Those authors argued that cheating vlaS chosen as a 
dependent variable because it reflected a desire to appear 
to do well on a task and that such a desire would manifest 
itself in situations valued by the person. Thus Srull and 
Karabenick were employing the motivation model as their 
framework. The task consisted of a series of line puzzles, 
and was presented to groups of internals and externals as skill 
or chance oriented. Persistence on the task and effort ratings 
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were also included as dependent variables. The results 
strongly supported personality and situation locus of control 
congruency. This was manifested by highly significant locus of 
control by instructions interactions: internalp cheated the 
most under skill and the least under chance; while externals 
displayed the exact opposite trend. The highest rate of 
cheating was by externals under chance. Srull and Karabenick 
also found that internals persisted (i.e. worked on more optional 
puzzles) much more than did the externals - in both skill and 
chance conditions. Internals also rated spending much less 
effort in skill (where they cheated most) than chance (where 
they cheated the least)o Externals were stable across conditions 
with high ratings of effort. Srull and Karabenick explained 
their results in terms of broader motivational dispositions 
governing the behaviour of internals (i.e. internals value 
success under skill and would persevere despite failure). The 
behaviour of externals was more difficult to explain, and Srull 
and Karabenick speculated about the low cheating of externals 
under skill as indicative of fear of being detected. 
It appears, therefore, that the skill and chance milieus 
provide internals and externals respectively, with an opportunity 
to function in a typical fashion. Feather (1968) investigated 
"typical" shifts in confidence after success and failure for 
internals and externals under a skill condition. Typical shifts 
were defined as an increase in confidence following success and 
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decrease in confidence following failureo Subjects were 
required to solve 5 easy anagrams (success condition) or 5 very 
difficult anagrams (failure condition) before attempting to 
answer 10 common anagrams of moderate difficulty level. Feather 
hypothesised that since the skill conditions allowed the internals 
to exercise control over reinforcements, then their previous 
experience would be related to their present behaviour (i.e. 
manifest typical changes ~n confidence). The findings supported 
Feather's predictions as internals made more typical shifts 
in confidence than externals over the 15 trials. Since Feather 
did not include a chance condition, Ryckman and Roda (1971) made 
the same predictions as those of Feather's, but also extended 
. 
them to externals under chance (there was no skill situation in 
the Ryckman and Roda study). The rationale behind the predic-
tions was that externals may behave in chance environment as if 
they could affect the outcome. Internal and external subjects 
were required to solve 15 line matching problems after exper-
iencing success on 5 practice problems. Subjects were told 
that since the difference between the lines was very small, 
success or failure would depend on chance. Consistent with 
previous findings, subjects who experienced initial success 
expressed more confidence than those who experienced initial 
failure. However, Ryckman and Roda's hypothesis that externals 
would make more typical shifts was not entirely confirmedo 
Although externals made more such shifts after success, internals 
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shifted more frequently following failure. Thus results 
pertaining to skill conditions seem to be consistent with 
personality locus of control congruency, while those obtained 
under chance are equivocal. 
Research on personality-situation locus of control ~s 
inconsistent. The nature of the task as well as the type of 
instructions given is of prime importance in identifying 
differences as a function of these two variables. This ~ssue 
forms the nucleus of the first study and will be discussed ~n 
further detail in the introduction to that study. 
3.2 COGNITIVE CORRELATES OF LOCUS OF CONTROL 
Studies dealing with personality-situation locus of 
control congruency rely solely on the motivation model to 
explain the behaviour of internals and externals. The issue 
~s left unclear in that although internals and externals differ 
~n valuing self versus other determined outcomes, the mechanisms 
underlying such motivational propensities are neglectedo It ~s 
here where research into the cognitive aspects of personality 
locus of control ~s most valuable. 
Studying patterns of behaviour (as a function of locus 
of control) under skill and chance conditions can be said to be 
dealing with the motivational correlates of locus of control. 
At the same time these behavioural patterns include "cognitive 
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activity" (i.e. problem solving, utilisation of information, 
etc). Thus it may seem that these motivational and cognitive 
components are beingtreated simultaneously. However, the issue 
lS rendered ambiguous by the tendency of certain investigators 
to consider locus of control as being primarily cognitive 
(Gavurin and Murgatroyde; 1973; Lefcourt, 1967; Lefcourt, 
Gronnerudi and McDonald, 1973; Lefcourt and Wine, 1969; 
McIntire and Dreyer, 1973) or primarily motivational (Baron, 
1967; Julian and Katz, 1968; Julian et al, 1968; Petzel and 
Gynther, 1970; Rotter and Mulry, 1965; Watson and Baumal, 1967). 
It should be stated that the present research does not 
consider motivational and cognitive variables as separate. 
However, the tendency of certain studies to concentrate on one 
variable rather than the other made it necessary to present 
these two components of locus of control separately. 
One of the maln proponents of locus of control as a 
cognitive variable lS H M Lefcourt (1967, 1976). He maintains 
that the stability of the "framework of personal causation" 
strengthens the ability to confront conflicting information 
surrounding a person. In order to deal effectively with such 
information one must have enough knowledge of one's potentials 
and weaknesses. Information about oneself should be sought 
and assimilated to safeguard against the vagaries of life. 
Lefcourt argues that an internal locus of control lS directly 
related to such competence. 
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The main ~ssue here is that of "information" or "cues". 
As will be seen later, an internal locus of control ~s associated 
with an "active" process to assimilate information. Hence the 
rubric "cognitive activity" includes such factors as attention, 
organisation, utilisation, assimilation, and processing of 
information, deliberation and inquisitiveness. 
Lefcourt (1967) argued that an external locus of control 
~s determined by its consequences. If apathy and inactivity 
characterise externality, then in the presence of implicit 
cues that would allow for success, an external would fail to 
"piCk up" these cues. Thus Lefcourt hypothesised that as the 
tasks instructions become more explicit, externals would benefit 
more than would internals, because they require cues as to 
"how" and "why" one should succeed. The level of aspiration 
board was employed with three kinds of instructions: those which 
minimise the importance of the task (low-cue condition); those 
which hinted at the importance of success (moderate cue condition); 
and those which thoroughly explained what was expected of 
subjects (high-cue condition). Lefcourt's predictions were 
confirmed. Internals were stable across the three conditions, 
while externals changed dramatically. Internals outperformed 
externals under low-cue condition, while externals outperformed 
internals in the high-cue condition. Although internals 
performed better than externals under moderate-cue condition, 
the difference failed to reach significance. These results 
indicate that externals are more respons~ve to external 
definitions of the task. Internals, on the other hand, seem to 
rely on their own perception and are less influenced by task 
explication. Lefcourt (1967) asserted that a low degree of 
motivation was not the cause of the external's passivity, but -
and here lies the crux of the problem - because of "cognitive 
and perceptual type deficiencies". More explicitly, Lefcourt 
argued that " ••• the individual with external control expectancies 
does not adequately search for reinforcement opportunities. It 
is possible that he fails to maintain the kind of internal 
dialogue that would facilitate the cognitive sorting and 
categorizing of the situation so that the opportunities for 
reinforcement in different situations would be more self-evident" 
(p.377). As will become evident later on, the whole research 
dealing with the cognitive components of locus of control centres 
around this issue. 
Generally, reserach in this area has concentrated on 
information seeking, utilisation and organisation of information, 
and problem solving (learni.ng). Of course, all these variables 
overlap, and "cognitive activity" becomes an overriding concept 
which incorporates them. 
A) Information Seeking and Attention 
An internal ~s expected, ~n a problem solving condition, 
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to seek more task relevant information since he/she believes 
~n his ability to influence outcomes. An external, on the other 
hand, is expected to show little interest in task relevant 
information in order to produce congruence between hiS/her 
expectancies (lacking the ability to in~luence rewards) and 
outcomes. Some studies support this line of reason~ng. 
Seeman and Evans (1962) investigated the behaviour 
of hospitalised male tuberculosis patients in seeking relevant 
information about their illness. Seeman and Evans hypothesised 
that since knowledge acquisition and the implied increase in 
personal influence is incongruent with the external's generalised 
beliefs, they would obtain limited knowledge relevant to their 
disease and recovery. The results of Seeman and Evans upheld 
such a prediction. More internals, as compared with externals, 
had more objective information about their illness, were rated 
by the hospital staff as having more knowledge of their condition, 
and were less satis~ied with the information they received on 
the ward. 
Tseng (1970), us~ng vocational rehabilitation clients, 
found that internal clients possessed significantly more 
knowledge of their jobs than the external clients. 
Seeman (1963) carried out a study similar to that of 
Seeman and Evans (1962). Subjects were reformatory inmates, 
and were divided into groups of internals and externals. The 
groups were tested for their interest in, and knowledge of, three 
categories of information: a) the immediate reformatory 
situation; b) achieving successful parole; and c) long-range 
prospects for a non-criminal career. Seeman predicted that 
since the information of parole attainment implied the 
possibility of personal control, it should be of more interest 
to the internals than to the externals. Such an interest would 
be reflected by more accurate recall of parole information. 
This prediction was supported. Internals recalled significantly 
more parole relevant information than externals. Both groups 
did not differ significantly in their recall of other materials. 
Seeman concluded that a person gains control over his life when 
heprrssesses information about the determinants of outcomes, and 
that internals, relative to externals, in attempting to better 
their life situations, are more concerned with, and actively seek, 
information that provides personal control. In other words, 
the externals' attention to, and acquisition of, information 
is inferior to that of the internals' since externals are not 
concerned with personal control. 
Davis and Phares (1967) investigated the acquisition of 
information in a social influence situation as a function of both 
personality and situation locus of control. Subjects (university 
students) were told that they would be asked to influence another 
subject regarding his attitude toward the Vietnam war. Subjects 
were also told that the experimenters possessed files of data 
of the person to be influenced. The major dependent variable 
was the number of questions about the influencee. 
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In addition 
subjects were glven a) skill instructions where success was 
determined by ability; b) chance instructions where personality 
characteristics of influencer and influencee affected performance; 
or c) no instructions regarding causes of performance. The 
results strongly supported Seeman's (1963) contentio~. Internals 
asked more questions than externals under skill and no instructions 
conditions. There were no significant differences between 
internals and externals under chance, although the tendency of 
externals was to ask more questions. Recently, a study by 
Weiner and Daughtry (1975) supported these findings. Thus it 
seems that internals engage in more extensive data gathering 
procedures than externals especially in self-determined condi~ions. 
It would be reasonable then to assume that internals, as compared 
with externals, attend more to task relevant cues. 
Lefcourt and Wine (1969) used the term "cue-searching" 
to explain the findings of Lefcourt (1967) and David and Phares 
(1967). They asserted that internals were characterised by a 
more active search for task relevant cues than externals. Lefcourt 
and Wine's main hypothesis was that internals relative to 
externals would exhibit more attentive behaviour (in terms of 
eye movements and actual observation) when trying to become 
familiar with another person. The results upheld the hypothesis: 
internals attended more to the person when his behaviour was 
uncertain, while externals looked more at the conventional 
person. Moreover, the internals, relative to externals, 
made more observations about the puzzling as well as the 
conventional persons. 
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In a second experiment Lefcourt and Wine (1969) 
investigated the effects of high versus low structured environments 
on internals and externals. The hypothesis was that internals' 
performance would exceed that of the externals when the 
experimental structuring of the environment was minimal. 
Groups of internals and externals were first taken into an 
experimental room that was rich in detail. Subjects were 
then required to perform a neutral task, and after that they 
were asked to describe the experimental room as accurately 
as possible. This condition was labelled low-cue condition. 
The procedure of the high-cue condition was very similar to 
that of the low-cue condition. However, subjects were given, 
prior to their entry to the experimental room, some:information 
regarding the need to pay attention to their environment. 
The results supported Lefcourt and Wine's prediction: significant 
interactions between locus of control and treatments were 
obtained. Internals made more observations under low-cue 
condition, while externals made more observations under the 
high-cue condition. Moreover, internals were stable across 
these two conditions, while externals were more affected by 
external manipulation of the environment. These results 
support those of Lefcourt (1967). Lefcourt and Wine concluded 
that internals are characterised by more versatile scann1ng 
procedures than externals. 
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Thus, it seems that the externals' attentive mechanisms 
may be facilitated by stru~turing the environment in such a 
way as to render it more accessible. Externals may also benefit 
therapeutically from such environments. Kilmann and Howell 
(1974) attempted to investigate this line of thought by exposing 
institutionalised female drug addicts to structured versus 
unstructured therapeutic seSS10ns. Where as internals were 
found to benefit more from both treatment for.mats, externals 
benefited from structured sessions only. 
, If internals are characterised by more active assimilation 
of information about their environment, could they for.m better 
predictions of their behaviour? Two studies (Steger, Simmons, 
and Lavelle, 1973; Wolfe,19(2) have shown that internals, 
relative to externals, to be more accurate predictors of their 
academic performance. Recently, work by Gilmore and Reid 
(1978) supported such findings. 
B) Utilisation and Organisation of Information 
Studies reviewed in the preV10US section indicate that 
internals deploy better recall and attention especially when 
personal control 1S salient. Reverting back to Rotter's social 
learning theory, it seems that these studies emphasise the notion 
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that the cognitive correlates of locus of control are directly 
related to the attainment of reinforcement. The generalised 
expectancies of internals that reinforcement follows their own 
actions seems to equip them with certain strategies to maintain 
behaviour-reinforcement contingency. Externals, on the other 
hand, seem not to care much for behaviour-reinforcement 
contingency and thus adopt different strategies that are 1n 
accord with their generalised expectancies regarding personal 
control. Studies dealing with the utilisation and organisation 
of information are the only ones that come close to delineating 
specific modes of cognitive functioning of internals and 
externals. 
Phares (1968) attempted to explain the more "active" 
cognitive system of internals in terms of better utilisation 
of information. Subjects (internals and externals) learned 
bits of information about four persons whom they were going 
to influence, and were tested for recall of this material. 
After one week the subjects were required to choose out of 
eight girls and ten occupations the best that would suite each 
of the four men. Subjects were required to write down the 
reasons for their matches and to recall the bits of information 
learned a week earlier. The subjects were offered financial or 
course credit rewards for correct matching (actually this was only 
to motivate the subjects). A control group was only required 
to recall the bits of information. Results showed that internals 
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gave significantly more reasons (50% more) for their matches 
than did the externals. When correct reasons were singled out, 
internals, compared to externals, gave much more (3 times as 
many) correct reasons. Furthermore, internals and externals 
in the control group did not differ significantly in their 
recall of material learned one week earlier. However, 
internals and externals in the experimental group were 
different, with internals recalling more items than externals 
(this difference just attained borderline significance, P<.08). 
Phares (1968) concluded that internals utilise information more 
effectively than externals, and that such utilisation ~s an 
essential prerequisite in furnishing an internal with better 
meahanisms for coping with reality. More interesting is that 
Phares discards motivation as a factor in differentiating 
internals. from externals and adopts a strictly cognitive 
explanation. 
If internals recall and utilise relevant information 
better than externals, then they should organ~se information 
differently.Bartel, DuCette, and Wolk (1972) investigated the 
recall of 25 nouns and the degree of category clustering as a 
function of locus of control. Their results showed that while 
significant differences between internals and externals in free 
recall of nouns were not obtained, internals displayed 
significantly more category clustering than externalso Moreover, 
the positive correlations between recall and category clustering 
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were highly significant for internals, and were not significant 
for externals. These differences as a function of locus of 
control led Bartel et al to conclude that strategies of learning 
are different for internals and externals with internals manifesting 
a greater degree of organisation of information. As Bartel 
et al put it " ••• organization seems to precede recall for 
internally controlled subject s" (p.255). 
Bartel's et al study 1S the only one 1n the literature 
(so far) that deals with the structure of organising discrete 
information as a function of locus of control. It is important 
because it demonstrates qualitative differences 1n handling 
information. Yet, like its predecessors, it does not deal with 
the way information is utilised and organised. 
c) Learning 
If internals organise and utilise information better 
than externals, then it is only logical to assume that they are 
also better problem solvers and learners. 
Lefcourt et al (1973) investigated the differences 1n 
hypothesis formation as a fUnction of locus of control and 
field-dependence: field-independence. Subjects were given 
bogus instructions that described the task as dealing with 
verbal facility. The stimulus word list was designed so that 
the number of sexual double entendres was gradually increased. 
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The maln dependent variables were latency of response (indicative 
of conflict or suspicion) and awareness of the sexual words 
(in terms of videotaped facial expressions and bodily movements). 
Lefcourt et al contended that internals would be quicker to 
extract or note the "odd" words. The results confirmed such a 
contention: internals exhibited response time delay before 
the externals, and laughed and smiled more than externals as 
the sexual words increased. Lefcourt et al asserted that it 
was the internals' more alert and active cognitive system that 
enabled them to notice immediately the sexually connoted words. 
As will be mentioned in the third study, these results are 
problematic. 
Gavurin and Murgatroyd (1973) found a significant 
correlation between anagram solving and locus of control for 
females only. Internal females solved more anagrams than 
external females. The correlation was in the same direction 
for the males, but was not significant. 
In an interesting study, Hickey (1976) compared the 
performance of internals and externals on word versus nonsense 
anagrams. A significant interaction was found between locus 
of control and the two types of anagrams. Internals solved 
more word anagrams than externals while externals solved more 
nonsense anagrams than internals. Hickey also found word 
anagrams to be of greater difficulty than nonsense anagrams. 
Wolk and DuCette (1974) using a more sophisticated and 
well-controlled experimental design supported the positive 
relationship between learning and internal locus of control. 
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Wolk and DuCette attempted to provide a systematic investigation 
of the perceptual and cognitive properties of locus of control. 
They argued that such systematic evaluation was absent due to 
the diversity of tasks employed. In order to reduce task 
demand characteristics and provide a more sensitive measure of 
perceptual and cognitive processes, Wolk and DuCette utilised 
the incidental learning techni~ue. Two studies were carried 
out. In the first study subjects were given the task of reading 
a story ~uickly to search for typographical errors. Later, 
subjects were asked to recall names, incidents, dates and other 
salient features of the story (incidental learning) as well 
as recalling typographical errors (intentional learning). 
Following this, subjects were given back the story and asked to 
memorise the dates. Again they were tested on intentional 
learning (dates) and incidental learning (names). In the second 
study the same proc·edure was followed. However, task difficulty 
and cue explication were varied. The sentences of the story 
were randomly se·~uenced in each paragraph and within each 
sentence words were randomly dispersed to create a high 
difficulty condition. A low difficulty condition was induced 
by presenting normal serles of sentences in a paragraph. 
Subjects were either warned of the possibility of being tested 
on other aspects of the story (high-cue explication) or were 
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not warned of incidental learning (low-cue explication). Subjects 
recei ved either the high or low cue explication conditions;· 
while all subjects were put under high and low task difficulty 
conditions. 
The results showed the typical trend of better 
performance by internals over externals. Internals found 
significantly more typographical errors and recalled more 
dates (intentional learning); they also recalled more names 
(incidental learning). Cue explication and task difficulty 
treatments influenced externals more than internals (a direct 
replication of Lefcourt's 1967; and Lefcourt and Wine's 1969, 
findings) • Significant changes in externals' performance 
across conditions was manifested ~n intentio~al as well as 
-incidental learning. Moreover, the positive correlations 
between intentional and incidental learning were high and 
significant for internals, while being low and non-significant 
for externals. Furthermore, under high-cue explication the 
same correlations were higher and reached significance for 
ext ernal s only 0 
Wolk and DuCette's main conclusions were that internals 
are characterised by a more "perceptually sensitive" cognitive 
system and by" ... more active attentional processes, more 
intensive, efficient structuring of environmental stimuli, and 
more extensive use of all potential sources of information" 
(p.lOO). Such cognitive functioning, Wolk and DuCette went on 
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to say, furnished internals with the ability to comprehend 
reinforcement potentials and be more adaptive to their 
environment. This is implied in all the studies reviewed so 
far in this section. 
These studies employed tasks where performance was 
determined by skill or at least by an ability that requires some 
kind of formal logical reason~ng. It would be interesting to 
see i£ a task controlled by external control (i.e. luck, fate) 
would provide the externals with an opportunity to excel. 
Bronzaft (1972) reasoned that if externals believe in luck and 
fate as controllers of their behaviour, their performance on 
an ESP task should be better than internals. Bronzaft used a 
shorter version of the I-E scale (by select±ng those items that 
stressed a belief or lack of belief in luck and fate). Each 
subject was faced with five photographs (his own being one of 
them) kept face down and under a white cover, and the subject 
was to point at a number on a white sheet, under which he 
thought his photo was. Results showed a significant (P<.Ol) 
positive correlation between the shortened version of the I-E 
scale and successes on the ESP task. Externals performed 
better than internals. This may contradict the findings 
of DuCette and Wolk (1973) which showed better performance by 
the internals on an ESP task. This inconsistency may be due 
to: a) the different nature of the tasks employed in the two 
studies; and/or b) the fact that Bronzaft used a shorter vers~on 
of the I-E scale, whereas DuCette and Wolk used the complete 
scale. 
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Internals appear to be superlor to externals on tasks 
that demand more efficient utilisation and organisation of 
information. This begs the question whether internals are more 
intelligent than externals (in terms of high scores on 
intelligence tests). Surprisingly, correlations have been low 
or negligible between the I-E scale and a) several intelligence 
tests (Rotter, 1966; Hersch and Schebe, 1967; Kiehlbauch-
reported in Phares, 1976); and b) academic performance (Eisenman 
and Platt, 1968; Hjelle, 1970; Warehime, 1972; Wolk and DuCette, 
1974). 
As can be seen, the findings of the research on the 
cognitive components of locus of control are impressively 
consistent in enunciating differences in the cognitive performances 
of internals and externals. The studies by Lefcourt (1967), 
Lefcourt and Wine (1969), Wolk and DuCette (1974) are important 
in that they demonstrate the differential effects of situational 
parameters (cue-explication) on the problem solving ability of 
externals and internals. The cognitive responses as a function 
of locus of control seem to interact with different features of 
the environment in such a way as to maximise congruence with 
generalised beliefs. However, one main shortcoming of the 
studies dealing with the cognitive correlates of locus of control 
is their neglect of the processes that precede problem solving 
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and learning. All that these studies have demonstrated (each 
in its own right) is that the performance and post task 
evaluation of internals and externals are different. 
303 MOTIVATIONAL COMPONENTS OF LOCUS OF CONTROL 
Research on the interaction between personality and 
situation locus of control regarded motivation as a situation 
specific characteristic-. Internals become motivated under 
skill, while externals become motivated under chance. However, 
other studies have regarded internalityas a motive in its own 
right. In other words, just as internals are equipped with 
a more active cognitive system, they are also characterised 
by higher levels of motivation. 
Julian and Katz (1968) regarded the "need tl to predict 
and control outcomes as a major motivational determinant of 
internals' behaviour irrespective of situation locus of control. 
Thus it seems that motivation and internality are positively 
related. 
Hersch and Scheibe (1967) investigated responses of 
internals and externals to adjective check lists. The results 
led the authors to conclude that internality is more homogeneous 
than externality. Twenty three adjectives were checked 
significantly more often by internals than externals who checked 
more often only one adjective "self-pitying". Internals described 
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themselves as more ".0. clever, efficient, egotistical, 
enthusiastic, independent, self-confident, ambitious, assertive, 
boastful, conceited, conscientious, deliberate, persevering, 
clear-thinking, dependable, determined, hard headed, industrious, 
ingenious, insightful, organized, reasonable, and stubborn" 
(p.612)~ From these adjectives, the internals' behaviour seems 
to be more structured and calculated than externals. 
Of particular interest here are the studies dealing 
with risk-taking as a function of locus of controlo Liverant 
and Scodel (1960) proposed that since internals, relative to 
externals, are characterised by a greater need to control events, 
they would manifest more conservatism in a risk-taking situation. 
Wagering on various dice throws of known probabilities , internal 
subjects chose more intermediate probability bets and fewer low 
probability bets than the externals, thereby supporting the 
hypothesis. 
It should be remembered that the internals in Julian 
et aI's (1968) study made low risk choices while the externals 
made high risk choices ~n the dart throwing game. On the other 
hand, Baron (1968) and Strickland, Lewicki and Katz (1966) 
reported a positive relationship between external control and 
conservatism in taking riskso 
strong support for the positive relationship between 
externality and extreme risk taking was provided by DuCette and 
Wolk (1972). They investigated extreme levels of confidence, 
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persistence, atypical shifts in level of aspiration, and 
extreme risk taking as a function of locus of control. Subjects 
were given a questionnaire, and were also asked to respond to 
several questions involving an attempt to solve a puzzle. 
Results showed that externals, relative to internals, displayed 
more preference for extreme risks, low persistence, and atypical 
shifts in level of aspiration (quitting a task as soon as possible), 
and were more extreme in their estimation of success when 
responding to items related to cognitive, academic and 
occupational activities. DuCette and Wolk related such a 
preference for extreme outcomes to the readiness on the externals' 
part to receive unrealistic feedback about themsleves. More 
slgnificantly, DuCette and Wolk concluded that " •• 0 externals 
place themselves in situations where they have little 
information about how much control they can exert over their 
fate. In other words, externality not only implies a belief 
in the fact that one's behaviour is under external control, it 
implies that one prefers it this way and will work to attain 
such an end" (p.258). 
The motivational correlates of locus of control may 
manifest themselves in the particular tasks preferred by 
externals and internals (activity preference). Gold (1966) 
allowed internals and externals to choose either a skill 
condition (rolling a ball) or a chance condition (drawing), 
both being equally likely to yield a reward. No significant 
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differences between internals and externals were found. In 
another study, Gold (1967) asked the subjects (comprised of 
internals and externals) to write down whether or not they 
prefer to work in a situation that demanded skill or luck in 
order to earn rewards. The results were complicated by sex 
differences (internal males mainly prefering skill tasks). 
Schneider (1968; 1972) examined expressed preference for skill 
or chance activities as a function of locus of control and sex. 
Subjects were given a forced choice activity preference scale 
made up of pairs of skill and chance activities. The results 
were e~uivocal and sex differences affected the results 
(internal males showing greater choice of activities that 
demanded skill). It should be stated that such sex differences 
are common when choosing between skill versus luck oriented 
activities (Deaux, White, and Farris, 1975). However, Berzins, 
Ross, and Cohen (1970) failed to establish a significant 
relationship between locus of control and activity preference 
using male hospitalised drug addicts. 
Another argument in support of locus of control as a 
motivational variable is that both achievement motivation and 
locus of control theories predict similar behavioural parameters -
i.e. both of these theories overlap with each other - (Wolk and 
DuCette, 1973). These authors investigated the influence of 
locus of control on the predictability of achievement-motivation 
theory in relation to preference for intermediate risk, 
estimation of future success and class room performance. 
Results of two separate studies indicated a high and positive 
relationship between internality and achievement-motivation. 
The main thesis of Wolk and DuCette (1973) 1S that similar 
psychological orientations underlie locus of control and 
ac.hievement motivation and the relationship is influenced 
by the value of reinforcement. In other words, achievement 
motivation is directly related to internality since internals 
do not view reinforcement as random but systematically linked 
to their outcomes. 
It is interesting to note that certain theories of 
motivation (e.g. Weiner, Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest, and 
Rosenbaum, 1971) incorporate the concept of locus of control 
as synonymous with certain levels of motivation. However, 
Weiner et al view internality versus externality differently. 
They contend that the causes of success and failure allocated 
by an individual fall under four elements: ability, effort, 
task difficulty, and luck. These four elements are also 
discussed by Heider (1958). According to Weiner et al the 
four elements that affect the perception of success and failure 
(see above) fall within two causal dimensions: locus of control 
(internal v.ersus external) and stability (fixed versus variable). 
Internal causes may either be fixed (i.e. depending on the ability 
of the individual) or variable (i.e. depending on effort). 
External causes may also be fixed (i.e. difficulty of a given 
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task) or variable (i.e. luck). ~einer, Hekhausen, Meyer, 
and Cook (1972) investigated the above paradigm and indicated 
that the internal variable causes, such as effort, produce 
positive feelings and strengthen achievement motivation. In 
other words, if the causes of outcomes are viewed by a person 
to be contingent on his effort (which is not fixed), as opposed 
to his ability (which is fixed), then he would be more motivated 
to excel. Moreover, if failure was attributed by the 
individual to luck (an external variable factor) then he lS 
more likely to persist despite failure, than if he attributed 
failure to task difficulty (an external fixed variable). However, 
as Wolk and DuCette (1973) suggest, Rotter's internals are 
characterised by higher levels of achievement motivation because 
they perceive themselves as the causes of their behaviour. 
Internals,relative to externals, then would be expected to value 
intrinsic motivation. 
Research on motivation distinguishes between intrinsic 
versus extrinsic motivation (e.g. Atkinson, 1964; Calder and 
Staw, 1975a, 1975b; Deci, 1975; Hunt, 1965; Koch, 1965; 
Woodworth, 1918; Young, 1961). A person is said to be 
intrinsically motivated if he/she carries out an activity for 
its own sake, and extrinsically motivated if the activity lS 
performed as a means of achieving an end such as a reward. 
Since internals rely less on external reinforcement and 
consider outcomes as self-determined, while externals construe 
outside forces as controlling their events, then it is only 
logical that internals and externals should react differently 
to intrinsic versus extrinsic feedback. A number of studies 
have shown that internals outperformed externals under intrinsic 
feedback conditions (self-discovery of success), while externals 
were superior to internals when feedback was extrinsic (verbal 
praise) (Baron, Cowan, Ganz, and McDonald, 1974; Baron and 
Ganz, 1972; Kumchy and Rankin, 1975). Thus it seems that 
locus of motivation is different for internals and externals. 
DuCette and Wolk (1973) argued that both the 
motivational .as well as the cognitive components of locus of 
control should be considered when studying problem solving. 
After finding that the internals learned faster than externals 
under skill and chance defined conditions, DuCette and Wolk 
concluded "0 .• that the mediating power of locus of control 
resides in both its cognitive and motivational qualities, neither 
of which are sufficient but both of which are necessary." 
Thus n ••• differing expectancies for control will give rise to 
different decision about the exertion of control (motivation) 
as well as differing efficiency with which this control is 
exerted (cognition)" (p.425). 
Researchers concerned with the motivational properties 
of locus of control regarded the need to control as a drive to 
engage in activities which enhances such a need. Consequently, 
this produces a tendency to perform better which then 
reinforces the need to control. 
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Studies dealing with the cognitive components of locus 
of control, on the other hand, construe the ability to view 
outcomes as being under one's control as synonymous with efficient, 
sensitive and active cognitive systems. According to Lefcourt 
(1976) " ••• the more intelligent and achieving a person 1S, 
the more likely he will perceive himself to be an active, 
effective person" (p.66). 
3.4 Summary and Evaluation 
Studies dealing with personality situation locus of 
control congruence did not always produce results typical of 
the congruency model especially when considering the behaviour 
of internals and externals under 'chance' defined conditions. 
The nature of these chance conditions may not be always 
representative of pure chance. In other words, there was an 
artefact in the instructions defining chance conditions. 
Moreover, the literature reviewed so far suggests that 
internals, relative to externals, solve problems better because 
they: a) are more motivated, especially under challenging 
conditions, and b) process, organise, assimilate, and recall 
task relevant information more efficiently. 
Studies dealing with cognitive functioning as a function 
of locus of control are concerned with broad differences between 
internals and externals. In fact these c,ognitive differences 
are so broad that they only imply differences in "cognitive 
activity" • In other words, these studies were more concerned 
with a broadly "how" internals and externals differ in their 
cognitive functioning 0 What was needed was an investigation 
of specific cognitive responses as a function of locus of 
control to determine the extent to which these responses would 
generalise across different situations; i.e. to determine 
specific cognitive styles as a function of locus of control. 
CHAPTER 4 
FIRST STUDY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Research dealing with the interaction between personality 
and situation locus of control has been characterised by 
inconsistencies. The aim of the first study was to provide 
an explanation for some of these inconsistencies. 
The results of certain studies investigating personality 
and situation locus of control congruency clearly demonstrated 
that skill and chance conditions do influence internals and 
externals differently (Davis and Phares, 1967; Lefcourt et aI, 
1968; Rotter and Mulry, 1965; Srull and Karabenick, 1975). 
However, various studies indicate that internals and externals do 
not always display the kind of responses characteristic of the 
situational variable. The internals in the studies of Julian 
and Katz (1968) and DuCette and Wolk (1973) exhibited similar 
behavioural patterns in both the skill and chance conditions. In 
other studies internals and externals revealed more anxiety 
(Watson and Baumal, 1967), and solved more anagrams (Petzel and 
Gynther, 1970) in incongruent situations, and the two groups did 
not respond differently to low and high control situations (McDonald et aI, 
1968) 0 Understanding of the results of these studies is made 
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even more difficult by the fact that the tasks and dependent 
measures employed by these researchers were very varied. It 
is suggested that some of the apparent inconsistencies 1n the 
results can be resolved by a more careful study of the "chance" 
conditions used. 
DuCette and Wolk (1973) argued that the better 
performance of the internals, as compared to the externals, 1n 
both skill and chance conditions was due to their more efficient 
cognitive functioning and higher motivational levels. However, 
it is questionable whether the internals in that study were 
responding to a genuine chance condition. An element of skill 
may have been present in DuCette and Wolk's (1973) chance 
instructions where it was stated to the subjects that although 
the chance task was controlled by luck, " ••• some subjects 
could perhaps perform better than chance if they had extra 
sensory abilities (emphasis added)" p.422). The superiority 
of internals over externals 1n the 'chance' condition may have 
been due to such an element. This, according to Rotter's social 
learningtheory,would induce certain levels of motivation for 
internals and render their search for cues more active. In 
fact, DuCette and Wolk maintained that the internals under 
chance might have used cues emitted unwittingly by the 
experimenter who knew what stimulus was on the card. In this 
context it is interesting to note that in the James and Rotter 
(1958) study the subjects under the skill condition were g1ven 
instructions that performance on an ESP task was controlled 
by ESP skill. 
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If the contention is correct that DuCette and Wolk's 
(1973) specific chance instructions created a challenge to the 
internals, then the contention that a quas1 chance situation 
(i.e. a situation approximating chance) was created is also 
correct. Considering the Julian and Katz's (1968) results one 
may argue that the presence of others created a challenge for 
the internals and probably motivated them to rely on themselves 
in both the skill and chance conditions. Thus it should be 
noted that an induced chance situation is a function of both 
the nature of the task and the specific instructions used in 
the task. 
Watson and Baumal (1967) used a learning task (paired-
associate nonsense syllables) which was, obviously, a skill 
determined task. It can be argued that presenting such a task 
in 'control' versus 'no control' situations would not prevent 
a subject's performance from being self-determined. The 
difficulty with the Watson and Baumal's results lies in the degree 
of manifest anxiety. Since the salient features of the task 
implies self determination of outcomes, then being stripped of 
control over whether one experiences an electric shock or not 
would certainly frustrate a person who believes in self control. 
Lefcourt et al (1968) emplqyed a motor task in their 
study so it is not surprising that some of the subjects in that 
study construed the chance condition as being skill determinedQ 
Similarly, the absence of any differences between internals 
and externals In the McDonald et al (1968) study could be due 
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to the nature of the task utilised (i.e. a motor task). Therefore, 
although the manipulation of low versus high control was successful 
(in terms of subjects' estimation of control), the subjects' own 
perceptions of the task (in terms of situation locus of control) 
may have been different. In fact, McDonald et al argued that 
their subjects could have viewed the task under both conditions 
as being internally controlled. Thus the method by which an 
experimental variable is manipulated is of crucial importance 
in determining the way subjects perceive the situation and the 
way they respond to it. 
A 'true' chance condition might not have been created 
In the aforementioned studies, for certain subjects (especially 
the internalS) may have questioned the chance instructions and 
perceived the outcomes as being determined by their ability 
(i.e. skill). It is argued that chance was not intrinsic to 
the task (i.e. subjects were told that because of high task 
difficulty, the likelihoQd of their being correct on any trial 
was, based on past experience with subjects, only 50%). 
The present study attempted to differentiate between 
two chance conditions. The first was a chance condition where 
the elements of chance were defined to the subjects (by instructions) 
as being represented in the task's difficulty. This condition 
lS labelled chance 1 condition, (or quasi chance) and is the kind 
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of chance condition typically used by researchers. In the second 
chance condition the elements of chance were intrinsic in the 
task (similar to a gambling game). This condition is labelled 
chance 2 (or pure chance). In addition there was also a skill 
condition (i.e. subjects were told that the task depended entirely 
on their skill). Thus the present study should indicate whether: a) 
there are any differences in the behaviour of internals and 
externals under the two chance conditions;b)the behaviour of 
internals and externals under a skill condition differs from 
their behaviour under either of the chance conditions;c)subjects 
used in the previous research were responding to a quasi chance 
situation or not. 
A problem solving (concept formation) task was employed 
as a means of investigating the cognitive ~lllctioning of internals 
and externals under these three conditions and motivation was 
manipulated by the task instructions. If internals are more 
motivated under skill and externals under pure chance, then their 
performance on the task should be affected by the task instructions. 
Performance under chance 1 for both groups could resemble their 
performance under the skill condition, or some subjects in each group 
could perceive their performance as being skill determined while 
others percelve it as being chance determined. The task used 
had to permit: a) the induction of skill, chance 1, and chance 
2 conditions Slnce the same task would be employed ln three 
conditions; b) subjects to tackle the concept formation task 
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1n quite different ways in order to investigate the subjects' 
cognitive activity;c)the possibility of subjects arriving at a 
correct answer in order to provide a baseline for subjects' 
performance and to render the task more interesting. 
The task was based on trial-and-error learning 1n which 
the subjects were attempting to find a common principle (or 
1) . f . concept relat1ng one 0 two words to a set of f1ve words over 
50 trials. The idea was that through trial-and-error subjects 
would be developing, testing, and rejecting different solution 
hypotheses in an attempt to identify the correct principle. The 
focus of the research was on how subjects developed and used 
solution hypotheses, rather than on the solution hypotheses per se, 
and examining how the approaches of subjects varied under the 
three conditions. 
Internals and externals were assigned to three 
groups: skill, chance 1, and chance 2. Any differences 
manifested in performance and subjectd reactions to these three cond-
itions would then beexplained 1n terms of motivational and cognitive 
correlates of locus of control. The depepdent variables were 
chosen so as to reflect both of these behavioural qualities 0 
1 In this thesis principle and concept are used interchangeably. 
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4.2 PREDICTIONS 
In accordance with Rotter's social learning theory in 
general and the value of reinforcement in particular, it was 
expected that internals and externals would react differently 
to skill versus pure chance conditions. It was also expected 
that chance 1 would not be perceived as pure chance and hence 
would not elicit the type of behaviour typical of that in pure 
chance conditions. Moreover, under the skill condition the 
performance of internals was expected to be better than that of 
the externals (Lefcourt, 1976); whereas under pure chance it 
was expected that these differences would be minimised. 
Several pilot studies were conducted to identity a 
suitable task for use in the main study. The task eventUally 
selected proved difficult for subjects so no predictions were 
made regarding differences between internals and externals either 
ln their ability to identity the principle or regarding the number 
of correct trials for each group. 
The dependent variables used can be grouped under two 
maln headings, the first called "task performance", and the 
second "perception of, and reactions to, the experiment". The 
former deals with the number and use of solution hypotheses, and 
the latter reflects motivational responses such as interest in 
and liking of the task, effort exertion etc. Subjects were 
also asked to indicate whether they perceived the task as being 
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skill or chance determined as a check on the experimental 
manipulation of the skill, chance 1, and chance 2 conditions. 
Specific Predictions 
Specific predictions regarding the performance of 
internals and externals were only made for certain dependent 
measures. These predictions are listed below. 
Skill Condition 
a. Task Performance 
Since previous studies (e.g. Davis and Phares, 1961; 
Phares, 1968; Lefcourt and Wine, 1969; Lefcourt et al, 1973; 
Wolk and DuCette, 1974) have demonstrated the flexibility and 
thoroughness of the internals' cognitive functioning, it is 
hypothesised that they will employ a greater number of solution 
hypotheses than externals, in trying to identity the principle 
in the concept formation task. Internals, relative to externals, 
will also be more accurate in their estimation of the number of 
trials on which they gave a correct answer (DuCette and Wolk, 1913; 
Steger et al, 1913). 
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b. Reactions to the Experiment 
Internals will find the task more interesting, and like 
it, more than externals (DuCette and Wolk, 1973). Although 
'interest' and 'liking' may sound the same, they were included 
as separate indices to find out if they yielded different 
reactions. It should be remembered that DuCette and Wolk (1973) 
used a 'liking' index and not interest. 
Internals will report spending more effort, when trying 
to decipher the principle, than externals (Srull and Karabenic, 1975). 
Chance 1 Condition 
a. Task Performance 
Since it is expected that chance 1 may contain an element 
of skill in it, internals, as compared to externals are 
expected to utilise more solution hypotheses. However, both 
groups will manifest lower frequencies in the number of solution 
hypotheses relative to those under skill. 
b. Reactions to the Experiment 
It is difficult to make predictions regarding subjects 
reactions to chance 1 as it is neither a pure skill nor a pure 
chance condition. Still it is expected that internals interest 
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and liking will be less than that exhibited in the skill condition. 
Internals may exert more effort than externals due to the challenge 
imposed by the skill effect. 
Chance 2 Condition 
a. Task Performance 
Chance 2 condition is a genUlne chance condition, it 
1S hypothesised that both the internals and externals will 
utilise fewer solution hypotheses as compared to internals and 
externals under skill. Externals may produce a higher number 
, 
of correct trials and/or more accurate estimates of these trials 
than internals (Bronzaft, 1912). 
b. Reactions to the Experiment 
The externals will be more interested in, and like, 
the task than internals (DuCette and Wolk, 1913). Both groups 
will report exerting less effort. However, externals may 
expend more effort than internals (Srull and KarabeniCk, 1915). 
In addition to the above dependent variables, other 
ones were introduced to investigate whether or not any significant 
differences might emerge in the attribution of responsibility 
for task performance (to internal versus external causes of 
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behaviour) as a function of both personality and situation locus 
of control. 
Recently, the interest in establishing a relationship 
between locus of control and attribution theory (Jones and Davis, 
1966; Jones, Kanouse, Kelley, Nisbett, Valins, and Weiner, 1972; 
Kelley, 1967, 1971) has been considerable (e.g. Gilmore and 
Minton, 1974; Hochreich, 1974, 1975; House, 1976; Joe, 1974; 
Krovetz, 1974; Lefcourt, Hogg, Struthers and Holmes,1975; Phares 
and Lamiell, 1974, 1975; Phares, Wilson, and Klyver, 1971; Shaw, 
Floyed, and Gwin, 1971; Sobel, 1974; Sosis, 1974). Generally 
speaking these studies have demonstrated the fact that internals 
attribute responsibility to themselves (ability or effort) 
concerning their performance whereas externals blame external 
forces (noise or task difficulty). 
It should be emphasised, however, that this issue 
was of secondary interest in this study. The attribution of 
responsibility variables used were task difficulty, competence, 
comfort, and distraction. 
for these variables. 
No specific predictions are made 
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4.3 METHOD 
a. General Synopsis 
The study was carried out in one phase. All the 
subjects worked individually on the task under one of the three 
conditions: skill, chance 1 or chance 2 conditions. After 
completing the task, the subjects answered the I-E scale and the 
post task questionnaire in order to assess their reactions to the 
experiment. A debriefing session concluded the experiment. 
b. Assessment of Internality and Externality 
, 
The overall mean (N = 72) of the I-E scale was 11.42. 
The potential range of scores is from 0 to 23 as 6 items in the 
scale are filler items. Those who scores 11 and below were 
classified as 'internals', while those score 12 and above were 
classified as 'externals'. This allocation of I-E scores 1S 1n 
line with previous studies. 
c. Experimental Design 
It was intended to have an equal number of subjects in 
each cell but this was not possible due to lack of availability 
of subj ects. There were 72 subjects distributed 1n each of 
the experimental conditions as follows: skill with 12 
internals (6 males and 6 females), and 12 externals (6 males 
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and 6 females); chance 1 with 12 internals (7 males and 5 
females), and 12 externals (5 males and 7 females); and 
chance 2 with 12 internals (5 males and 7 females), and 12 
externals (7 males and 5 females)o A 2x2x3 factorial design 
locus of control X sex X conditions with unequal number in cells 
(least squares analysis) was employed to analyse the data. Sex 
was included in the analyses not because of any specific 
predictions, butin.case any differences might emerge. The 
experimental design is presented in Table 4.1 
Table 401 
Experimental Design of the First Study 
SUBJECTS 
Internals 
Externals 
M = Males 
F = Females 
SKILL 
6M & 6F(13)* 
6M & 6F(13) 
CONDITIONS 
CHANCE 1 
7M & 5F (14) 
5M & 7F (15) 
CHANCE 2 
5M & 7F 
7F & 5M(13) 
( )* = The number of subjects originally assigned to this cell. 
Some subjects were omitted where unsatisfactory data were 
obtained, or by random rejection. 
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d. Selection of Subjects 
The subjects were Open University students who were 
enrolled In the Open University summer programme (1976 class) 
at Stirling University. The subjects volunteered to participate 
and were solicited via a noticeboard. Their age ranged between 
20 and 46 years. Every effort was made to ensure that subjects 
were taking the experiment seriously and that their participation 
. 
was genulne. Originally 83 subjects were tested • However 11 
subjects were rejected for the following reasons: 1- One 
subject (a female under skill condition) refused to answer the 
~uestionnaire and I-E scale after completing the tasko 2-
Two. subjects were old (a 70 year old male and a 65 year old 
female under skill condition) and were unable to concentrate 
while working on the task. Both subjects did not answer the 
post task ~uestionnaire and I-E scale. 3~ Six subjects did 
not take the experiment seriously (i.e. they were making jokes 
and not concentrating on the task). The subjects were an 
internal female and an external male (skill), three external 
females and an external male (chance 1). Four of these six 
subjects (two internals and two external females) did not 
answer all the items of the post task ~uestionnaire. 4- Two 
subjects (an internal female under chance 1, and external 
female under chance 2) were randomly eliminated to provide for 
e~ual number of internals and externals in each of the three 
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experimental conditions. 
e. Instruments 
~ Rotter's I-E Scale: as indicated in the introduction 
the present research utilized the I-E scale developed by Rotter 
and his colleagues (Rotter, 1966). Other measures of locus of 
control have been developed (cf. Bialer's Locus of Control 
Questionnaire (Bialer, 1961); the Crandall Intellectual 
Achievement Responsibility Questionnaire (Crandall, Katkovsky, 
and Crandall, 1965); the James Internal-External Locus of Control 
Scale (James, 1957); the Nowicki-Strickland Scale (Nowicki and 
Strickland, 1973). ' These scales have limited utility (all the 
aforementioned scales, except James's scale are devised for 
children), or do not have the same degree of reliability 
or standardization as Rotter's original I-E scale. The three 
studies reported in this thesis employed Rotter's original I-E 
scale. 
~~ The Task: Phares (1957) employed a colour matching 
task with subtle gradation to make the task di~ficulto Rotter 
and Mulry (1965) presented their subjects with an angle matching 
task where, again, the differences between the angles were 
minute and difficult to judge. This tendency to utilize 
difficult matching tasks was deemed necessary as the task had to 
appear credible under skill as well as chance instructions. 
The same strategy was followed when constructing the present 
task, only this time words were used instead of colours or 
angles 0 Words were employed because they allow more room 
for the formation of solution hypotheses. 
f. Pilot Studies 
Numerous pilot studies were carried out to arr~ve at 
a task that was uncommon yet would motivate the subjects to 
decipher it. The task consisted of five words on a stimulus 
card (14 by 6 cms) and two response cards (6 by 6 cms) with one 
word on each (see diagram below) a All the words were printed 
with black letraset size 207. The three cards were mounted 
on a wooden rod approximately 40 by 2 cms using blu-tack as 
adhesive. The distance between the stimulus card and the 
nearest response card was approximately 6~ cms and the two 
response cards were very close to each other with a little 
gap in between: 
Stimu Ius card Res po nse cards 
f' 
I Pencil bed postage glass book leg tree J 
Thus the subject would be presented with three cards 
simultaneously. 
The main purpose of the pilot studies was to find a 
principle that would relate one word on a response card to a 
word on the stimulus card. Many different principles were 
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tried to arrive at the following characteristics: a) difficulty 
in finding the principle; b) the generation of different 
solution hypotheses; and c) a principle which could be 
presented with either skill or chance instructions. There 
were 79 pilot subjects (undergraduates as well as librarians 
and postgraduates). The subjects were tested individually 
and their responses, comments, solution hypotheses and number 
of co~rect words were noted down. Pilot subjects were also 
given a 9 point rating scale at the end of the testingo The 
scale measured the subject's perception of the task and ranged 
from "purely a matter of chance" to "purely a matter of skill" 
(no measurement of locus of control was taken). After many 
tests a principle was obtained that: a - was very difficult 
to det ermine (only 3 subjects, females, were able to find the 
principle); b - was liked by the subjects (based on subjects' 
remarks and comments) ; andc - was not perceived as totally 
skill or chance determined (the mean of rating scale was 5.01). 
g. Main Features of the Task used 1n the Experiment 
Proper 
The format of presentation was exactly the same 
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as that described in,the above section (see diagram on page 85). 
The principle which related one of the words on a response card 
to a word on the stimulus card was that the particular response 
word contained the same number of letters as the second word on 
the stimulus card. The complete list of cards (in the order 
presented to the subjects) is presented in Appendix 1 and another 
example is given below: 
Stimulus Card Response Cards 
picture spring wall model man person 
The correct response word 1S person Slnce it contains the same 
number of letters (6) as the second word (spring) on the stimulus 
card. 
There were 350 words in all (250 stimulus words and 100 
response words). The length of all the words ranged from 3 to 
8 letters inclusive. The 5 words on each stimulus card were 
always composed of different number of letters. In all the 350 
words, a word never appeared twice. The distributions of the 
number of letters of the corrects words over the 50 trials were 
such that the gap (in terms of number of letters) between the 
correct and wrong response words was not always increased so 
as not to render the principle more salient. For 
example, when the correct response word contained three words 
(e.g. map), the other response word (i.e. the wrong word) did 
not always contain number of letters much larger than 3 (e.g. 
mountain). Thus many of the other response words were four 
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or five letter words. There were 9 trials when the correct 
word contained 3 letters, 9 trials when it contained 4 letters, 
9 trials when it contained 5 letters, 9 trials when it contained 
6 letters, 7 trials when it contained 7 letters and 7 trials 
when it contained 8 letters. The distribution of the number 
of letters of the wrong words is presented in Appendix 1. 
The same task was used in skill, chance 1 and chance 2 
conditions. The nature of the task was such that it could 
easily be presented under each of the three conditions. Thus 
the arrangements of the words on the cards were purely arbitrary. 
For example, under skill and chance 1 (where subjects were 
informed that there was a principle) the words on the stimulus 
card and a response word might seem to the subjects as open to 
associations such as similar meaning etc., or under chance 2 
(where no mention of a principle was made) these words might 
look to the subjects as if they were not associated by any 
apparent rule. 
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h. Post Task Questionnaire 
The post task questionnaire (see Appendix 1) was 
constructed specifically for the present study. It consisted 
of two main parts, the first part contained questions regarding 
number, type and order of solution hypotheses used by-the 
subjects while working on the task, over the 50 trials (a 
detailed description of this part ~s g~ven in the results 
section) • The second part dealt with the perception of, and 
reactions to, the experiment which were measured by a number 
of 9-point rating scales2 designed to assess the subjects' 
motivation and involvement in the task. Five related questions 
were asked "How much did you like the task?", ''When trying to 
discover the underlying principle, how hard did you !El.?", "How 
interested were you in the task?", ''How much do you think this 
was a task which depended on skill or chance?", and ''How much 
do you think each of the factors listed influenced your perform-
ance?". The subjects also answered four additional questions 
2 All the scales employed in the three studies were 9-point 
scales. Each represented a Bi-polar dimension with a 
neutral mid-point (5); the extremes were labelled with the 
appropriate terms (e.g. not interested at all - very much 
interested; purely a matter of skill - purely a matter of 
chance). 
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concernlng whether they found the task to be too easy or ~ 
difficult; whether they were competent or incompetent to 
solve the problem; whether they felt comfortable or not 
comfortable during the testing session; and whether they were 
distracted or not distracted while working on the task. All 
these questions were answered using 9-point rating scales. 
One of the questions (How much do you think this was 
a task which depended on skill or chance?) was used as ·a check 
for the experimental manipulation of skill, chance I and chance 2 
conditions. 
The post task questionnaire also contained a 50-point 
line (standing for the 50 trials) where subjects had to circle 
the points (trials) on which they guessed the answer. If a 
subject did not resort to guessing at all, hekhewas required 
to tick a box. Subjects also indicated, by ticking a box,whether or 
not they thought they had found the principle. In addition, the 
subjects were asked to write down the number of trials on which 
they named the correct word. The scores were out of 50 (total 
number of trials). This was a measure of the subjects' 
estimation of their correct trials. At the end of the 
questionnaire, the subjects were given the option of writing down 
their own comments regarding their performance and/or any other 
aspects of the task. 
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l. Procedure 
The subjects were tested individually. Upon the 
subject's arrival he/she was seated facing the experimenter with 
a table separating them. The subject was randomly assigned 
to skill, chance 1 or chance 2 conditions. 
Skill and Chance 1 Conditions: 
The subjects were given the following instructions: 
INSTRUCTIONS 
This is a learning task. You will be presented with 
three cards simultaneously. One card - the stimulus card -
contains 2 words and the other two cards - the response cards -
contain I word on each. There is an underlying principle which 
relates one of the two words on the response card to the stimulus 
card. Your task is to name the word on ONE of the response cards 
which you think goes with the stimulus card. There are 50 trials 
and you will have up to 30 seconds to work on each trial, (each 
trial consists of a different set of cards). The same principle 
applies to all cards. If you think you have found the correct 
principle, keep working on that principle until the 50 trials are 
over. You will receive immediate feedback after every trial; 
(if you name the correct word I will respond "correct", and if 
you name the wrong word I will respond "wrong"). 
The skill group received the following additional 
instructions: 
Let me emphasise that this task depends on your skill at 
singling out the underlying principle. Although the principle 
is quite difficult to determine, we have found that some people 
are highly skilled in discovering it. The results depend entirely 
upon your ability. Do as well as you can and we will see if 
you have any skill at this task. 
I will further explain the nature or the task before 
commencing the experiment proper. 
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~e chance I subjects were glven these additional 
instructions: 
Let me emphasise that the underlying principle you 
are required to discover is very dirficult to determine, so 
much so that most people do no better than chance in finding 
the correct word for each trial. However some people do get 
high scores presumably because they are lucky and guess the 
correct word, unless they happen to discover the principle. 
Needless to say, chance plays a major role in discovering the 
correct word on each trial. 
I will further explain the nature of the task before 
commenclng the experiment proper. 
Chance 2 Condition: 
The instructions for the chance 2 group were as follows: 
INSTRUCTIONS 
You will be presented with three cards simultaneously. 
One card - the stimulus card - contains 2 words and the other 
two cards - the response cards - contain 1 word on each. Your 
task is to name the word ·on ONE of the response cards which you 
think goes with the stimulus card.' There are 50 trials and 
you will have up to 30 seconds to work on each trial, (each 
trial consists of a difrerent set of cards). Let me emphasise 
that these three cards are related purely by chance. The 
"correct" word on the response card is simply the first of the 
two response words which we picked out of a large hat containing 
many possibilities. In other words, there is no relationship 
among the three cards except that the "correct" word on the 
response card (which goes with the stimulus card) was determined 
purely on a chance basis. Therefore, this is a test of your 
illck in finding the correct word on each triaJ. 
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You may, ~uite naturally, wonder why we ere showing 
you the stimulus card. This was deemed necessary for purposes 
of comparability. Another group of subjects in this study is 
told that there is a logical underlying principle which relates 
one of the response cards with the stimulus card; and that 
group is re~uired to discover this principle. However, as we 
have indicated, the actual relationship between the cards was 
determined purely by chance. Thus, for purposes of comparability, 
we are interested to see how many of the 50 words you can find 
now that you realise the true nature of the task. Let us see 
if you are lucky at this task. 
I will fUrther explain the nature of the task before 
commenc~ng the experiment proper. 
After this, the subject was shown a sample of the 
cards' arrangement (i.e. 3 cards mounted on a wooden rod). The 
subject was then asked if he/she undertstood the instructions. 
The experiment proper did not commence until the subject indicated 
• that he/she completely understood what was expected·. In the 
chance 2 condition, the subjects were slightly perplexed after 
reading the instructions. However, their perplexity diminished 
following further explanations by the experimenter. It was 
hoped that while working on the task, the chance 2 instructions 
would make more sense to the subjectso 
The subject was timed using an ordinary stop watch, 
~n order to check that he/she would not exceed the 30 seconds 
limit. The subject was assured that the timing was for that 
purpose and not to determine his/her speed. No measurement 
of the subject's reaction time was taken. 
The experimenter held the wooden rod ~n front of the 
• 
94 
subject by placing his fingers between the stimulus card and 
the nearest response card, and started the stop watch with the 
other hand. If the subject gave a response before the 30 
seconds elapsed, the stop watch was stopped; if he/she exceeded 
the time limit, the experimenter stopped the stop watch and 
urged the subject to g~ve a response. After naming a response 
word the subject was allowed a few seconds (about 5) to scan the 
three cards before presenting the next trial3• The same 
procedure was followed throughout the 50 trials. The subjects' 
number of correct responses was recorded. 
When the 50 trials were over the subject was escorted 
to another table and was given the post-task questionnaire to 
answer • After completing the post-task questionnaire, the 
subject was handed the I-E scale. While the subject was 
answering the scale the experimenter was checking the appropriate-
ness of the subject's answers to the post-task questionnaire 
(i.e. not leaving out items, no vague wordings etc.) 
After completing the I-E scale, and if the post-task 
questionnaire was answered adequately, the subject was thanked, 
debriefed, and his questions were answered (if any). The 
subject was asked not to discuss the experiment with his colleagues. 
3 This five seeonds interval would allow the subject to check 
the reason(s) for his solution hypothesis being correct or 
wrong. 
95 
4.4 RESULTS 
The main purpose of the first study was to find out 
if the subjects would display different behavioural patterns 
under chance 2 conditions as compared to skill and chance 1 
conditions, and whether any differences exist between internals 
and externals across these conditions. 
It was essential to determine whether or not the 
experimental manipulations regarding skill, chance 1 and 
chance 2 conditions were successful before drawing any valid 
conclusions from the resultso Treatment check results will 
therefore be presented first followed by distribution of I-E 
scores across the three conditions. Reports on task 
performance come next. 
the presentation. 
Reactions to the experiment conclude 
For the predicted differences, a priori t tests 
based on orthogonal comparisons (Edwards, 1972) were employed to 
test mean differences whenever significant interactions were 
found, even if the direction ran contrary to the prediction. 
If a significant interaction occurred and was not 'predicted, 
then Tukey's HSD test (q) for a posteriori pairwise comparisons 
(Kirk, 1968) was used. Chi-square tests were employed where 
applicable. The experimental design is presented in Table 4.1 
(p. 82 ). 
a. Treatment Checks 
One of the rating scales in the post task questionnaire 
was a measurement of the subjects' own perception of task 
control. 
Table 4.2 
Mean Ratings of Skill, Chance 1 and Chance 2 as a function of 
Locus of Control 
CONDITIONS 
SKILL CHANCE 1 CHANCE 2 COMBINED 
Internals 7.67 5.27 2.07 5000 , 
Externals 8.00 4.53 2.11 4.88 
Combined 7.84 4.90 2.09 4.94 
Low score indicates chance control, high score skill control, 
9-point rating scale used. 
The subjects' ratings of the question "How much do you think this 
was a task which depended on skill or chance?" were analysed in 
a 2x2x3 factorial design. Unless otherwise stated, this design 
was used for all subsequent analyses. The breakdown of sums of 
squares of treatment check scores, presented in Table 4.2, 
indicates that the experimental manipulations were very effective. 
As Table 4.2 shows subjects perceived the task in accordance with 
the instructions given. 
There were no significant differences due to locus 
of control or sex. 
Table 4.3 
Summary of analysis of variance of the subjects' rating of 
task control for skill, chance I and chance 2 as a function 
of locus of control and sex. 
VARIATION SS DF MS F 
A (locus of control) 0125 1 .125 . .085 
B (sex) .681 1 .681 .460 
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P 
C (conditions) 3910083 2 195.542 132.194 <.001 
AB .208 1 .208 .141 
AC 3.592 2 1.796 1.214 
BC 2.041 2 1.020 .690 
ABC 2.393 2 1.197 .809 
Within cells 88.752 60 1.479 
b. I-E Scores 
Table 4.4 shows the means and standard deviations of 
I-E scores across skill, chance 1 and chance 2 conditions. 
The overall mean is 11.42. The distribution of internals and 
externals is presented in the methocE section. The internals' 
scores ranged from 3 to 11 inclusive; those of externals from 
Table 404 
Means and standard deviations (S.D.) of the I-E scores across 
the three conditions 
CONDITIONS 
SKILL CHANCE 1 CHANCE 2 COMBINED 
- - -X S.D. X S.D. X S.D. X S.D. 
IM 7067 2073 9029 1.38 7.20 2.83 8.05 2.32 
IF 8.67 1051 7040 2.61 7.71 1.89 7092 2.00 
EM 14.17 1.94 15020 1.64 15.14 2.27 14.80 1.95 
EF 14.83 2.86 14.14 1 086 15.60 2.19 14.86 2.30 
I 8.17 2.12 8.35 2.00 7.46 2.36 7.99 2.16 
E 14.50 2.40 14 067 1.75 15.37 2.23 14.85 2013 
Com- 11034 3.92 11.51 3.65 11.42 4.52 11.42 4.00 
bined 
IM = Internal Males 
IF = " Females 
EM = External Males 
EF " Females 
I = Internals 
E = Externals 
12 to 20 inclusive. 
A. Task Performance 
1. Decipherment of the Principle 
Only seven subjects (an internal female and two 
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externals ,one male and one female, under skil~; two internals 
(one male and one female) and two external females under chance 1 
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were able to find the correct principle. These results 
correspond with those of the pilot studies. The principle was 
not an obvious one to the subjects which may have rendered-it insens-
itive to differences as a function of locus of control. Thus 
as far as solution per ~, both internals and externals were 
unable to find the correct principle. 
2. Number of Correct Words 
The number of correct words was recorded for each 
subject (the scores are out of 50 words, or trials) •. Analysis 
ov var1ance of number of correct words did not result in any 
significant differences. The means (Table 4.5) are close to 
each other and are almost on a 50% basis (a similar finding was 
obtained in the pilot study). The highest number of correct 
words was by internals under chance 1, and the lowest was by 
externals 1n chance 2. 
Table 4.5 
Mean scores for the number of correct words identified as a 
function of16cus ofc6ntrol and conditions 
CONDITIONS 
100 
SKILL CHANCE 1 CHANCE 2 COMBINED 
Internals 24.92 25.73 24.07 24.91 
Externals 25.08 24.84 22.11 24.01 
Combined 25.00 25029 23.09 24.46 
The scores are out of fifty. 
3. Number of Estimated Correct Words 
Subjects were required to g~ve an estimate of the 
number of correct words which they thought they had named during 
the 50 trials. The scores are again out of 50. An analysis of var-
iance of the,- number of estimated correct words produced no 
significant differences. Thus, contrary to the expectation put 
forward in the introduction to the first study, internals and 
externals did not differ significantly in their estimation of 
correct words they had identified. The means are reported 
in Table 4.6. Compared with the means of the number of correct, 
those of the estimated number of correct words are generally 
lower (cf. Table 4.5). The externals under skill exhibited 
the highest estimate; the lowest estimate was by externals 
under chance 2. 
, 
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Table 4.6 
Mean scores for the estimated number of correct 
words as a function of locus of control and conditions 
SKILL 
CONDITIONS 
CHANCE 1 CHANCE 2 COMBINED 
Internals 22.17 
Externals 26.42 
Combined 24.30 
The scores are out of fifty. 
23086 
23.47 
23.67 
23.67 
20.87 
22.28 
23.24 
23.59 
23.42 
4. Solution HyPotheses used to decipher the Principle 
In order to clarifY any ambiguity that might ar1se, the 
term "solution hypothesis" will be operationally defined. 
Since the principle is one which relates a response word to a 
word on the stimulus card, a solution hypothesis to find such 
a principle is defined as any cognitive attempt at relating 
one of the response words to the word(s) on the stimulus card. 
Thus any attempt to relate the two words on the response card 
to each other or to choose a response word due to the subject's 
own preference will not be considered a solution hypothesis 
proper, and will be labelled as spur10us solution hyPothesis 
hereafter. 
As indicated 1n the method section there were two 
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parts of the post-task questionnaire that dealt with solution 
hypotheses. The first part simply asked the subjects to write 
down the total number of' solution hypotheses which they employed 
over the 50 trials. The second part was concerned with the 
manner by which subjects tested and reje'cted their solution 
hypotheses. Five solution hypotheses (based on results of 
pilot studies) were listed with a space in the left hand column 
of each solution hypotheses. The first solution hypothesis 
was concerned with a relationship between the word on the 
response card and the stimulus card in terms of similar meaning; 
the second in terms of opposite meaning; the third in terms 
of number of' letters; the fourth in terms of a common category 
(i.e. category clustering); and the f'ifth in terms of letter 
sequence (i.e. the word on the response card contained the same 
letter(s) as the one(s) prominent 1n the words on the stimulus 
card) 0 Subjects were instructed to examine the five solution 
hypotheses and add any solution hypotheses they used which were 
not included in the list. The subjects were also instructed 
to write down numbers in the spaces near each solution hypothesis 
denoting the order of utilisation. For example, number 3 
against a solution hypothesis indicated that that particular 
solution hypothesis was employed third. If a subject returned 
to a solution hypothesis after having used it, he was told to 
write down another number against it. Thus the numbers 1 - 4 -
6 indicated that a solution hypothesis was utilised first, fourth 
.. 
and sixth respectively. There was also a space against the 
statement "simply guessed the correct word", and subj ects were 
instructed to write down numbers against it (similar to the 
manner described above) in cases where they guessed. 
Following our definition of a solution hypothesis, 
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it was deemed necessary to establish those solution hypotheses 
that coincided with the definition of a solution hypothesis 
and those that did not. Two independent judges were consulted 
for this purpose. They were given the operational definition 
of a solution hypothesis, and.then were presented with a list 
of all the 'solution hypotheses' that were added by the sUbjects. 
The judges were asked to assign all the additional solution 
hypotheses to the categories "solution hypotheses" versus 
"spurious solution hypotheses" depending on whether or not they 
agreed with the definition of a solution hypothesis. It should 
be noted that some of the solution hypotheses that were added by 
the subjects were actually very similar to the five listed 
solution hypotheses, only the wording was different. These 
were included as part of the five listed solution hypotheses. 
Thus, the added solution hypotheses were different from the 
listed five. Nine new solution hypotheses and four spurious 
ones emerged. The new solution hypotheses were as follows: 
relating a response word to the stimulus card words in terms 
of: 1 - adjectives; 2 - vowels; 3 - consonants; 4 - rhythm; 
lJ4 
5 - rejection of the response word that agreed with the stimulus 
card words; 6 - spelling the words backwards; 7 - adding a 
letter to the words; 8 - forming a sentence; and 9 - forming 
new words from letters of stimulus and response words and testing 
to see if they were related. The spurious solution hypotheses 
dealt with: 1 - liking of the response word; 2 - left-right 
(L.R.) sequence of correct response words (i.e. if the correct 
response word was three times on the left hand side, then it 
is about time that it should be on the right; this spurious 
solution hypotheses was considered a 'gambler's fallacy'); 
3 - naming the response word if it reminded the subject of any 
experience; and 4 - concentrating on the experimenter's 
reactions before choosing a-response word. 
The agreement among the three subjects (i.e. the two 
independent judges plus the experimenter) was unanimous. 
i Number of 'quasi' Solution Hypotheses 
As stated earlier, the first part of the post-task 
questionnaire dealing with task performance asked the subjects 
to write down the number of all solution hypotheses they used 
over the 50 trials. This measure was rendered ambugious for 
two ma1n reasons: firstly, the number of all solution hypotheses 
did not coincide with the number of solution hypotheses actually 
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employed by the subjects (second part of the post-task 
questionnaire concerned with performance). Secondly, it was 
difficult to tell whether or not solution hypotheses or spur~ous 
solution hypotheses were included in this measure s~nce what a 
subject regarded as a solution hypothesis might not have conformed 
to the operational definition of a solution hypothesis. Hence 
these were labelled 'quasi' solution hypotheses to distinguish 
them from solution hypotheses based on the second part of post-
task questionnaire dealing with performance. Thus, the result 
pertaining to quas i solution hypotheses (summary ,.of, analysi s 
of variance and mean scores) are presented in Appendix 1 for 
reference only. 
~~ Number of Solution HyPotheses 
The number of different solution hypotheses included both 
the five listed solution hypotheses and those added by the subjects 
which conformed to the definition of a solution hypothesis. 
Table 4.7 
Mean scores for the number of different solution hyPotheses as a 
function of locus of control and conditions. 
SKILL CHANCE 1 CHANCE 2 COMBINED 
Internals 2.75 3.49 .90 2.38 
Externals 6.00 4.53 1.56 4.06 
Combined 4.42 4.01 1.23 3.22 
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The breakdown of sum of squares for the number of 
different solution hypotheses, presented 1n table 4.8, shows that 
internals and externals behaved differently and that the 
difference was also affected by the three conditions. The highly 
significant locus of control main effect indicates that, contrary to 
theprediction, externals employed more different solution hypotheses 
than did internals (see Table 4.7). The highly significant 
conditions main effect indicates that subjects under skill and 
chance 1 used more different solution hypotheses than subjects 
under chance 2 (Table 4.7). Thus subjects clearly reacted to 
the chance 2 instructions as a genuine chance condition but their 
responses to the skill and chance 1 instructions were not so 
distinct. 
Table 4.8 
Summary of analysis of variance of the number of solution 
hypotheses as a function of locus of control, sex, and conditions. 
VARIATION SS DF MS F P 
A (locus of control) 50.000 1 50.000 38.055 <.001 
B (Sex .889 1 .889 .667 
c (conditions) 141.,361 2 70.681 53.795 <.001 
AB .331 1 .331 .252 
AC 22.921' 2 11.461 8.723 <.001 
BC .678 2 .339 .258 
ABC 1.431 2 .716 .545 
Within cells (error) 78.833 60 1.314 
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The significant interaction was inspected using 
t tests. The t values indicatedthat externals, as compared 
to internals, utilised more solution hypotheses under skill 
(t = 6.373, df = 60, p<.0005) and under chance 1 (t = 2.311, 
df = 60, p<.03). Although externals employed more solution 
hypotheses than internals under chance 2, such a difference was 
not significant. 
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Figure 4.1 
Interaction between locus of control and number of different 
solution hypothe3es for the three experimental conditions 
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These unexpected, and highly significant findings 
demanded further investigations into the type and pattern of 
solution hypotheses utilised by internals and externals. 
111 Number of the First 10, 20, and. 30 Correct Trials 
Before taking any step further, it may be argued that 
these differences in the number of solution hypotheses used were 
simplY due to differences in reinforcement (correct trials). In 
other words, during the early stages of the trials, the number of 
correct words may have been greater for externals ,than internals 
and it could be argued that this difference was responsible for 
them employing more solution hypotheses. 
Table 4.9 
Mean number of correct responses for the first 10, 20, and 30 
Correct trials as a function of locus I of control and conditions 
SKILL CRANCE 1 CHANCE 2 
I E I E I E 
10 T 3.50 3.92 4.33 4.00 4.42 4.00 I= Internals 
20 T 8.50 10.00 9.92 9.33 9.67 8.83 E= Externals 
30 T 13.83 13.08 14.17 14.67 14.58 13.75 T= Trials 
In order to account for this variable A 3x2x3 (conditions 
X locus of control X trials - first 10, 20, and 30 correct trials) 
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split plot factorial design with repeated mesaures on the last 
factor was carried out. Table 4.10 presents summary of 
analysis of variance for first 10, 20, and 30 correct trials. 
Table 4.10 
Summary of analysis of variance of the first 10, 20 and 30 correct 
trials as a function of locus of control and conditions 
VARIATION SS DF MS F P 
Between EeoE1e 1402.500 71 
A (conditions) 13.361 2 6.681 0.3201 
C(locus of control) 1.185 1 ,1.185 0.0568 
AC 10.565 2 5.282 002531 
Sub.w.gps. 1377.389 66 20.870 
within people 
B (trials) 3596.028 2 1798.014 473.6232 <.001 
AB··,· 4.444 4 1.111 0.2927 
BC 1.398 2 0.699 0.1841 
f 
ABC 180352 4 4.588 1.2085 
Bxsubj • w. gps • , 501.111 132 3.796 
The only significant difference found was the trials maln effect 
indicating that as trials increase so did the number of correct 
trials (see Table 4.9). Therefore, internals and externals 
were not significantly different from each other in terms of 
initial correct trials. Hence both groups were not 
. 
differentially reinforced. 
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lV Number of Internals and Externals Employing the Five 
Listed Solution Hypotheses 
Table 4.11 shows the number of internals and externals 
~ho used the five listed solution hypotheses over the three 
conditions. As the table shows externals equalled or exceeded 
Table 4.11 
Number of Internals and Externals who used the five listed 
solution hypotheses across the three conditions. 
SKILL CHANCE 1 CHANCE 2 
I E I E I E 
S.M. 11 11 12 12 7 11 
O.M. 4 7 5 6 0 4 
N.L. 5 11 6 11 0 1 
C.C. 5 11 8 9 4 6 
L.S. 6 11 9 10 0 2 
S.M. = Similar meaning 
O.P. = Opposite meaning 
N.L. = Number of letters 
C.C. = Common category 
LoS. = Letter sequence 
I = Internals 
E = Externals 
internals on all the five solution hypotheses and across the 
three conditions. Investigating the differences between internals 
and externals using the Fisher Exact Probability Test (Siegel, 1956), 
2 tailed, indicated that: under skill more externals, related 
to internals, used "number of letters" and "common category" 
solution hypotheses (P<.05); more externals used the "letter 
III 
se<luence" solution hypothesis, but this difference only approached 
significance (P<.IO);under chance I more externals used the 
"number of letters" solution hypothesis than internals, however, 
the difference reached borderline significance (P<.lO). All 
the other differences were not significant. It is interesting 
to note that almost all the subjects have utilised the 'similar 
meaning' solution hypotheses. Thus it seems that people most 
commonly associate words with their meanlngs in this task. 
v Number of Internals and Externals who added 
Solution Hypotheses and Spurious Solution Hypotheses 
to the Listed 5 Solution Hypotheses 
As indicated earlier, 9 so~ution hypotheses and 4 spurlous 
solution hypotheses were added by the subjects to the listed 5 
solution hypotheses. One spurious solution hypothesis stood 
out more than the other spurious solution hypotheses, and that 
being L.R. (left-right se<luences of response words)Q Since such 
a spurlous solution hypothesis was more fre<luent than the others 
and was indicative of a gambler's fallacy type of behaviour, L.R. 
se<luences are presented as a special kind of spurious solution 
hypothesis. The number of internals and externals who added 
solution hypotheses and/or spurious solution hypotheses across 
the three conditions is presented in Table 4.12. 
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Table 4.12 
Number of internals and externals who added solution hypotheses 
and spurious solution hypotheses to the five listed solution 
hyPotheses across the three conditions. 
Solution Spurious Solution Hypotheses 
Hypotheses L.R. Only Remaining Spurious 
Hypctheses 
S Cl C2 S Cl C2 S Cl C2 
I 2 2 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 
E 6 6 0 1 .8 11 2 3 7 
I = Internals 
E = Externals 
S = Skill 
Cl = Chance 1 
C2 = Chance 2 
L.R. = Left-Right 
The number of externals who added solution hypotheses 
or spurious solution hypotheses exceeded that of the internals. 
No subject added a solution hypothesis in chance 2. Investigating 
the differences between internals and externals using the Fisher 
Exact Probability Test (2 tailed) indicates that: under skill 
the differences approached significance (P<.20) for added 
solution hypotheses; the differences for L.R. sequences and other 
SpurlOUS solution hypotheses were not significant • Under chance 1 
the differences were not quite significant (P<.20) for added 
solution hypotheses, and were not significant for the other 
spurlous hypotheses; however, the differences were significant 
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when considering L.R. sequences, P<.05, (i.e. more externals 
as compared to internals, employed L.R. sequences). Under chance 
2 the differences between internals and externals were not 
significant for added solution hypotheses, but were significant 
for added spurious solution hypotheses (excluding L.E.), P<.Ol, 
and for L.R. only (P<.005) favouring externals. Thus more 
externals, relative to internals, added spurious solution hypotheses 
and employed L.R. sequences. 
Collapsing skill and chance 1 conditions, the results 
were arranged into contingency tables and analysed using a ~ 
corrected for continuity (Siegel, 1956). More externals (N = 12) 
added solution hypotheses than internals (N = 4) (~ = 6, df = 1, 
P<.02, two-tailed). Thus the externals seem to be more variable 
in their employment of solution hypotheses (in terms of the sheer 
number of solution hypotheses). 
vi Utilisation of Old Solution Hypotheses 
As shown on page 102 the number of repeats (i.e. go~ng back 
to an already utilised solution hypotheses and then using it again) 
can easily be determined. The number of subjects using old 
solution hypotheses was investigated to account for any differences 
between internals and externals across the 3 conditions. 
Table 4.13 
Number of internals and externals returning to an already 
utilised solution hypotheses across the three conditions. 
CONDITIONS 
SKILL CHANCE 1 CHANCE 2 
Internals 3 4 1 
Externals 10 11 5 
As table 4.13 indicates, less internals, relative to 
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externals, were returning to already used solution hypotheses. 
Investigating these differences using the Fisher Exact 
, 
Probability Test (2 tailed) indicatedthat more externals went 
back to old solution hypotheses than internals in skill, chance 1 
and chance 2 (P<.02; P<.Ol; P<.05 respectively). 
Table 4.14 shows the mean scores for the number of 
repeats made by internals and externals across the three 
conditions. 
Table 4.14 
Mean scores for the number of repeats as a function of locus 
of control and the three conditions 
LOCUS SKILL CHANCE 1 CHANCE 2 COMBINED 
Internals .42 .50 .10 .34 
Externals 4000 3.00 .41 2.47 
Combined 2.28 1.75 .26 1.43 
Analysis of variance of repeat scores resulted in three 
highly significant differences: locus of control main effect 
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(F = 34.492; df 1/60, P<.OOl); conditions main effect (F = 10.982; 
df 1/60, P<.OOl); and locus of control X conditions interaction 
(F = 7.148; df 1/6, P<.OO~). All the other differences were not 
significant. Examination of the means (Table 4.14) indicated 
that externals used more repeats than internals, and that subjects 
under skill and chance 1 used more repeats than subjects under 
chance 2. However, most of the variability was caused by the 
externals. Inspection of the locus of control X conditions 
interaction using Tukey's q test for ~ posteriori pairwise 
compar1sons (Kirk, 1968) indicated that under skill and chance 1 
externals employed more repeats than internals (q = 8.136; df 2,60, 
P<.OOl; q = 5.682; df 2,60, P<.OOI respectively). 
Thus it seems that externals changed solution hypotheses 
more rapidly and were returning frequently to used solution 
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hypotheses, while internals lingered with their solution 
hypotheses and were less mobile in changing them. 
It must be admitted that these results are not totally 
conclusive for the subjects had to remember after completing the 
task in what order they used solution hypotheses. Thus the 
subjects' memory could have been at fault. Nonetheless, we 
consider such results important, as most of the differences between 
internals and externals were highly significant. The results, 
therefore, merited further consideration. 
vii Number of Trials on which Subjects Guessed 
.. 
• After finishing the task the subjects were required to 
circle the trial(s) on which they guessed on a 50 point line 
(corresponding to the total number of trials). The number of 
trials on which subjects guessed proved a problem for two main 
reasons: a) it was very difficult to discern on which trials 
pure guessing was used, since many subjects employed spurl0uS 
solution hypotheses which were similar to guessing; and b) 61 
subjects (33 externals and 29 internals) indicated in the 
comments they wrote at the end of the questionnaire that the 
"guessing" scale was confusing due to difficulty ln remembering 
specific trials on which they guessed. 
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Therefore, the 'guessing' index is rendered ambiguous, 
and summary of analysis of variance and mean scores for number 
of trials on which subjects guessed as a function of locus of 
c9ntrol, sex and conditions is presented in Appendix 1 for 
reference. purposes only. 
However, a measure of the subjects' guesses could be 
obtained. As indicated earlier, the subjects had the option 
of ticking "simply guessed the correct word" if they did not 
employ any solution hypothesis. Counting the number of internal 
and externals who ticked the aforementioned item indicated that 
under the skill and chance 1 conditions no subject endorsed the 
item; but under chance 2 condition 7 internals (3 males and 4 
females) endorsed the item as compared to only 2 externals (males). 
Testing this difference between internals and externals using the 
Fisher Exact Probability Test (Siegel, 1956), two tailed, revealed 
that such difference approached significance (P<.lO). Thus, it 
seems, to a rather limited extent, that more internals than 
externals simply guessed the correct word under chance 2 condition 0 
Summary of the Results of Task Performance 
The analyses of the results so far demonstrated that 
the experimental manipulations of skill, chance 1 and chance 2 
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were highly effective, and that skill and chance 1 produced 
similar responses from subjects as compared to responses produced 
by chance 2. Moreover, our predictions regarding the performance 
of internals and externals were not upheld 0 Whereas both groups 
did not differ in the solution of the problem per ~, they differed 
considerably in the manner they generated and utilised solution 
hypotheses. The externals, as compared to the internals, used 
and added more solution hypotheses; they employed more spurious 
solution hypotheses and adopted gambler's fallacy behaviour; 
they changed solution hypotheses and returned to old solution 
hypotheses more frequently. These results although unexpected, 
provide a valuable insight into the way internals and externals 
handle their solution hypotheses. They also enhance the 
effectiveness of the I-E scale in delineating molecular behaviour 
differences. 
B. Reactions to the Experiment 
The following indices were included to determine the 
subjects' involvement in the task, and their attribution of 
internal versus external causes. As indicated earlier all these 
indices were measured using a 9 point rating scale. 
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~ Liking of the Task 
To assess the degree of liking the subjects displayed 
to the task, subjects responded to the following question: "How 
much did you like the task?" 
Table 4.15 
Mean ratings of the subjects' liking of the task as a function- 'of 
their locus of control and the three conditionso 
CONDITIONS 
SKILL CHANCE 1 CHANCE 2 COMBINED 
Internals 5.08 6.96 4.70 5.58 
Externals 4.83 5.80 5.26 5.30 
Combined 4.96 6.38 4.98 5.44 
Low score denotes dislike, high score the reverse. 
The analysis of var~ance for liking scores resulted in a 
significant conditions main effect (F = 6.026; df 1/60, p<oo04) 
which was the only significant difference obtained. The locus of 
control X sex interaction approached significance. The mean 
scores (Table 4.15) show that subjects under chance 1 condition 
liked the task more than subjects under either skill or chance 2 
conditions. Thus contrary to our hypotheses, internals and 
externals did not differ significantly in their liking of the 
task. 
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Within personality compar~sons us~ng q tests revealed 
that internals under chance 1 liked the task more than internals 
under either skill or chance 2 (q = 4.087 - chance 1 versus skill, 
and q = 4.913 - chance 1 versus chance 2, df 2,60; P<.Ol for 
both comparisons). The externals did not differ significantly 
in their liking of the task over the three conditions. Internals, 
therefore, accounted for most of the variability by liking the 
task under chance 1 the most. 
~~ Interest 
Subjects rated the degree of their interest in the task 
by responding to the following question: "How· interested were 
you in the task?" 
Table 4.16 
Mean ratings of the subjects' interest in the task as a function 
of their locusef control and the three conditions. 
CONDITIONS 
SKILL CRANCE 1 CRANCE 2 COMBINED 
Internals 8017 7.77 5.27 70 07 
Externals 6.83 7.79 6.71 7011 
Combined 7050 7.78 5099 7009 
Low score indicates disinterest, high score the reverse 0 
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The analysis of var~ance for interest scores produced a 
highly significant conditions main effect (F = 6.354; at 1/60; 
P< 0003) and, more interestingly a significant locus of control X 
conditions interaction (F = 30566; at 1/60, P<.03). Sex main 
effect reached borderline significance (P<.09). Inspection of 
the mean scores (Table 4016) indicated that the skill and chance 1 
groups were more interested in the task than the chance 2 group. 
Investigation of the locus of control X conditions interaction 
using t tests showed that, as predicted, internals, relative to 
externals, were more interested in the task under skill 
(t = 1.861, df = 60, P<.05) while externals displayed more 
interest in the task under chance 2 than internals (t = 2.000, 
df = 60, P<.025). Under the chance 1 condition the two groups 
were almost identical. Thus a strong personality situation locus 
of control congruence was achieved. These trends are plotted 
~n Figure 4.2. 
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Within personality compar1sons uS1ng q tests indicated 
that the internals under skill and chance 1 were more interested 
1n the task than internals in chance 2 (q = 5.686 - skill versus 
chance 2; q = 4.902 - chance 1 versus chance 2; df 2,60; 
P<.Ol, for both comparisons). Chance 1 and skill internals did 
not differ significantly. The externals, on the other hand, displayed 
no significant differences 1n their interest in 
the task across skill, chance 1 and chance 2. Thus, aga1n, the 
internals accounted for most of the variability, while externals 
were static across conditions. It is interesting to note that 
internals reacted similarly to skill and chance 1 but their 
reaction to chance 2 was significantly different. 
It also seems that the interest index was more sensitive 
to personality differences than the liking index. 
111 -Effort Scores 
Subjects responded to the following question: "When 
trying to discover the underlying principle, how hard did you !!::L?" 
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Table 4.17 
Mean~elf-ratings of the subjects' effort while working on the task 
as a function of their locus of control and the three conditionso 
CONDITIONS 
SKILL CHANCE 1 CHANCE 2 COMBINED 
Internals 8.17 8.21 5.10 7016 
Externals 7.75 7.44 7.70 7.63 
Combined 7896 7083 6.40 7.40 
Low scores indicates low effort, high score the opposite. 
Again, the analysis of var1ance resulted ina significant 
conditions main effect (F = 60431; df 1/60, P<.003) and a locus 
of control X conditions interaction (F = 7.820; df 1/60, P<.OOl) 
only this time both diff~rences were highly significant. All the 
other differences were not significant. Mean scores (Table 4.17) 
indicated that the skill and chance 1 groups spent more effort 
while working on the task than chance 2 group. Investigation 
of locus of control X conditions interaction using t tests 
indicated that, as predicted, under chance 2 externals reported 
expending more effort than internals (t = 3.824; df = 60, 
P<.OOl). However contrary to the prediction, internals and 
externals did not differ significantly in their effort exertion 
under skill, although the internals' scores were highero 
Within personality comparisons using q tests showed that internals 
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under skill and chance 1 expended more effort than the 
equivalent group under chance 2 (q = 6.396 - skill versus 
chance 2; q = 6.479 - chance 1 versus chance 2; df 2.60; 
P<.Ol ~or both comparisons) 0 Externals, on the other hand, 
were stable across the three conditions. Therefore, internals 
accounted for most of the variability by reacting differently 
to chance 2 as compared to their reaction to either chance 1 or 
skill 0 Again, it is interesting to note that internals 
considered skill and chance 1 as though they were the same 
condition. 
~v Task Difficulty 
Task difficulty ratings ranged from "the task was too 
easy ~or me" to "the task was too difficult -for me". 
Table 4.18 
Mean ratings of the subjects' perception of task difficulty as 
a function of their locus of control and the three conditionso 
CONDITIONS 
SKILL CHANCE 1 CHANCE 2 COMBINED 
Internals 6083 5.61 5010 5.85 
Externals 6.42 6.06 5.54 6.01 
Combined 6.63 5.84 5.32 5.93 
Low score denotes less difficulty, high score the opposite. 
Analysis of var~ance for task difficulty scores 
resulted in significant conditions main effect (F = 3.920; 
df 1/60, P<o03) which was the only significant difference 
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obtained. Table 4~18 shows that subjects perceived the skill 
conditions to be more difficult than either chance 1 or chance 2 
conditions. In general subjects were uncertain as about how to 
evaluate the task's difficulty. 
evident under;chance 20 
This uncertainty was more 
Within personality compar~sons us~ng ~ tests indicated 
that skill internals rated the task as being more difficult 
than chance 2 internals (~ = 3.604; df 2~66; P<.05). All the 
other mean diff~rences were not significant. Once more the 
variability was mainly caused by the differential reactions of 
the internals to chance 2 as compared with their reactions to 
either skill or chance 1. 
v Competence Scores 
Competence ratings ranged from "I am not competent 
at such a task" to "I am highly competent at such a task". 
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Table 4.19 
Mean ratings of the subjects' perception of their competence 
to solve the task as a function of their locus of control and 
the three conditionso 
SKILL CHANCE 1 CHANCE 2 COMBINED 
Internals 4.17 4.91 4.73 4.60 
Externals 4.42 4.87 4.43 4.57 
Combined 4.30 4.89 4.58 4.59 
Low score indicated incompetence, high score the reverse. 
The analysis of varlance for competence scores did not 
produce any significant differences. The mean scores (Table 4.19) 
are generally low and approaching uncertainty. This may be 
either because the subjects thought that the task was beyond 
their competence, or that such an index was vague. 
Vl Comfort scores 
Comfort ratings were ranglng from "I wasn't feeling 
comfortable at all during the experiment" to "I was feeling 
very comfortable during the experiment". 
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TabJe 4.20 
Mean ratings of the subjects' comfort during the experiment as 
a fUnction of their locus of control and the three conditions. 
Internals 
Externals 
Combined 
SKILL CHANCE 1 
7.30 
6.94 
7.12 
CHANCE 2 
4.80 
6.74 
5.77 
COMBINED 
6014 
6.45 
6.30 
Low score indicates discomfort, high score the reverseo 
Analysis of variance for comfort scores 
produced two significant differences: a conditions ma~n effect 
(F = 3.061; df 1/60, P<005), anda locus of control X conditions 
interation (F = 3.178; df 1/60, P<.05). All the other 
differences were not significant. The mean scores (Table 4.20) 
reveal that chance 1 group felt more comfortable than chance 2 
group. Using q tests to determine whether or not the chance 1 
group felt more comfortable than the skill group did not result 
in a significant difference. Investigation of the locus of 
control X conditions interaction using q tests indicated one 
significant difference only: under chance 2, externals rated 
themselves as being more comfortable than internals (q = 3.404; 
df 2,60; P<.05) • 
• 
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Within personality comparisons uSlng q tests showed that 
chance 1 internals felt more comfortable than chance 2 internals 
(q = 4.386; df 2~60, P<.Ol). Differences between skill 
internals and chance 2 internals approached significance 
(q = 2.689; df 2.60; P<.lO). All the other differences were not 
significant. Internals accounted for most of the variability 
by reacting differently to chance 2 as compared to their 
reactions to skill and chance 1. Externals, on the other hand, 
did not react significantly differently across the three conditions. 
Vll Distraction Scores 
Distraction ratings ranged from "testing situation 
distracted me very much" to "I wasn't distracted at all by 
testing situation". 
Table 4021 
Mean ratings of the subjects' distraction during the experiment 
as a function of their locus of control and the three conditions. 
SKILL CHANCE 1 CHANCE 2 COMBINED 
Internals 7.83 7.79 5.04 6089 
Externals 7.08 8.10 7.36 7.51 
Combined 7046 7095 6.20 7.20 
Low score denotes ~ore distraction, high score the reverse. 
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Analysis of var~ance for distraction scores resulted 
in only two significant differences: a highly significant 
conditions main effect (F = 50668; df 1/60, p<.006), and a 
significant locus of control X conditions interaction (F = 4.385; 
df 1/60, P<.02). Inspection of the mean scores (Table 4.21) 
show that skill and chance 1 groups were less distracted than 
the chance 2 group. Investigating the significant interaction 
using q tests resulted in only one significant difference, 
namely that under chance 2 the internals felt more distracted 
than externals (q = 40549; df 2~60; P<.Ol). 
Within personality compar~sons across the three conditions 
indicated that internals under skill and chance 1 were le~s distra-
cted than internals in chance 2 (q = 5.471 - skill versus chance.2; 
q = 5.392 - chance 1 versus chance 2; P<.Ol for both comparisons); 
chance 1 and skill internals were not significantly different; 
and no significant differences were obtained within the external 
groups across the three conditions. 
Summary of the Reactions to the Experiment Results 
The results showed that the internals seemed to be more 
motivated in skill conditions, and externals in pure chance 
conditions (as far as the subjects' interest and effort exertion 
• 
were concerned). Thus the personality situation locus of 
control congruency was supported. 
Moreover, internals and externals did not differ in: 
their liking of the task; rating the task difficulty; and 
in rating their competence at finding the principle. Under 
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chance 2 the internals felt less comfortable and more distracted 
than externals. 
The most important finding was that the skill and 
chance 1 conditions elicited equivalent reactions, from subjects, 
which were different from those displayed in chance 2. These 
differences between chance 2 and either skill or chance 1 were 
solely accounted for by internals who seemed to be sensitive to 
the different conditions. Externals on the other hand, 
reacted as though the three conditions were not different. 
, 
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4.5 DISCUSSION 
The ma~n purpose of the first study was the investigation 
of personality and situation locus of control interaction using 
skill, chancel (quasi chance), and chance 2 (pure chance) 
conditions, and studying internals' and externals' cognitive 
functioning under, and their reactions to, these conditions. 
While certain predictions were upheld, others were not confirmed 
and some very interesting, and important, differences between 
internals and externals were obtained. A summary of the major 
findings ~s presented below. 
1. The experimental manipulations of skill, chance 1 
and chance 2 conditions were highly effective 
suggesting that the subjects perceived the task 
in accordance with the instructions g~ven. 
2. Skill and chance 1 elicited similar performances 
and reactions which were different from those 
produced under chance 2. Thus the two types 
of chance conditions were essentially different 
from each other. 
3. Externals, as compared to internals, employed and 
generated more solution hypotheses, changed them 
more frequently and returned more often to prev~ous 
solution hypotheses. Externals also used more 
'gambler's fallacy' sequences than internals. 
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4. Personality situation locus of control congruency 
was achieved for the interest, effort and distraction 
indices for the skill and chance 2 conditions. 
Reactions to t.he chance 1 condition were more 
variable. However, it was more liked by both 
groups relative to either the skill or chance 2 
condition. 
5. The internals reacted differently to the chance 2 
condition as compared to their reactions to either 
the skill or chance 1 conditions. The externals' 
reactions on the other hand, were stable across 
the three conditions. 
Results pertaining to the different nature of the two 
chance conditions are discussed first, followed by those 
involving the performance and reactions of internals and externals 
in the three experimental conditions. A discussion of the way 
internals and externals handled their solution hypotheses,to find 
the task principle,follows. 
a. The Nature of Chance Conditions 
It can be confidently said that the two types of chance 
conditions, one created by the extrinsic features of the task 
(i.e. difficulty of the task) and the other by its intrinsic 
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properties (pure chance), were perceived and responded to in a 
different manner by the subjects. Therefore, some of the 
inconsistencies that have characterised research on personality 
situation locus of control congruency may have been caused by 
confounding quasi and pure chance conditions. If the task or the 
instructions are ambiguous it may encourage the subjects to v1ew 
the task as a challenge. In other words, some subjects could 
perce1ve it as being more skill determined than the experimenter 
intended. This was evident in the Lefcourt et al (1968) study 
where the chance condition was dictated mainly by task difficulty. 
A vague chance situation may have been created which rendered 
the validity of the chance instructions questionable, thus 
-diminishing considerably any differences between internals 
and externals. 
DuCette and Wolk (1973) argued that the 'active' nature 
of the internals' cognitive functioning, which is supplemented 
by their high level of motivation, provided the internals with 
better cue differentiation skills irrespective of the nature of 
the situation locus of control. Consequently, the externals, 
who lack such thorough cognitive functioning, may havefailedto pick up 
cues irrespective of skill and chance conditions. As suggested 
in the introduction, DuCette and Wolk's chance condition was more 
representative of a quasi chance than a pure chance condition. 
Thus the better performance of DuCette and Wolk's internals 
was not irrespective of conditions, but was actually skill dependent. 
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Internals, therefore, are not motivated in all conditions, but 
only in those where they can infer a skill element. However, 
it may be argued that since the externals, in DuCette and Wolk's 
study, liked the chance situation more than internals and more than 
they liked the skill condition, they were responding to a genUlne 
chance condition. The externals could not have inferred the 
skill element embedded in the chance condition because they 
lack the sharpness of internals in detecting s11btle cues 
(Lefcourt, 1967; Lefcourt and Wine, 1969; Wolk and DuCette, 
1974). However, since the skill element that rendered the 
chance condition ambig1lous in the DuCette and Wolk study was more 
salient in the prese~t study (chance 1), the externals perceived 
"it as such and rated the task as not being entirely skill or 
chance determined. Future research, dealing with personality 
situation locus of control congruency should pay more attention 
to the design of the chance conditions. 
b. Reactions to, and Performance under, the skill, chance 1 
and chance 2 conditions 
The reactions of internals to skill and externals to 
chance 2 fit Rotter's social learning theory, and in particular 
personality situation locus of control congruence (Rotter and 
Mulry, 1965). The internals found the task under skill more 
interesting than externals who found chance 2 more interesting 
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(supporting DuCette and Wolk's 1973 findings); both groups 
exerted more effort than the other under congruent conditions 
(supporting Srull and Karabenic's~975 results). Morevoer, 
under chance 2, externals felt more comfortable and less distracted 
than internals. Thus it seems that internals and externals value 
situations where behaviour-reinforcement contingencies are s~ilar 
to their beliefs about such contingencies. 
The internals' and externals' performance In congruent 
situations does not provide clear support for Rotter and Mulry's 
(1965) conclusions that, under skill conditions, the performance 
of internals is better than that of externals. Contrary to the 
predictions, the externals introduced and employed.more solution 
, 
hypotheses than internals. If the mere number of solution 
hypothesis lS a sign of superior performance, then it may be 
suggested that externals outperformed or were more flexible 
than internals in skill (a detailed discussion of the mode of 
solution hypothesis utilised by internals and externals is 
presented at the end of this section). If the aforementioned 
argument is valid then it appears that externals may do better 
under incongruent conditions than in congruent ones, a finding 
which contradicts the results for the interest and effort variables. 
It should be remembered that this was the argument of Petzel and 
Gynther (1970) who found that internals solved more anagrams than 
externals in the chance condition and externals solved more 
anagrams than internals in the skill condition. The incongruency 
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model of Petzel and Gynther 1S ambiguous due to the possibility 
that their chance condition resembled a u~uasi~ chance condition. 
Moreover, in the present study it was only the externals who 
produced more solution hypotheses under the skill condition, 
whereas according to the Petzel and Gynther model the internals 
should have introduced more solution hypotheses llnder the chance 2 
condition. Further, both internals and externals were more 
motivated (in terms of their interest and effort) in congrUent 
conditions. What was lacking in the Petzel and Gynther's study 
was a measurement of the motivational levels of the subjects 
besides their problem solving performance. 
The utilisation of the 'gambler's fallacy'se~uences 
by externals' in chance 1 and chance 2 gives further support to 
. 
Rotter and Mulry's (1965) congruency model. Although the 
difference between internals and externals in the employment of 
these se~uences was great in chance 1, it was even greater 
in chance 2. Internals rarely used such a spurious solution 
hypothesis in chance 1 and 2. The utilisation of the 'gambler's 
fallacy' se~uence ln chance 1 and 2 by externals 1S 1n line with 
prev10us research (e.g. Phares, 1957; Rotter et al, 1960). 
When externals find themselves in chance conditions their 
behaviour (i.e. gambler's fallacy) is reinforced, for their 
generalised expectancies about behaviour reinforcement outcome 
are compatible with these conditions. 
An interesting finding in·the present study was the 
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internals' failure to display more accurate estimation of their 
correct scores. Both groups were fairly accurate. The 
internals in the Stager et al (1973) and the Gilmor and Reid 
(1978) studies were more accurate in estimating their academic 
activities than externals. The results of Stager et al and 
Gilmor and Reid may be due to the relevance and value of the 
information in these studies. Since students value academic 
activities, and since the literature demonstrated the higher 
level of the internals' motivation (e.g. Wolk and DuCette, 1973) 
the estimation of such activities may be of greater relevance 
to the internals than to the externals. 
An important finding obtained from the reaction to the 
experimental indices (interest, like, effort etc.), was that 
internals reacted differently to the chance 2 condition as 
compared to their reactions to the skill and chance 1 conditions 3. 
The externals, on the other hand, were insensitive, or at least 
did not react differently, to skill, chance 1, and chance 2. 
These findings support those obtained by Lefcourt et al (1968) 
where they reported similar trendso Thus internals displayed 
greater variability in terms of their reactions to the experimental 
conditions, but in terms of solution hypotheses it was the externals 
3 Except for the competence' index whose scores were low for 
all groups. The high level of task difficulty made the 
subjects feel incompetent,removing or obscuring any differences 
between internals and externals. 
who exhibited greater variability by creating, uSlng, and 
changing more solution hypotheses than internals. 
c. Methods of Appro,aching the Task 
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Both internals and externals performed poorly In 
terms of deciphering the principle. This was expected Slnce 
pilot subjects found the task very difficult. However, the 
task did provide a real opportunity for subjects to form 
solution hypotheses. Task difficulty clearly inhibited 
successful solutions and possibly obscured differences between 
internals and externals. The number of correct trials for internals 
and externals was not significantly difrerent. Nevertheless, 
this does not diminish the value of the task, as it provided 
the most important and significant finding of the study; l.e. 
that internals and externals handle solution hypotheses In a 
quite different way. 
Contrary to the predictions, the externals exceeded 
internals in the number of solution hypotheses used under 
skill. Also more externals, as compared to internals, introduced 
new solution hypotheses and spurious hypotheses (especially 
'gambler's fallacy' sequences). Furthermore, significantly 
more externals than internals changed solution hypotheses 
frequently and returned to an already employed solution hypotheses. 
Thus, the externals seem to be more dynamic and flexible, while 
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internals seem more strict and cautious in their utilisation 
of hypotheses. These findings appear to contradict previous 
research which indicated that internals were more dynamic ln 
their cognitive func~ioning and evidenced superior ability when 
compared with externals (cf. Lefcourt, 1976; Phares, 1976). 
It is difficult to ascertain which of the two approaches 
adopted by internals and externals in this study was more efficient 
as neither approach entailed success in terms of finding the 
principle. Previous studies (e.g. Bartel et aI, 1972; 
Lefcourt and Wine, 1969; Wolk and DuCette, 1974) have demonstrated 
that externals adopt less systematic and less organised strategies to 
handling information than internals. The externals approach to 
handling solution hypotheses may thus reflect lability, while 
the internals' approach may reflect concentration and rlgorous 
testing. The notion of the lability of externals is rendered 
plausible when considering their 'gambler's fallacy' behaviour 
(left-right sequences of the response cards). More externals, 
relative to internals, used gambler's fallacy sequences in chance 
1 and chance 2. Adopting these sequences under chance 2 is 
conceivable, but chance 1 was less of a pure chance condition, 
gambler's fallacy sequences are not associated with any rlgorous 
attempt to solve the problem as they simply involve comparlsons 
of the response words and ignore the stimulus words. They 
resemble a more indifferent or carefree approacho It seems 
therefore, that the introduction of, and shifting among, many 
different solution hypotheses by externals, is not a slgn of 
being flexible and creative but of a more superficial and 
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perhaps less valuable approach. Perhaps this point will become 
more clear when discussing the testing of solution hypotheses 
below. 
Each trial in the experiment provided evidence which 
indicated the correctness or falsity of a solution hypothesis. 
The more trials on which a subject persisted with a given solution 
hypothesis the more evidence he could gather regarding whether 
this particular solution hypothesis was correct. Externals 
used more solution hypotheses and changed them more frequently 
than ;_internals who used relatively few hypotheses and changed 
them infrequently. What seemed to be happening was that 
externals rejected an hypothesis on the basis of minimal 
evidence suggesting that it was incorrect. They then tried 
other hypotheses which in turn were also proved incorrect. It 
appears that the externals then '~lestioned' whether they had 
thoroughly tested earlier hypotheses and so returned to them 
agaln. The internals, however, used fewer solution hypotheses 
and rarely returned to them on later trials which suggests that 
they thoroughly convinced themselves of the falsity of an 
hypothesis before rejecting it. Thus both groups seem to set 
themselves a different criterion for testing and rejecting 
solution hypotheses. 
This argument however ralses further questions. 
Theoretically, a subject only required ~ negative response 
to confirm for him that his solution hypothesis was incorrect. 
So why should internals persist in trying an hypothesis or 
externals return to hypotheses previously rejected? The 
answer possibly lies in the strict time factor and task 
difficulty. The subjects were given only 30 seconds per trial. 
Since the task was a very difficult one, 30 seconds might not 
have been sufficient for many subjects to determine the 
correctness or falsity of an hypothesis for themselves. 
Pines and Julian (1972) found that internals were more attuned 
to task difficulty and the consequent pressure it exerted on 
information processing, while externals were more affected 
by the social demand characteristics of the situation. 
Therefore, it may be speculated that internals in this study 
persisted until thy could see for themselves that their solution 
hypothesis was incorrect whereas externals did not, but did 
return to the hypothesis later almost as if to verify again that 
it was incorrect. Thus, the relatively smaller number of 
solution hypotheses employed by the internals, compared to externals, 
in this experiment,appears to be a function of the task difficulty 
(including time constraint) and their more thorough approach 
to testing solution hypotheses, rather than a rigid approach. 
What makes the results of the present study interesting 
1S that internals' and externals' performance was not affected 
by differential reinforcement. Both groups did not differ 
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significantly In the number of correct answers for the first 
10, 20 and 30 trials. Thus the task performance of internals 
and externals reflects different problem solving strategies and 
not the influence of differential reinforcement during the 
experiment. 
The methods by which internals and externals approach 
a problem has not been ade~uately investigated in previous 
studies as they were mostly concerned with the discovery of 
the solution per ~. This study showed that both groups 
adopted ~uite different approaches to discoveringthe principle 
underlying the experimental task. The results are novel, 
statistically highly significant and are not predictable from 
. the findings of previous research. 
One criticism might be raised against the author's 
interpretation of the results and concerns the fact that 
subjects had to recall the details of the number and kind of 
solution hypotheses used during the experiment, after 
completing the task. Thus, it could be suggested that the 
results reflect the recall ability of internals and externals 
rather than their actual performance. It is possible that the 
recall process may have affected the results, however both 
internals and externals were re~uired to recall their performance. 
Therefore, for this argument. to have any real validity it must 
be demonstrated how the recall process could systematically lead 
to clear-cut differences between the reported performance of 
internals and externals. This does not seem readily possible 
and weighted against this argument are at least three points. 
First, the internals' and externals' perception of, and reactions 
to, the experiment are fairly consistent with predictions, 
although their task performance is not. Second, the differences 
in task performance are systematic and not random ~ Third, 
the differences are highly significant. However, a methodological 
weakness of the study was the lack of an adequate measure of 
the solution hypotheses following every trial. Nevertheless, 
the differences in the way internals and externals attempted 
to find the principle underlying the task clearly merit further 
investigation. 
CHAPTER 5 
SECOND STUDY 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
A major finding of the first study was the differences 
in the way internals and externals utilised their solution 
hypotheses. Both groups did not differ in their deciphering 
of the principle, therefore it seems that the 'operations' 
that precede problem solving are different for internals and 
externals. The aim of the second study was to probe further 
into these different modes of processing information while 
attempting to solve a problem. 
Externals as compared to internals, have been shown to 
be less adaptive to different experimental conditions (first 
study; Lefcourt et al, 1968), less vigilant (Sanders et al, 1976), 
recall information without organising it (Bartel et al, 1972), 
and less sensitive to environmental cues (Lefcourt, 1967; 
Lefcourt and Wine, 1969; Wolk and DuCette, 1974). Thus the 
method by which internals process information seems to be more 
structured and organised, while that of the externals seems to 
be more diffuse and disorganised. 
In the studies by Lefcourt (1967), Lefcourt and Wine 
(1969), and Wolk and DuCette (1974) externals demanded more 
'cues' than internals in order to assimilate information (ie. 
the information became more salient). Thus it seems that 
externals process information better when it ~s rendered more 
salient. One reason for the overdependence of externals 
on additional cues may reside ~n the fact that they are less 
able than internals to extract relevant information from the 
environment. Indeed in Seeman's studies (Seeman and Evans, 
1962; Seeman, 1963) externals were less successful than 
internals in acquiring information about the immediate 
environment. Externals may not examine all the possibilities 
in the surroundings. It was argued, in the first study, 
that part of the reason why externals went back to a solution 
hypothesis was because they rejected hypotheses quickly, on 
the basis of minimal evidence, and then appeared to doubt their 
decision, whereas the more deliberate testing of a solution 
hypothesis by internals decreased the tendency to go back to ito 
In the Lefcourt, Lefcourt and Wine, and Wolk and DuCette 
studies, the experimenter himself increased the task's saliency 
by providing the subjects with the necessary cues. This raises 
the question: if externals and internals were provided with 
the opportunity to increase task saliency, who would capitalise 
more on this opportunity? According to the aforementioned 
studies, the externals would seek to increase information saliency 
to make it more assimilable. But this should be less trueof 
internals as they are better able to assimilate the same information 
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from their environment. There is indirect evidence to suggest 
that internals may scan information faster than externals. 
Internals, relative to externals, have been shown to be more 
verbally fluent (Brecher and Denmark, 1969), and If.. . fluent ••• 
individuals appear to be those who can rapidly scan stored data 
and withdraw quickly from the memory pool items of information 
that are needed ••• " (Payne, 1973, p.422). 
The second study attempted to investigate the following 
question: what kind of differences would emerge between internals 
and externals when they are faced with a task which has to be 
solved using two sets of information which can be viewed 
separately but not simultaneously? 
The task employed in the second. study consisted of 
presenting subjects with a series of characteristics describing 
an object,on one slide,and then with a list of objects, only one 
of which was best described by the characteristics, on another 
slide. Since the list of characteristics and the list of 
objects were presented separately it was possible for subjects 
to switchback between the two lists to re-examine them (cf. 
Johnson, Lincoln, and Hall, 1961). The time subjects spent 
scanning the characteristics' lists and the objects' lists and 
using switchbacks (if any) was recorded. These times were 
used as measures of how efficiently subjects processed the 
information and of their need to increase the saliency of the 
information. 
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The high level of task difficulty and the time 
constraint for each trial of the first study may have removed 
or obscured any differences between internals and externals 
~n their ability to solve the task. This second study utilised 
a relatively easy task to see if such differences would emerge. 
5.2 PREDICTIONS 
The dependent variables also fall under the same broad 
headings as those used in the first study: task performance, 
and perception of and reactions to the experiment • 
. 
A. Task Performance 
1. Preparation and Solution Time 
As internals have been shown to organ~se, assimilate 
and utilise information better, and are more verbally fluent 
than externals, it is hypothesised that internals' preparation 
and solution times will be significantly less than those of 
externals. 
2. Switchbacks 
Since switchbacks are considered to be modes of increasing 
the task's saliency, which increases the time spent on the task, 
it is hypothesised that significantly more externals will employ 
switchbacks than internals. 
3. Number of Errors 
Since it is difficult to specify the accuracy of 
problem solving as a function of personality differences (first 
study; Goh and Farely, 1977), no predictions regarding the 
number of errors are made. 
B. Perception of, and Reaction to the Task 
The same indices as those employed in the first study 
were included to examine the subjects' perception of and reactions 
to, the experiment. 
5.3 METHOD 
a.General Synopsis 
The study was conducted in two phases. During the 
first, carried out three months prior to the second, all the 
subjects answered Rotter's I-E scale to assess the dimensions 
of locus of control to which they belonged. In the second 
phase internals and externals were tested individually to determine 
their performance on the task. After completing the task, subjects 
received the post task questionnaire which included items 
pertaining to the taskandto subjects' reaction to the experiment. 
The study was concluded by a debriefing session. 
b. Assessment of Internal and External Locus of Control 
The overall mean of the I-E scale (N = 92) was 11.64. 
The internals were defined as those subjects scoring 11 and below, 
while the externals were defined as those scoring 12 and above. 
This is the same allocation as that of the first study. 
c. Experimental Design 
Ninety-two subjects participated in the study, half 
were classified as internals (23 males and 23 females) and half 
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as externals (23 males and 23 females). Two experimental designs 
were employed. For the analyses of preparation and solution time 
a 2x2x7 split-plot factorial design (locus o~ control X sex X 
characteristics (3,4,5,6,7,8, and 9 characteristics)) with repeated 
measures on the last factor (Kirk, 1968) was used. As regards 
perception o~, and reaction to, the experiment indices,a 2x2 (locus 
of control X sex) ~actorial design was employed. Correlations 
and chi square tests were carried out where applicable. The 
design o~ the experiment ~s presented in Table 5.1 
Table 5.1 
Experimental design of the second stu~ 
SUBJECTS 
Internals 
Externals 
MALES 
23 (28)* 
23 (26) 
SEX 
FEMALES 
23 (27) 
23 (29) 
( )* = The number of subjects originallY assigned to this cell. 
Omitting subjects due to apparatus malfunctioning, where 
unsatisfactory data were obtained, or by random rejection, left 
23 subjects per cell. 
d. Selection of Subjects 
The subjects were 92 (males and females) introductory 
psychology students (from 1976 class) at Stirling University. 
At the beginning of the academic year all the introductory 
151 
psychology students were g~ven Rotter's I-E scale as part 
of routine testing. Originally, 110 subjects participated ln 
the experiment. Eighteen subjects were excluded for the 
following reasons: 6 subjects could not complete the task due 
to apparatus malfunctioning; data from 3 subjects were rejected 
because of misunderstanding of the instructions; 9 subjects 
were randomly eliminated to provide for equal number of subjects 
in each cell. The last 9 subjects were: 6 externals (5 females 
and 1 male), and 3 internals (1 female and 2 males). Subjects 
were glven a course credit each for taking part in the experiment. 
e. Instruments 
1 Rotter's I-E Scale see first study. 
~1 The Task 
The task had to fulfill three criteria: 1) it must 
allow for rehearsing of information in preparation for a solution; 
2) solution must be based on the information rehearsed; and 
3) it must allow for switching back to the information already 
rehearsed. 
The task was adapted from Johnson, Lincoln and Hall (1961). 
Johnson et al investigated the effect of the length of characteristics 
describing an object on the subject's preparation and solution 
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time. Preparation time is the time taken to study a list of 
characteristics describing an object, while solution time is the 
time taken to name an object best described by the characteristics. 
In Johnson et aI's study the number of characteristics ranged from 
3 to 11 inclusive and were presented on cards, while the number of objects 
was always 5 per card. The characteristics'and objects' cards 
were never presented simultaneously. The subjects first pressed 
a button which illuminated a card in a left compartment of a two-
compartment box. That card contained a number of characteristics 
which the subject had to rehearse. The subject was allowed as 
much time as he/she wanted for rehearsal, and when he/she was 
ready for the objects' list, he/she pushed another button 
illuminating the right compartment and the light in the left 
compartment went out. The card in the right compartment contains 
5 objects only one of which 1S fully described by the characteristics. 
The subject had to choose what he/she believed to be the appropriate 
object. Thus the preparation material must be carried 1n 
memory if solution is to be attained. The subject was also 
allowed to switch back to the left compartment if solution was not 
arrived at. Johnson et al found that as the number of characteristics 
increased from 3 to 9 so did preparation time; solution time was 
constant. It was also found that the number of switchbacks 
increased with the number of the characteristics probably indicating 
a failure in memory. Moreover, individual differences generated 
high variability in Johnson et al's results. 
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f. Pilot Studies 
Pilot subj ects were psychology lecturers, postgraduates, 
and first year psychology students. Since the items making up 
the preparation and solution lists in Johnson et aI's experiments 
were not available, these items had to be constructed. This 
resulted in considerable testing and editing in order that: 
a) the characteristics describing an object were non-redundant; 
b) each characteristic had to provide more information towards 
the solution; and c) the 5 objects had to be similar yet only 
one of them satisfied all the characteristics describing it, so 
that choosing the appropriate object required rigorous processing 
of the characteristics. 
The characteristics ranged from 3 to 9 inclusive and not 
from 3 to 11 as in the Johnson et al's (1961) study. The reason 
for not including 10 and 11 characteristics is that such amounts 
tend to satiate the subject and produce little differentation 
in the results (cf. Johnson et al). A total of 28 trials were 
obtained, rrade up of 4 of each number of the characteristics from 
3 to 9 inclusive (i.e. 4 with 3 characteristics, 4 with 4 
characteristics etc.). 
g. Specific Features of the Task 
The task employed In the experiment proper together with 
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introductory problems is presented in Appendix 2. An example of 
a problem of 5 characteristics is given below. 
CHARACTERISTICS 
COVERING 
TRANSPORTABLE 
LIGHT 
FLAPPED 
GUMMED 
OBJECTS 
LABEL 
FOLDER 
ENVELOPE 
PAD 
WRAPPER 
Folder is ruled out because it is not 'gummed', and pad is ruled 
out because it is not 'covering'. Thus the choice rema1ns 
between wrapper, label and envelope. Since 'f~apped' 1S more 
associated with envelope, then envelope is the correct word 
because it satisfies all the characteristics. 
The correct word was determined by giving a further 
group of pilot subjects the list of objects and asking them to 
write down as many characteristics as possible to describe a 
particular object. After editing the characteristics to 
reduce redundancy, another group of pilot subjects was presented 
with the characteristics and were asked to write down objects 
best described by each set of characteristics. Then a third 
pilot group was given both the characteristics and objects and 
were asked to determine the accuracy of the characteristics in 
describing their objects. An 9bject was only considered correct 
when most of the subjects (99%) perceived it accordingly. Certain 
objects were more difficult to describe than others (eog. stone, 
chalk, plastic, knob). These objects were chosen to render the task 
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more challenging. 
h • Apparatus 
A more sophisticated and accurate apparatus than that 
used in Johnson et al study was specifically designed for the 
present experiment. The apparatus measured not only preparation 
and solution time, but also the time taken to switchback. Two 
Kodak carousel slide projectors, one for the characteristics' 
material and the other for objects' material, were employed 
equipped with an electro mechanical shutter. The shutters were 
solenoid driven. The shutters were essential for presenting 
the characteristics' and objects' lists separately. A paper 
tape output data logger was used to log time ( cumulative) and 
event (category). The data logger was a modified solartron 
D.T.U. with ten millisecond line base and a high speed paper punch. 
Subjects responded by pressing small keys. There were 4 keys: 
the first two keys were the trial keys and represent the 
characteristics and objects keys. The other two keys were the 
switchback keys, one for characteristics and one for objects (see 
Figure 5.1). 
The two slide projectors were synchronised. At the 
beginning of the experiment the shutters of both projectors were 
Modular 
Electronic 
Logic 
Data Logger 
and 
Timer 
Figure 5.1 
Apparatus employed In the second study. 
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closed. Pressing the characteristics trial key opened the 
shutter of projector number 1 and the characteristics list 
was projected on the screen. If the subjects want to see the 
objects list, they press the objects trial key which closes the 
shutter of projector number 1 and opens the shutter of projector 
2, thus projecting the objects list. If the subjects name the 
appropriate object they push the trial characteristics list 
immediately which closes the shutter of projector number 2, moves 
the slides of projector number 1 a trial forward, and then opens 
the shutter of projector number 1. This whole sequence takes 
4 seconds (labelled inter-trial interval). Pressing the objects' 
trial key closes the shutter of the first projector, moves the 
second projector one trial forward and then opens its shutter. 
If the objects list is projected on the screen and the 
subject wants to switchback before naming the appropriate word, 
he/she presses the switchback 'characteristics key which closes 
the shutter of the objects' projector and opens that of the 
characteristics'without moving a trial forward. The subject 
can make endless switchbacks which he/she can terminate by 
press1ng the trial characteristics' key which carries him/her to 
the next trial after the inter-trial interval. 
Every time the subject presses a key, the paper tape 
of the data logger is punched registering a time (in seconds). 
When the paper tape is transcribed into a teleprinter, a print 
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of all the times, corresponding to the key presses, is printed 
on a paper, and by simple subtraction procedures based on special 
symbols on the printer paper, preparation time, solution time 
and swi~chback time (if any) are computed. 
The sequence of the trials, the shutter control pulses, 
and input to data logger were co-ordinated by a system of 
modular electronic logic. 
The reliability of the apparatus was tested uSlng 21 
high school students (final year). The apparatus was not 
employed In the experiment proper until all its mechanical 
failures had been resolved. 
l. Post Task Questionnaire 
The post task questionnaire (see Appendix 2) was made 
of two parts.o The first part explored types of approaches used 
In solving the problems. These approaches were those most 
commonly used by pilot sUbjects. The other part dealt with 
subjects' perception of, and reaction to, the experiment uSlng a 
number of 9-point rating scales similar to those employed in the 
first study. Subjects were asked "How interested were you in the 
task?"; "When trying to name the correct object, how hard did 
you !!;L?"; "How much did you like the task?"; and "How much 
do you think this was a task which depended on skill or chance?" 
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The subjects also answered two additional questions concerning 
whether they found the task to be too easy or too difficult; 
and whether or not they possessed the ability to perform the 
task. These two questions were answered using a 9-point rating 
scale. At the end of the questionnaire subjects were g~ven 
the option of writing comments about their performances or any 
aspects of the task. 
J. Task Familiarity Check 
During pilot studies 53 subjects answered a 9-point 
rating scale dealing with familiarity of the task. Subjects 
were asked "How familiar was this task to you?". It was 
important to determine the level of task difficulty to guard 
against any prior encounter with a task of similar nature to 
the one under investigation. The 53 pilot subjects were from 
the same population as those of the experiment proper (i.eo first 
year psychology students). They were also given the I-E scale 
and the allocation of internals and externals was as follows: 
24 internals (10 males and 14 females), and 29 externals (16 
males and 13 females). The task familiarity data were analysed 
us~ng a 2x2 (locus of control X sex) factorial design with unequal 
number in cells (least square analysis). 
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k. Procedure 
Subjects were tested individually. When the subject 
arrived he/she was seated in front of the apparatus and was 
given the following instructions to read: 
INSTRUCTIONS 
You will be presented with two lists of words 9 one at 
a time. List number 1 contains characteristics describing an 
object. The number of these characteristics ranges from 3 to 9 
inclusive. List number 2 contains five objects of which only 
one possesses all the characteristics on list number 1. Your 
task is to name one object on list number 2 which you think 
possesses all the characteristics on list number 1. 
You will not see both lists simultaneously. The first 
list will be projected on the screen when the characteristics' 
button is pressed. Examine the list carefully, and when you are 
ready for the second list "(objects' list) press the objects' 
button, and that list will be projected on the screen. Examine 
the list carefully and then name the object which you think 
possesses all the characteristics on the first list. If you feel 
you want to switch back to the first list before making you final 
decision, press the switchback button number 1, and the first 
list (characteristics' list) will be projected on the screen. 
After re-examining the list, press switchback button number 2 
so that you may see the second (objects') list again, and then 
name the appropriate objecto You are allowed as much time and 
switchbacks as you wish, but remember that you can not see both 
lists simultaneously. 
Once you have named the appropriate Object, press the 
characteristics button immediately. If you name the correct 
object I will respond "correct ll , and if you name the wrong object 
I will respond "wrong" after you have named the appropriate 
object and pressed the characteristics' button. Please do not 
discuss the materials during the trials' phase. Once this phase 
has terminated you may discuss anything about the experiment. 
There will be 28 trials. Before starting the experiment proper, 
I will give you two trials to familiaris e you with the task. 
Are there any questions? 
Then the experimenter explained to ,the subject the 
nature of the task. The subject was given two problems to 
familiarize him/her with the task and the apparatus. These 
two problems were repeated many times (whenever needed by a 
subject) until the subject understood fUlly the mechanics of 
the experiment. 
Since the punching of the paper tape made some n01se, 
the subject was told to ignore the noise which was explained 
to be due to connections with the department's computer. The 
subjects were never under the impression that their responses 
were timed (this was clear during post task interviews). The 
apparatus functioned smoothly except for six sessions. During 
the experiment, thee~erimenter sat behind the subject and 
informed him/her during the inter-trial interval whether or not 
he/she named the appropriate object. 
After the end of the 28th triall , the subject was escorted 
to a table and was handed the post-task questionnaire. When 
the subject finished answering the questionnaire, the experimenter 
inspected it to make sure all the items were answered adequately. 
Then the experimenter signed the course credit card, debriefed 
1 The experimental seSS10n was one hour. 
this time limit. 
No subject exceeded 
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the subject, answered all his/her questions (if any), and told 
him/her not to discuss the experiment with his/her classmates. 
5.4 RESULTS 
The second study was designed to delineate differences 
between internals and externals in their preparation and solution 
time and tendency to switchback. Their perception of, and 
reaction to, the experiment were also investigated in order to 
complement the measures of their performance by measuring their 
involvement ~n the task. 
It ~s important to determine whether or not the task 
was a familiar one to the subjects before conclusions are drawn 
from the results. Any past familiarity with the task would 
bias subjects'behaviour. Thus task familiarity check scores 
are presented first to be followed by distribution of I-E scores. 
Results of task performance come next, and reports on perception 
of, and reactions to, the experiment conclude the presentation. 
a. Task Familiarity Check 
Pilot subjects responded to the following question 
"How familair was this task to you?" 
Table 5.2 
Mean ratings of the subjects' perception of task familiarity 
as a function of their locus of control and sex. 
SEX 
MALES FEMALES COMBINED 
Internals 8.70 8.64 8.67 
Externals 8.56 8.54 8.55 
Combined 8.63 8.59 8.61 
Low score indicates unfamiliarity, high score the reverse. 
The analysis of varlance for task familiarity scores 
(summary of which i~ presented in Table 5.3) did not result 
in ~y significant differences. All subjects construed the 
task to be unfamiliar (see Table 5.2) 
Table 5.3 
Summary of analysis of variance of.the subjects' ratings of the 
task familiarity as a function of their locus of control and sex. 
VARIATION SS DF MS F P 
A (locus of control) .173 1 .173 .460 
B (sex) .020 1 .020 .052 
AB .004 1 .004 .009 
Within Cells 18.483 49 .377 
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b. I-E Scores 
Means and standard deviations of I-E scores for males 
and females and the combined sample are presented in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4 
Means and standard deviations of the I-E scores 
MEANS STANDARD DEVIATION 
Internal Males 7.87 2.26 
Internal Femal.es 8.00 1.95 
External Males 15.22 2.58 
External Females 15.43 2.13 
Internals 7094 2.11 
Externals "15.33 2.36 
Combined Sample 11.64 4.32 
Internality scores ranged from 2 to 11 inclusive, those 
of externality ranged from 12 to 21 inclusvie. 
A. Task Performance 
1. Reaction Time and Switchbacks 
Initial preparation time commences when the characteristics' 
list 1S projected on the screen, and terminates when the subject 
pushes the objects' trial key. Thus initial preparation 
time does not include time of switchback(s). Preparation 
time proper, on the other hand, includes initial preparation 
time plus additional time, if any, the subject took when 
switching back to the characteristic list after being exposed 
to the objects' list2 • Solution time commences when the objects' 
list (not previously seen) is projected on the screen and 
terminates when the characteristics' trial key is pressed 
(i.e. with the termination of a trial). Solution time includes 
re-examination of objects (if any). Thus if a subject switched 
back to the objects after being exposed once again to the 
characteristics, the switch back time he/she spends re-exam~n~ng 
the list is added t~the previous time he/she spent looking at 
; 
the objects. Solution time therefore, measures the whole process 
of studying the objects' listo 
Data of initial preparation time are analysed first, 
followed by the analyses of switchbacks and the analyses of 
total preparation and solution time. 
2 Preparation time proper will be labelled total preparation 
time hereafter. 
-
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i Initial Preparation Time 
Since the ma~n interest was to delineate differences 
between internals and externals in their processing of inform-
ation, any discrepancies in their initial preparation time 
would reflect a difference in their ability of scanning and 
rehearsing information as a prerequisite for organising and 
assimilating the information. The means for initial 
preparation time are reported in Table 5.5. 
Data of initial preparation time was analysed us~ng 
a 2x2x7 split-llot factorial design with repeated measures 
on the third factor 3 (as indicated in the method's section). 
The analysis of variance (Table 5.6) resulted in a significant 
locus of control main effect, and highly significant character-
istics main effect. All the other differences were not 
significant. The mean scores (table 5.5) reveal that, as 
predicted, internals' initial preparation time was faster than 
that of the externals; and that as the number of characteristics 
increase do did initial preparation time. This is in direct 
support of Johnson et al ',s (1961 ) results. Examination of the 
differences between internals and externals across the different 
number of characteristics :indicate that for 3,4,5,8 and 9 numbers 
of characteristics, the internals were faster than externals 
(t = 3.638, df 528, P<.0005; t = 3.362; P<.005; t = 10936; 
P<.05; t = 2.737, P<.025; and t = 2.649; P<.025 respectively). 
3 The same design was used for the analyses of total preparation 
and solution time. 
,. 
Table 5.5 
Mean scores for initial preparation time as a function of locus of control, sex, and the seven 
numbers of characteristics. 
Number of 
Characteristics 1M IF EM EF M F I E Combined 
3 6.19 5.92 7.50 8.04 6.85 6.98 6.06 7.77 6.91 
4 7.63 7.62 9.71 8.71 8.67 8.16 7.63 9.21 8.42 
5 9.09 8.76 9.27 10.40 9.18 9.58 8.92 9.83 9.38 
6 10.42 10.64 10.83 10.75 10.63 10.69 10.53 10.79 10.66 
7 11.30 13.41 12.55 13.38 11.92 13.40 12.36 12.96 12.66 
8 12.61 14.51 14.69 15.55 13.65 15.03 13.56 15.12 14.34 
9 16.70 17.68 17.88 19.52 17.29 18.60 17.19 18.70 17.94 
Combined 11.17 11.78 10.89 12.06 
1M = Internal males 
IF = Internal females 
EM = External males 
EF = External females 
M = Males 
F = Females 
I = Internals 
E = Externals 
.. 
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Table 5.6 
Summary of analysis of variance of initial preparation time 
as a function of locus of control, sex, and the seven numbers 
of characteristics. 
VARIATION SS DF MS F P 
Between People 2593.49 91 
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A (locus of 218.07 1 
control) 218.07 8.29 <.01 
B (sex) 59.62 1 59.62 2.27 
AB 0.40 1 0.40 0.02 
Subj. W. Groups 2315.40 88 26.31 
Within PeoEle 10865.71 552 
C (characteris- 7973.85 6 1328.97 257.66 <.0001 
tics) 
44.82 6 7.47 1.45 AC 
BC 83.85 6 13.97 2.71 
ABC 39079 6 6.63 1.29 
CXSubj. W. Gps. 2723.40 528 5016 
Total 13459.20 643 
Although internals were faster than externals at numbers of 6 and 
7, such differences were not significant. These trends are plotted 
in Figure 5.2. 
ii Switchbacks 
In the instructions the subjects were told they could make 
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Initial preparation time as a function of locus of control and the 
seven numbers of characteristics. 
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as many switchbacks as they wished. However it was necessary 
to determine whether or not subjects construed switchbacks as a 
task demand characteristic. Subjects, who switched back, were 
asked about the causes of their switchbacks in a post-task 
interview following the completion of the questionnaire. As 
indicated in the method section, data of three subjects were 
rejected, because those subjects employed switchbacks even when 
they did not need it/thinking that switchbacks were part of the 
experiment. All the others who used switchbacks stated they 
actually needed them. 
Examination of switchbacks used by the subjects resulted 
1n the identification of four types of switchbacks: 
1 Standard Switchbacks: pertain to going back to the 
characteristics, then to the objects, and finally naming an object. 
Thus in a standard switchback situation the subject is exposed 
twice to the characteristics' and objects' lists in any g1ven 
trial. 
11 Half Switchbacks: when a subject switches back to 
the characteristics, after seeing the objects, and names an object 
without switching back to the objects, he/she has executed a half 
switchback. In this condition the subject seems to hold the 
objects in his/her memory while processing the characteristics 
for the second time. Thus he/she is exposed once to the objects 
and twice to the characteristics in any given trial. 
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iii Double Switchbacks: pertain to two standard 
switchbacks (i.e. going back to the characteristics, then to 
the objects, then to the characteristics, then to the objects 
and finally naming an object). In this condition the subject 
is exposed three times to the characteristics' and objects' 
lists in any given trial. 
lV Double + Switchbacks: are any switchbacks 
exceeding double switchbacks in any given trial. 
Table 5.7 presents the number of internals and externals 
utilising any of the four types of switchbacks across the seven 
numbers of chara~eristics.4 
Considering the total number of switchbacks (the four 
types collapsed over the 9 numbers of characteristics), the 
externals used much more total switchbacks (771) than the 
internals (259). The externals also used more: a) standard 
switchbacks (597) as compared to the internals (105); b) double 
switchbacks (98 versus 7 by the internals); and c) double + 
switchbacks (33 versus none by the internals). Internals on 
the other hand, used more half switchbacks (147) as compared to 
the externals (4~). It is interesting to note that as the 
number of characteristics increase so does the number of half 
switchbacks for internals reaching its peak at number of six 
characteristics and then slightly decreasing for the rest of the 
4 Only one subject (an external male) made l~ switchback, and only 
two subjects (external females) made 2~ switchbacks. Because of 
the very low incident of these switchbacks, they were treated as 
standard and double switchbacks respectively. 
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~ap1e 5. '7 
Freguenc;£ of all the types of switchbacks as a function of locus 
of control, sex, and the seven numbers .of characteristics 0 
, 
Number of SWITCHBACKS Character- ". 
istics ss ~S DS D+S Combined 
IM 0 0 0 0 0 
IF 1 1 0 0 2 SS = Standard 
3 EM 1'7 1 0 0 18 Switchbacks 
EF 11 0 2 0 13 ~S = Half Switch-
I 1 1 0 0 2 backs 
E 28 1 2 0 31 DS = Double 
IM 3 6 0 0 9 Switchbacks 
IF 6 '7 0 0 13 D+S = Double + 
4 EM 20 4 '7 0 31 Switchbacks 
EF 32 0 5 0 37 
I 9 13 0 0 22 IM = Internal Males 
E 52 4 
< 
12 0 68 IF = Internal Females 
IM 5 8 0 0 13 
EM = External Males 
IF 8 9 0 0 i'7 EF = External Females 
5 EM 37 7 4 0 48 
EF 40 3 4 0 4'7 I = Internals 
I 13 1'7 0 0 30 E = Externals 
E 77 10 8 0 95 
1M 8 19 1 0 28 
IF '7 21 2 0 30 
6 EM 59 3 12 3 '7'7 
EF 55 6 13 6 80 
I 15 40 3 0 58 
E 114 9 25 9 15'7 
IM 8 12 1 0 21 
IF 14 14 1 0 29 
'7 EM 55 5 '7 3 70 
EF 60 5 5 1 '71 
I 22 26 2 0 50 
E 115 10 12 3 141 
IM 12 10 1 0 23 
IF 12 14 0 0 26 
8 EM 54 3 12 5 '74 
EF 56 5 '7 3 '71 
I 24 24 1 0 49 
E 110 8 19 8 145 
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Table 5.7 continued 
Number of SWITCHBACKS 
Character-
istics SS lS 2 . .DS D+S Combined 
IM 11 15 0 0 26 
IF 10 11 1 0 22 
EM 50 . 1 11 7 69 
9 EF 51 0 9 5 65 
I 21 26 1 0 48 
E 101 1 20 12 134 
IM 47 70 3 0 120 
Combined IF 58 77 4 0 139 
Charact- EM 292 24 53 18 387 
eristics EF 305 19 45 15 384 I 105 147 7 0 259 
E 597 43 98 33 171 
characteristics. The externals, on the other hand, show the 
opposite trend for half switchbacks. However, considering 
double switchbacks the externals displayed the same behaviour as 
that of the internals for half switchbacks. Thus the internals 
method of utilising half switchbacks was similar to that used 
by externals for double switchbacks. Both groups increased 
their employment of standard switchbacks as the number of 
characteristics increased. It is also interesting to note that 
the highest number of total switchbacks was displayed by the 
subjects when the characteristics numbered 6. 
In order to investigate the significance of the 
differences between externals and internals in switchbacks, 
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data of the number of internals and externals who used any 
type of switchbacks were organised into contingency tables (see table 5.8) 
and analysed using X2s corrected for continuity (Siegel, 1956). 
More externals, relative to internals, employed total 
switchbacks, standard, double and double + switchbacks. 
However, more internals used half switchbacks than externals. 
All these results are highly significant. Thus internals and 
externals clearly adopted different methods in attempting to 
solve the problems. 
Table 5.8 
Number of internals and externals making any of the switchbacks; plus chi square values 
I 
E 
X2 
TS = 
SS = 
~S = 
DS = 
DS+ = 
a = 
b = 
c = 
d = 
e = 
I = 
E = 
TS 
a b 
14 8 
1 3 
21.96* 
df = 2 
* P<.OOl 
+ P<.OOOI 
c 
24 
42 
SS 
a b 
19 25 
2 3 
66.42+ 
df = 2 
two tailed 
Total switchbacks 
Standard 
Half 
Double 
Double + 
" 
" 
" 
" 
TYPE OF SWITCHBACK 
~S 
c a b 
2 16 20 
41 32 13 
14.18* 
df = 2 
Number of switchbacks raning from O,to 1. 
Number of switchbacks ranging from 2 to 5. 
Number of switchbacks over 5. 
Number of subjects using the switchbacks. 
Number of subjects not using the switchbacks. 
Internals 
Externals. 
DS DS+ 
c d e d e 
10 5 41 0 ' 46 
1 29 17 15 31 
24.86* 16.29* 
df = 1 df = 1 
I-' 
-.:j 
Vl 
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iii Total Preparation Time 
As indicated earlier, total preparation time included 
the time subjects took in re-examining the characteristics. 
The breakdown o~ sums o~ squares for total preparation 
time, presented in Table 5.10, indicates highly significant 
locus o~ control and characteristics main effects, and a 
significant sex main e~fect. Table 5. 9 ~next page) shows that as 
predicted, internals were faster than externals; total 
preparation time increased as the number of characteristics 
increased; and that males were faster than females. As 
Table 5.10 clearly demonstrates, the variability due to locus 
of control is much greater than that of sex. 
Table 5.10 
Summary of analysis o~ variance of total preparation time as a 
function o~ locus of control, sex and the seven numbers o~ 
characteristics. 
VARIATION SS DF MS F P 
Between People 7411.l9 91 
A (locus o~ 3775.20 1 3775.20 96.08 <.001 
control) 
B (sex) 170.87 1 170.87 4.35 <.05 
AB 7.24 1 7.24 0.18 
Subj w. Groups 3457.88 88 39.29 
Within People 17331.43 552 
C (conditions) 14274.35 6 2379.06 562.99 <.0001 
AC 590.91 6 98.48 23.31 <.001 
BC 168.50 6 28.08 6065 <.01 
ABC 66.46 6 11.08 2.62 <005 
C X Subj w. Gpso 2231.22 528 4.23 
Total 24742.62 643 
Table 5.9 
Mean scores for total preparation time as a function of locus of control, sex, and the seven 
numbers of characteristics. 
Number of 
Characteristics 1M IF EM EF M F I E Combined 
3 6.19 5.99 8.27 8.78 7.23 7.38 6.09 8.52 7.30 
4 7.77 7.93 11.41 11.24 9.59 9.59 7.85 11.32 9.59 
5 9.29 9.26 11.44 13.22 10.37 11.24 9.27 12.33 10.80 
6 10.83 11.14 15.90 15.05 13.36 13.09 10.98 15.47 13.23 
7 11.70 14.29 17.85 19.37 14.78 16.83 13.00 18.61 15.80 
8 13.50 15.35 19.98 22.36 16.74 18.86 14.43 21.17 17.80 
9 17.36 18.39 24.20 27.72 20.78 23.06 17.88 25.96 21.92 
Combined 13.26 14.29 11.36 16.20 
1M = Internal males 
IF = Internal females 
EM = External males 
EF = External females 
I = Internals 
E = Externals 
I-' 
--.:J 
--.:J 
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The highly significant locus of control X characteristics 
interaction was investigated using t tests. At every number 
of the characteristics the internals were faster than externals 
(t = -3.857; -5.508; -4.857; -7.127; -8.905; -10.700; and 
-12.825 for numbers 3,4,5,6,7,8, and 9 of the characteristics 
respectively; all the t values are significant at .0005 level 
of significance). Thus as the characteristics increased 
from 3 to 9 so did the differences between internals and 
externals (except for 5 characteristics where the difference is 
slightly reduced). 
Investigation of the sex X characteristics interaction uSlng Tukey's 
q tests show that for numbers 5,7,8 and 9 of the characteristics 
males were faster than females (q = 3.995, P<.Ol; q = 9.318, . ' 
P<.OOl; q = 9.636, P<.OOl; and q = 10.364, P<.OOl respectively). 
There were no significant differences between males and females 
for numbers 3,4 and 6 of the characteristics. Thus as the 
characteristics increase in number (especially from 7 onwards) 
the differences between males and females also increased. 
As the variability caused by locus X sex X characteristics 
triple interaction is so low compared to that due to locus X 
characteristics interaction, it did not warrant further examination. 
lV Solution Time 
Mean scores of solution time are presented ln Table 5.11. 
Table 5.ll 
Mean scores ror solution time as a fUnction of locus of control, sex, and the seven 
numbers of characteristics. 
Number or 
Characteristics 1M IF EM EF M F I E Combined 
3 8.44 9.90 15.52 17.88 11.98 13.89 9.17 16.70 12.93 
4 10.18 11.33 15.08 15.84 12.63 13.58 10.75 15.46 13.11 
5 6.59 7.00 11.05 10.58 8.82 8.79 6.79 10.81 8.80 
6 7.31 7.82 11.12 10.07 9.22 8.95 7.57 10.60 9.08 
7 6.16 7.76 10.47 8.97 8.31 8.36 6.96 9.72 8.34 
8 6.36 8.23 9.60 9.29 7.98 8.76 7.30 9.44 8.37 
9 6.29 8.33 9.85 12.19 8.07 10.26 7.31 11.02 9.17 
Combined 9.57 10.37 7.98 11.96 
1M = Internal males 
IF = Internal females 
EM = External males 
EF = External females 
I = Internals 
E = Externals 
I--' 
~ 
\0 
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An analysis of varlance of solution time scores produced 
the following significant differences: highly significant locus 
of control and characteristics main effects; and significant 
locus X characteristics and sex X characteristics interaction 
(see Table 5.12) • 
Table 5.12 
Summary of analysis of variance of solution time as a function 
of locus of control,sex, and the seven numbers of characteristics. 
VARIATION SS DF MS F P 
Between PeoEle 7002.90 91 
A (locus of con- 2559.31 1 2559.31 52.35 <.001 
trol) 
B' (sex) 102.48 1 102.48 2.10 
AB 39.31 1 39.31 0080 
Subj W. Groups 4301.81 88 48.88 
Within PeoEle 7553.76 552 
C (condition) 2449.92 6 408.32 48.21 <.001 
AC 434.74 6 72.46 8.55 <.01 
BC 129.08 6 21.51 2.54 <.05 
ABC 67.71 6 11.29 1.33 
c X subj W. Groups 4472.31 528 8.47 
Total 14556.67 643 
Inspection of the mean scores indicate that solution time 
increased slightly as the characteristics increased from 3 to 4. 
However, when the characteristics increased from 4 to 5 solution 
time dropped sharply and remained relatively constant from 5 to 9 
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characteristics. This stability of solution type for the number 
of characteristics of >5 was also reported by Johnson et al (1961). 
Considering the differences between internals and externals, 
the prediction was upheld, the internals' solution time was faster 
than that of the externals'. Unlike total preparation time, 
the variability in solution time due to the locus of control ma1n 
effect is greater than that of characteristics main effect. 
·Investigation of the locus X characteristics interaction 
uS1ng t tests indicatedthat for each number of the characteristics, 
internals were faster than internals (t = -17.512; -10.953; 
-9.349; -7.047; -6.419; -4.977; and -8.628 for numbers 
3,4,5,6,7,8 and 9 of the characteristics respectively; all the 
t values are significant at the .0005~level). Thus 
. 
the difference between internals and externals was greatest for 
3 and 4 characteristics, then as the characteristics increased, 
the difference, though still significant, was reduced. However, 
at 9 characteristics the difference increased sharply. These 
results together with those of total preparation time are plotted 
in Figure 5.3. 
Inspecting the sex X characteristics interaction, uS1ng q 
tests, show that males were faster at numbers 3 (q = 3.411; 
p<.05) and 9 (q = 3.911; P<.Ol) of the characteristics. All 
the other differences were not significant. Thus males solved 
the problems quicker than females only at the extreme ends of the 
range of characteristicso 
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Figure 5.3 
Interaction between locus of control and total preparation and 
solution times for the seven numbers of characteristics. 
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v Approaches to Solve the Problem 
The first part of the post-task questionnaire dealt 
with two approaches subjects possibly might have used while 
working on the problems. Subjects responded to the following 
two approaches by putting a cross against the approach(es) they 
used: "Tended to conceptualise the appropriate object while 
examining the characteristics' list, and before looking at 
the objects' list" and "In addition to matching the appropriate 
object with characteristics, I tried to compare all the five 
objects with each other". Subjects were also asked whether or 
not they employed the "conceptualisation of the objects" approach 
for the obvious objects. It was expected that internals and 
externals would differ in utilising these two approaches. 5 
The number of internals and externals employing the 
two approaches was very close. Subjects tended to conceptualise 
obvious objects before being exposed to them more often than 
comparing the five objects, in any objects' list, with each 
other (see Table 5.13). 
5 Subjects were observed to use these particular approaches in 
the pilot studies. This is why they were specified in the 
post-task questionnaire. 
Table 5.13 
Number of subjects using the listed approaches as a function 
of theirloc.usofc6ntrol and sex. 
APPROACHES 
Ss a b c d 
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IM 20 0 20 18 a = Conceptualisation 
IF 21 0 21 17 of objects. 
EM 21 0 21 15 b = 'a' but for all 
objects 
EF 23 0 23 18 
'a' but c = for obvious 
I 41 0 41 35 objects only 
E 44 0 44 33 d = comparison of objects 
Comb- 85 0 85 68 
ined 
l.V Errors 
The experimenter kept a record of all the errors (over 
the 24 trials) for each subject. Generally the errors were 
low for most subjects, indicating that the task was not a very 
difficult one. The frequency of errors, and the number of 
subjects making them, across the seven characteristics are 
presented in Table 5.14. The number of errors for internals 
and externals was not very different (96 versus 93 respectively). 
Results of the number of internals and externals making less 
than 4 or 4 and more errors were arranged in a contingency 
table and analysed using a ~ corrected for continuity (Siegel, 1956). 
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Table 5.14 
Frequency of errors and number of subjects making the errors 
as a function of locus of control, sex, and the seven 
chara.cteristics. 
NUMBER OF CHARACTERISTICS 
Ss 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
IM 5 6 7 10 9 6 4 
Frequency IF 7 9 5 9 10 5 4 
EM 2 7 8 10 8 4 4 . IM = Internal males 
EF 8 7 10 8 5 5 7 IF = Internal 
I 12 15 12 19 19 11 8 females 
E 10 14 18 18 13 9 11 EM = External 
males 
IM 5 3 6 6 4 4 3 EF = External females 
IF 5 7 3 7 6 4 3 I = Internals 
Number EM 2 6 6 9 6 3 4 
of E -= Externals EF 7 5 8 7 3 5 6 Subjects 
I 10 10 9 13 10 8 6 
E 9 11 14 18 9 8 10 
Internals and externals did not differ significantly in the 
2 
number of errors they made overthe 24 trials (X = .14;n.s.) 
It is interesting to note that, once again as in the 
first study, although internals and externals differed consider-
ably in their cognitive responses (i.e. switchbacks), the 
solution per ~_(naming the correct word) was the same for both 
groups. 
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Task. performance measures (except approaches to solving 
the problem) were intercorrelated for internals and externals. 
The resulting matrix . (Table 5.15) indicates that where as the 
correlations among total preparation time and all the types 
of switchbacks were highly-significant and positive for internals, 
the same correlations were very low for externals. This indicates 
that for internals as preparation time increased so did the number 
of switchbacks; whereas these two variables were unrelated for 
externals. Thus for an internal the amount of time he spent 
scanning the characteristics is directly related to the number of 
switchbacks he made. Obviously the longer he took the more 
difficult he found the task and thus the more switchbacks he made 
between the lists. The number of switchbac~ made by an external, 
however, was not contingent upon the time he spent studying the 
characteristics. Externals used switchbacks when their preparation 
time was short and the item described was relatively easy to 
identify, and when this time was long and the item described was 
more difficult to identify. Both groups appear to handle 
information differently. It is interesting to note that solution 
time and half switchbacks were significantly, positively correlated 
for internals only. Half switchbacks comprised the majority of 
switchbacks employed by internals. Moreover, the correlations 
between half switchbacks and either overall or standard switchbacks 
were only significant (and positive) for internals. This 1S 
expected since externals used very few half switchbacks as compared 
to internals. All the other significant correlations in Table 5.13 
are obvious. 
Table 5.15 
S.T. . E. O.SW. S.SW. , 2SW • D.SW • D+SW. 
T.P.T. INT. • 821b -.150 • 526b • 490b .439b .45'Tb -* 
EXT. • 699b .056 .196 .241 .037 .049 .149 
S.T. INT. -.188 .311 .256 .299a .234 
EXT. .013 .195 .262 .005 .041 .119 
E. INT. .060 .028 .047 .195 
EXT. .084 .042 .149 .044 .104 
O.SW. INT. . 910b • 894b • 663b 
EXT. .905b .106 • 891b .768b 
S.SW. INT. . 638b .665b 
EXT -.101 • 670b .50'Tb 
~SW. INT. .436b 
EXT. -.008 -.025 
D .• SW. INT. 
EXT. 
D+SW. EXT. .876b 
a = P<.05 b = P< .01 
I----' 
ex> 
* Double + switchbacks are not included for internals as they did not employ any. -.::J 
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Summary of the Results of Task Performance 
Task familiarity check indicated that subjects were 
unfamiliar with the tasko The predictions regarding preparation 
and solution time and switchbacks were strongly supported: 
internals, as compared to externals, took shorter time to 
rehearse the characteristics and name the correct objects and 
utilised much less standard and double switchbacks (no internal 
used double + switchbacks). Internals also employed more 
half switchbacks than externals. Both internals and externals 
tended to conceptualise the obvious objects while scann1ng 
the characteristics and before viewing the objects. Both 
.groups had identical number of errors which was low. 
Preparation time and switchbacks were positively related for 
internals and were independent for externals. Therefore, 
it is clearly demonstrated that internals and externals dealt 
with the task in different ways, without there being any 
significant differences in their success in naming the correct 
objects. Sex differences in preparation and solution time were 
small compared with those due to locus of control and the 
different number of characteristics. 
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B. Perception of, and Reactions to, the Task 
The second part of the post task questionnaire was 
concerned with the subjects' involvement In the experiment 
and their perception of skill versus chance determination of 
the task. As indicated in the method section all the 
indices pertaining to subjects perception of, and reaction to, 
the task were measured using a 9 point rating scale. 
i Interest Scores 
Subjects responded to the following question: "How 
interested were you in the task?". The mean scores are reported 
in Table 5.16. 
Table 5.16 
Mean ratings of the subject's interest in the task as a function 
of locus of control and sex. 
SEX 
SUBJECTS MALES FEMALES COMBINED 
Internals 7.74 7.91 7.83 
Externals 7.70 7.74 7.72 
Combined 7.72 7.83 7078 
Low score indicates disinterest, high score the reverse. 
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The data were analysed using a 2x2 factorial design 
(locus of control X sex). This design ~s used for all subsequent 
analyses in this section. A~ummary of the analysis of variance of 
interest scores is presented in Table 5.17. 
Table 5.17 
Summary of the analysis of variance of the subjects' ratings 
of their interest in the task as a function of locus of control 
and· sex. 
VARIATION SS DF MS F P 
A (locus of control) O~27 1 0.27 0.29 
B (sex) _ 0.27 1 0.27 0.29 
A X B 0.10 1 0.10 0.11 
Within cell 81<>57 88 0.93 
Total 82.21 91 
No significant effects were obtained, and as Table 5.16 
shows subjects found the task to be reasonably interesting. 
ii Effort Scores 
The mean scores for the subjects' responses to the 
question "When trying to name the correct object, how hard did 
you try?" are presented in Table 5.18. 
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Table 5.18 
Mean ratings of the subjects' effort exertion while working on 
the task as a function of locus of control and sexo 
SEX 
SUBJECTS MALES FEMALES COMBINED 
Internals 8061 8.48 8.54 
Externals 8.09 . 8.68 8.37 
Combined 8.35 8.58 8.46 
Low score denotes less effort, high score the opposite. 
Analysis of var1ance of effort scores produced 
significant locus X sex interaction (F = 4.87; df 1/88, P<.05) 
which was the only significant difference obtained. Generally, 
all subjects expended great effort while working on the task 
(see Table 5.16). Inspecting the significant interaction using 
Tukey's q tests indicated: that internal males exerted more 
effort than external males (q = 3.250; P<.05), and that external 
females expended greater effort than external males (q = 3.688; 
P<. 05) 0 The external males had the lowest effort score, while 
external females scored the highest. These differences are 
relative to each other as all subjects had high effort scores o 
111 Like Scores 
The subjects responded to the question "How much did 
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you like the task?" Table 5.19 shows mean scores for 'like' 
scores. 
Table 5.19 
Mean ratings of the subjects' liking of the task as a function 
of Ibcusof·controland sex. 
SEX 
SUBJECTS MALES FEMALES COMBINED 
Internals 7.91 7.48 7.70 
Externals 7.43 7.61 7052 
Combined 7067 7.55 7.61 
Low score denotes dislike, high score the opposite. 
No significant effects were obtained from the analysis 
of variance of 'like' scores and,as Table 5.17 indicates,all 
the subjects liked the tasko 
Mean scores for 'like' and 'interest' (see tables 
5.16 and 5.19) are very similar suggesting that these two indices 
measure much the same thing. These results contradict those 
obtained 1n the first study where 'interest' scores were higher 
than 'like' scores. 
1V Task Perception Scores 
This index measures the subjects own perception of task 
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control. The mean scores for the subjects' responses to the 
question "How much do you think this was a task which depended 
on skill or chance?" are shown in Table 5.20. 
Mean ratings of the subjects'perception of the task control 
as a function of locus of control and sex. 
SEX 
SUBJECTS MALES FEMALES COMBINED 
Internals 8.l3 7.74 7.54 
Externals 6.96 7.13 7.09 
Combined 7.55 7.44 7.32 
Low score indicates chance control, high score the reverse. 
The analysis of var~ance of task perception scores 
resulted in a highly significant locus of control main effect 
(F = 14.03, at 1/88, P<oOOl). The other differences were 
not significant. The mean scores (Table 5.20) reveal that 
internals perceived the task as being more controlled by skill 
than externals. Most of the variability was caused by internal 
and external males. Internal males scored the highest while 
external males scored the lowest. Generally all the subjects 
construed the task to be skill controlled. 
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v. Task Difficulty Scores 
Task difficulty rating ranged from "the task was too 
easy for me" to "the task was too difficult for me". Mean 
scores for task difficulty are presented in Table 5.21. 
Table 5.21 
Mean ratings of the subjects' perception of task difficulty as 
a function of locus of control and sex. 
SEX 
SUBJECTS MALES FEMALES COMBINED 
Internals 3061 4.35 3.98 
Externals 5.13 5.17 5.15 
Combined 4037 4.76 4057 
Low score indicates less difficulty, high score the opposite. 
The analysis of varlance of task difficulty scores 
produced a highlysignificant locus of control main effect 
(F = 17.81; df 1/88, P<oOOl) which was the only significant 
difference obtained. Inspection of the means (Table 5.21) 
indicated that internals construed the task to be easier than 
externals. However, again these differences are relative to 
each other as all the subjects considered the task to be easy. 
Thus the ease of the task was reflected by both the subjects' 
own ratings and their low error rates. 
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vi Ability Scores 
Ability ratings ranged from "I lack the ability to 
perform such a task" to "I am very able to perf'orm such a task". 
Mean scores for ability are shown in Table 5.22. 
Table 5.22 
Mean ratings of the subjects' perception of their ability to 
solve the task as a fUnction of locus of control and sex. 
SEX 
SUBJECTS MALE FEMALE COMBINED 
Internals 7.04 6.65 6.85 
Externals 6.70 5.91 6.30 
Combined 6.87 6.28 6.58 
Low score denotes inability, high score the reverse. 
The sex main effect was the only significant difference 
(F = 4.50; df 1/88, p<.05) obtained from the analyses of' 
variance of ability scores. As the mean scores indicate males 
felt that they were more able to perform the task than females. 
Further, internal males exhibited the highest scores, while 
external females displayed the lowest scores. Generally, the 
subjects were not quite sure that they possessed the full ability 
to perform the task. 
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v~~ Number of Internals and Externals who wrote Comments 
At the end of the post-task questionnaire, the subjects 
were given the option of writing their comments about their 
performance or any aspects of the task. Sixty-nine subjects 
wrote comments. The number of internals who wrote comments 
was 40 (21 males and 19 females) while the number of externals 
who wrote comments was 29 (15 males and 14 females). These 
results were arranged into a contengency table and analysed 
X2 f' . us~ng a corrected or cont~nu~ty. More internals wrote 
2 
comments than externals X = 5.797, df = 1, P<.02, two-tailed). 
Most of the subjects' comments were about the nature of the task 
(i.e. remarks on certain words, how well the experiment was 
controlled etc). 
Summary of the Results of the Subjects' Reaction to the 
Experiment 
The subjects liked the task, found it interesting, worked 
hard at it, construed it as skill controlled, perceived it as 
easy, and were not completely positive about their ability to 
perform the task. However, the internals, relative to externals, 
viewed the task as being more self controlled and easier, They 
also wrote more comments about the task than externals. 
5.5 DISCUSSION 
The different approaches adopted by internals and 
externals in handling their solution hypotheses (first study) 
were further investigated by the present study. 
summary of the results obtained. 
Below is a 
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1. All subjects construed the task to be a completely 
unfamiliar one. 
2. Predictions regarding preparation and solution 
time and switchbacks were strongly supported; 
internals were significantly faster than externals 
who employed many more switchbacks than internals. 
Moreover, the correlations between preparation 
and solution time and switchbacks were significantly 
positive for internals only. 
3. No significant differences in errors between 
internals and externals were obtainedo Both groups 
were equally successful in naming the correct words. 
4. Internals rated the task as being significantly more 
controlledby skill and significantly less difficult 
than externals. Effort and ability ratings were 
affected by sex differenceso All the subjects 
found the task to be an interesting one. 
5. Significantly more internals than externals wrote 
comments about either their performance and/or 
the task. 
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The second study has further demonstrated that internals 
and externals differ in their assimilation and processing of 
information, although attainment of the solution per ~ was the 
same for both groups. These findings not only corroborate 
those by Bartel et al (1972), Lefcourt and Wine (1969), Phares 
(1968) and Walk and DuCette (1974), but have also demonstrated 
that the ability to solve the task does not identify differences 
between internals and externals as readily as their approaches 
to the task. Except for the Bartel et al study, the other studies 
drew their conclusions about the cognitive activity of internals 
and externals from results concerning solution attainmento The 
results pertaining to task performance are discussed below, 
first, followed by those relating to the subjects' perception 
of, and reactions to the experiment. 
a. Task Performance 
~ Initial and Total Preparation Time and 
Solution Time 
The internals in the second study had shorter initial 
preparation times than the externals. Thus they may be regarded 
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as faster in scann~ng information than externals. They seem 
to assimilate the same information necessary for an adequate 
solution as externals, but more quickly. Since the task employed 
in the second study was relatively easier than that used in the 
first study, and the time constraint was absent, it could be 
argued that the internals' scanning of information may be more 
efficient than that of the externals when working on an easy 
task and at their own pace. The externals, on the other hand, 
clearly deliberated on the information longer in order to 
assimilate it. Perhaps the externals' inability to pick up 
subtle cues in ambiguous conditions (cf. Lefcourt and Wine, 1969) 
is due to the fact that they need more time than internals to 
assimilate these cues. Task difficulty and the time factor 
appear to be significant factors in influencing the problem 
solving behaviour of internals and externals. 
The second study has also demonstrated that the externals' 
total preparation and solution time was much. longer than that 
of the internals. Thus internals not only scan information 
faster than externals, but also process it more quickly. Tnis 
is one sense ~n which internals are more cognitively 'active' 
than externals. They seem to possess the ability of rapidly 
acquiring the elements of a relatively easy task, and solving 
it almost effortlessly 0 
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~~ Switchbacks 
The externals utilised more switchbacks than internals. 
The externals' longer preparation time and greater number of 
switchbacks could be regarded as means of increasing the 
saliency of information to facilitate assimilation. This 
process allows the externals to ponder and extract more information 
which, if processed at a faster speed and with less switchbacks, 
especiallY standard and double switchbacks, offer an easy way 
of strengthening the saliency of preparation and solution 
. items, and it was the externals who employed these latter types 
of switchbacks more than internals. Thus externals, relative 
to internals, not only require more explicit cues to facilitate 
their problem solving abilities (Lefcourt, 1967; Lefcourt and 
Wine, 1969; Wolk and DuCette, 1974), but would themselves 
increase the saliency of information if allowed to do so. 
The externals' ability to relate to their environment ~s more 
dictated by its prominent features than is true of internals 
who are also sensitive to less prominent ones. Thus it is not 
surprising that both internals and externals performed equally 
well (in terms of their low number of errors). It seems that 
the more salient a task becomes, the more likelihood that 
externals would perform as well as internals. The lack of any 
significant differences between the two groups as far as solution 
per ~ is concerned, therefore, may be due to the availability 
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of switchbacks for the externals and the lack of any time 
constraints. How they would perform if not given the opportunity 
to switchback is an open ~uestion and deserves further 
investigation. 
Another important difference between internals and 
externals is in the types of switchbacks employed. More 
internals used half switchbacks than externals. In a half 
switchback subjects 'hold' the objects' list in their head (or 
immediate memory) while scanning the characteristics' list for 
the second time, and then name the appropriate object without 
switching to the objects' list. This kind of switchback is 
certainly less redundant than standard switchbacks, or even 
, 
double and double plus switchbacks. The issue is not merely 
that internals used more half switchbacks than externals, but 
that they employed fewer total switchbacks. Internals seem 
to be more able to hold certain information in their head while 
processlng other information. It is important to realise that 
the nature of the the task, task difficulty, and time constraints 
seem to affect the cognitive functioning of internals and 
externals differently. 
It was argued in the first study that internals and 
externals set themselves different criteria for testing and 
rejecting their solution hypotheses. The internals in that 
study used relatively more trials per solution hypothesis, 
while the externals seemed to abandon an hj~othesis without 
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fully exploring it and they often 'returned to it later. It was 
also argued that such different criteria were the result of the 
time constraints and the high level of task difficulty. In 
the present study there were no time constraints as subjects 
worked at their own pace. Moreover, the task in this study 
was relatively easier than that employed in the first study as 
manifested by the subjects' ratings and low error rates. 
Therefore, when the time constraints are minimal and the nature 
of the task is easy, then internals' capacity for processing 
information effectively is superior to that of the externals. 
The results also showed that as the number of 
characteristics increases, the object being described becomes 
more obvious. This can be seen in Figure 5.3 which 
indicates that as the number of characteristics increased from 
3 to 5, the solution time dropped sharply. When the number 
of characteristics was small (3 or 4), little information was 
conveyed and subjects required more time to name the object. 
What is puzzling is that externals employed many switchbacks 
even when the number of characteristics was 3 and 4, while 
internals rarely used them for that number of characteristics. 
This raises the question whether externals failed to hold ln 
their memory as few as 3 characteristics. What is also 
interesting is that although both internals and externals 
conceptualised obvious objects while scanning the characteristics 
and before being exposed to the objects' list, the externals 
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nevertheless switched back more than externals. Does this mean 
that externals forgot the conceptualised object when being 
exposed to the objects' list and/or that they conceptualised the 
wrong object? 
The externals whenfaced with the objects' list might 
attempt to test each characteristic in their head against an 
object. In doing so they increase the chances of forgetting 
the remaining characteristics because they are dealing with 
them in a discrete manner. Thus they switched back to the 
characteristics, refreshed their memory, and then switched to 
the objects' list. Indeed the externals' employment of many 
more double and double plus switchbacks than internals supports 
the above line of thought. -In double and double plus switchbacks 
subjects went back and forth more than once between the 
characteristics and the objects. These switchbacks seem to 
transfer the characteristics' and objects' lists from being 
separate into being simultaneous. In other words, double and 
double plus switchbacks render both lists so salient that they 
do not look separate. 
The internals, on the other hand,' when examining the 
objects' list, seemed to be comparing all the characteristics 
with the five objects thus rendering a switchback unnecessary. 
They did not appear to handle information discretely, but treated 
the characteristics' and objects' lists as a whole. Externals, 
relative to internals, have been shown to deal with the components 
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of a task in a discrete fashion and with inefficient allocation 
of attention and structuring of stimuli (Wolk and DuCette, 1914). 
In the first study of this research, the externals utilised more 
solution hypotheses and changed them more frequently than internals, 
who used only a few solution hypotheses because of their different 
criterion for rejecting them. This cautious thoroughness approach of 
the internals in the first study is not evident in the second 
study because the task was easy and internals processed the 
information quickly and accurately. However, the externals' 
approach in the first study which was explained as 111abile" 
seems to have manifested itself again in the second study 1n the 
sheer number of switchbacks utilised by the externals. 
Moreover, the correlations between decision time 
(preparation and solution time) and switchbacks further buttresses 
the above argument. These correlations were low and non-
significant for externals, while they were highly significant 
and positive for internals. Thus as preparation and solution 
time increased for internals they used more switchbacks, but 
the externals' use of switchbacks evidenced no such consistency (cf. p.186) • 
It is interesting to note that the majority of the 
subjects' switchbacks occured when the number of characteristics 
was 6 (see Table 5.1), although their total preparation time was 
not longer for those characteristics as compared with 1, 8 and 9 
characteristics. This was due to the fact that the subjects' 
initial preparation time for 6 characteristics was shorter than 
that for 7, 8 or 9 characteristics. Also the subjects' 
switchbacks' time for 6 characteristics was shorter than that 
for 7, 8, or 9 characteristics. The peak of the number of 
switchbacks used at 6 characteristics is difficult to explain 
and may be an artefact due to the specific items made up of 6 
characteristics. 
Other explanations of the differences 1n switchbacks 
between internals and externals are failure of memory and/or 
low confidence. It may be argued that externals switched 
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back simply because they forgot the materials. However, it 1S 
the causes of this "forgetting" which makes the differences 
between internals and externals interesting, and a probable 
reason for this "forgetting" has already been explored (i.e. 
the tendency to handle the information in a discrete manner). 
If externals are characterised by a less effective memory (for 
whatever reason) then switchbacks will help by increasing task 
saliency. 
It may also be argued that externals' employment of 
many switchbacks was a means of assuring themselves of the 
appropriate object. In other words, externals lacked the 
confidence of naming an object without switchbacks. Again this 
1S a valid issue, however, the task was rated as being easy 
by externals. Still it may be that externals construed the 
task to be an easy one because they switched back. Confidence 
may not be very meaningful if taken out of the context of externals' 
, 
performance on the task. If switching back increased the 
externals' confidence, the question becomes why? Is the 
externals' confidence contingent upon information saliency? 
That is to say, are externals only confident in situations 
where events are less subtle? It may be that they lack 
confidence in ambiguous conditions due to their inability to 
extract task relevant information. 
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It is interesting to note that sex differences were 
only significant in total preparation time. Males were found 
to be faster than females. It is a typical finding that males' reaction 
time is faster than their female counterparts' for these kinds of tasks 
(Woodworth and Schlosberg, 1954). Moreover, sex differences 
did not seriously affect total preparation time data as the 
variability due" to sex was much smaller than that caused by 
locus of control differences. 
b. Perceptions of, and Reactions to, the Experiment 
Turning now to the subjects' perception of, and reactions 
to the experiment: internals construed the task as being more 
skill controlled and rated it as eaSler than externals. These 
results are in line with the internal's perception of themselves 
as determining their own behaviour. It is also understandable 
that they should regard the task as very easy since their 
preparation and solution times were fast and their error rates 
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were low. However, both internals and externals conceived the 
task to be skill determined and easy to perform, although this 
was significantly more true of the internals. It seems that 
task difficulty and situation locus of control (skill versus 
chance) affect reaction times differently. In the Rotter and 
Mulry (1965) and Lefcourt et al (1968) studies internals had 
longer decision times when the task was difficult and skill 
determined. However, in the present study, when the task was 
easy and determined by skill, internals' reaction times became 
faster than those of the externals. Thus it may not only 
be the nature of situation locus of control which influences 
reaction times (as suggested by Lefcourt et al, 1968), but also 
the level of task difficulty. 
It could be that externals construed the task as being 
self determined because they were allowed to employ switchbacks 
(i.e. switching back gave the externals more sense of mastery). 
It may be conjectured that as the task becomes more salient 
(either by cue explication or switchbacks) the externals might 
develop internally controlled expectancies. Lefcourt (1967) 
offered some support for this line of thought. 
Both internals and externals rated the task to be 
interesting, and demanding high effort. Thus it seems that 
both groups were motivated to work on the problem. Sex 
differences affected the effort and ability ratings. External 
females reported the highest effort ratings and the lowest 
ability ratings. External females may have worked harder 
because they thought that they lacked the ability to perform 
the task. Internal males, on the other hand, displayed the 
highest ability scores. They seemed to be highly conf.ident 
of performing well on the task. Although Rotter (1966) 
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maintained that sex interactions with locus of control were 
minimal, Lefcourt and Wine (1969) argued that the males' desire 
to appear as the controller of their actions may affect such 
an interaction. 
Significantly more internals than externals wrote 
comments about either their performance and/or the task. 
Writing comments may be regarded as a slgn of greater involvement. 
Thus although both internals and externals rated the task as being 
equally interesting, the internals seem to have been more 
involved in the task than the externals. Although it is 
purely conject1rral that writing comments is a measure of 
involvement, it lS a typical finding that internals are more 
involved in the tasks they engage in (Karabenick, 1972)0 
c. Conclusions 
Internals and externals are characterised by distinctive 
approaches to problem solving. The ways In which they handled 
their solution hypotheses (first study), and processed information 
(second study) were different. Most significant is the fact 
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that in both these studies, where different tasks were employed, 
internals and externals displayed the same problem solving 
behaviour characteristic of each group. 
CHAPTER 6 
THIRD STUDY 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The aJ.m of the third study was two fold: first, to 
attempt to overcome some methodological problems that were 
associated with the first study; and second, to investigate 
further the generalisability of the cognitive responses of 
internals and externals which were identified in the first two 
studies. 
The recording of solution hypotheses used in the first 
study lacked some reliabilitY,due to the fact that subjects 
indicated their solution hypotheses at the end of the 
experiment, and hence depended on the accuracy of their recall. 
Although internals and externals approached the tasks 
of the first and second studies differently, it made no 
difference to their performance (i.e. solution ~~). The 
task of the first study was too difficult and the one employed 
in the second study was relatively easy. Therefore, for this 
present study, a concept formation task was devised which was 
of more intermediate difficulty and allowed subjects to indicate 
the solution hypothesis they used following each trial. In this 
way the manner of hypotheses utilisation was more closely 
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monitored. The task lasted for twenty four trials. On each 
trial subjects were shown a "set" made up of two letters and two 
numbers (e.g. CAl6) and they were required to find a common 
principle (or concept) which was used in the construction of some 
of the sets. 
Measurement of the degree of the subjects' confidence 
ln identifying the principle was also take~ as the wide-spread 
use of switchbacks by externals in the second study might have 
reflected their low level of confidence. There were three 
confidence indices: one before commenclng the task (initial 
confidence); one while working on the task (middle confidence); 
and one after completing the task (post confidence). These 
three indices were included to account for any differential 
confidence shifts between internals and externals. Previous 
studies have shown the internals' initial confidence to be 
higher than that of the externals (Ryckman, Gold, and Rodda, 1971; 
Johnson and Kilmann, 1975). No differences in confidence shifts 
were found in these studies between internals and externals 
(i.e. all subjects raised their confidence following success 
and lowered it after failure). 
As regards performanc e , it was difficult to tell which of 
the two groups (internals or externals) would be better at 
deciphering the principle. Hickey (1976), after finding that 
internals outperformed externals in solving anagrams, argued 
that internals tended to perceive the problem as a whole and 
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manipulated the stimuli within that whole bett~r than externals, 
who failed to construe the task in a coherent way. 
Wolk and DuCette(1974) offered the same line of thought. These 
differences may be due to the different methods by which internals 
and externals approach a problem; the internals' more systematic 
way of processing information, and the externals' more labile 
handling of the task's components. However, since the solution 
of the problem was the same for internals and externals ln the 
first and second studies, there is no clear precedent for 
predicting which, if either, of the two groups would be better 
at discovering the principle underlying the construction of the 
sets. 
6.2 PREDICTIONS 
Although there is strong evidence to suggest that 
internals solve problems better than externals (DuCette and Wolk, 
1973; Hickey,1976; Lefcourt et aI, 1973; Lefcourt and Wine, 
1969; Phares, 1968; Wolk and DuCette, 1974) the results of the 
first two studies make clear-cut predictions somewhat equivocal • 
Therefore, no specific predictions . are made concernlng 
differences between internals and externals in their ability 
to discover the principle. Differences between the groups ln 
the number and use of solution hypotheses are also difficult to 
predict as this task is only of intermediate difficulty, however, 
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similar trends to those found ~n the first study seem possible 
as the tasks are similar. 
As regards confidence ratings, it is predicted that 
internals initial confidence will be higher than that of the 
externals. No predictions for middle and post confidence were 
made since it was not known at what stage of the trials the 
subjects would find the principle. 
Perceptions of, and reactions to the experimental 
indices (similar to those employed in the first and second studies) 
were also included to supplement the data for task performance. 
It is expected that internals, relative to externals, will 
perceive their performance and the task to be more skill 
oriented. 
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6.3 METHOD 
a.General Synopsis 
The study consisted of two phases. During the first, 
conducted two months prior to the second, all the subjects 
completed Rotter's I-E scale in order to determine their locus 
of control. In the second phase internals and externals were 
tested in group sessions to assess their performance on the task. 
When they finished the task, the subjects were given the post-
task questionnaire which contained items related to their 
perception of, and reactions to, the experiment. A debriefing 
session concluded the study. 
b. Assessment of Internality and Externality 
The overall mean of the I-E scores (N = 40) was 11.47. 
Internals were defined as those subjects scoring 11 and below, 
while externals were those subjects scoring 12 and above. Thus 
in the three studies the criterion of allocation of I-E scores 
was the same. 
c. Experimental Design 
The sample was comprised of 40 subjects, half were 
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classified as internals (11 males and 9 females), and the other 
half as externals (8 males and 12 females). Data were analysed 
using 2x2 factorial design (locus of control X sex) with unequal 
number in cells (least square analysis). This design is presented 
in Table 6.1 
Table 6.1 
Experimental Design of the Third Study 
SUBJECTS 
Internals 
Externals 
MALES 
11 
8 
SEX 
FEMALES 
9 
12 (13)* 
( )* = The number originally assigned to this cell. 
was omitted as she refused to perform the task. 
d. Selection of Subjects 
The subject 
Subjects were introductory psychology students (from the 
1911 class) at Stirling University. Early in the academic 
year the whole class was administered Rotter's I-E scale. Two 
months later subjects were solicited via a notice board and 
received a course credit each for their participation. However, 
since the number of those volunteered contained more externals 
than internals (11 versus 12), 11 (8 internals and 3 externals) 
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from the same population were offered one pound for acting 
as subjects in the experiment. The 11 students were sent 
letters urging them to participate. All of them reacted 
positively to the letter. One subject (an internal female) 
refused the one pound asserting that she just wanted to help. 
Originally 41 subjects took part. However, one 
subject (an external female) refused to do the experiment, 
after reading the instructions, claiming that she lacked the 
ability to perform the task. 
e. InStruments 
1 Rotter's I-E Scale: (see the first study). 
11 The Task 
The task employed in the first study was almost 
, 
impossible to solve, but allowed for the formation of solution 
hypotheses, while in the second study, the task was-relatively easy 
and generated specific behaviour (i.e. switchbacks) particularly 
with the externals. The main aim in constructing the present 
task was to strike a balance between these two extremes of 
difficulty and ease. In other words, a task whose solution 
is more accessible to certain subjects than others. Thet~k 
should also provide some room for creating solution hypotheseso 
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f. . Pilot Studies 
Numerous pilot studies were carried out to arr~ve at a 
task that would satisfY the above specifications. The chosen 
task was loosely based on the one adopted by Mandler, Cowan and 
Gold (1964). Mandler et al investigated the effect of prior 
training when a concept was present (a positive instance) and when 
it was not present (a negative instance) on performance. The 
dimensions of the concept employed by Mander et al were: 4 
letters of the alphabet; 4 numericals, and 2 types (upper and 
lower case). 
The dimensions employed ~n the present study were: 
2 letters of the alphabet and 2 numericals (for example CAl6). 
Many different principles were tested and proved to be either 
too difficulty or too easy. However, one principle produced 
a 50% chance of being detected (i.e. almost half of subjects 
discovered it and the other half could not). The principle was 
that whenever "Au and "3" were present in a set, the set 
contained the principle. Thus the sets ACl3 and BA43 contain 
the principle while the sets CD26 and DBl6 do not contain the 
principle. The subjects were presented with 24 sets some of 
which contained the principle (positive instances) and some of 
which did not contain the principle (negative instances). 
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g. Specifications of the Task Employed In the Experiment 
Proper 
There were 24 trials comprised of 24 sets. All these 
sets are presented In Appendix 3. There were 15 positive sets 
(i.e. containing the principle) and 9 negative sets (i.e. not 
containing the principle) , following Mandler and Cowan's (1962) 
and Mandler et aI's (1964) findings that when the posi ti ve 
instances exceed the negative ones the concept becomes more 
approachable. The positive and negative instances were randomly 
distributed except for the first two sets. This was necessary 
to influence the formation of solution hypotheses at the early 
stages of the trials, for during pilot studies subjects attache~ 
great importance to the order of numbers and letters (e.g. in 
the set CD12, "C" comes before "D" and so does "1" and "2"). An 
"A" ora"3" were never included In a negative setl. 
The task was designed for group testing, and thus was 
presented in a booklet form. The booklet contained 24 trial 
sheets, feedback sheets, and confidence rating scales. A 
sample of a trial page is presented overleaf. 
1 Including "A" or "3" in negative sets confused many pilot 
subjects and rendered the task more difficult. 
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Sample 
DA23 
This set contains the principle 
This set does not contain the principle 
Please write down the strategy2(ies) that you used: 
Thus in a trial page a set was printed on the top 
with two statements underneath, and the subjects were required 
to tick one of them. After ticking one statement the subjects 
had to write down any solution hypothesis they employed. The 
subjects were told to write down guesses or any relevant reasons 
for choosing a particular statement. The next page (feedback 
sheet) informed the subjects whether or not the previous set 
contained the principle. Thus a positive feedback sheet contained 
the following statement: "The set contained the principle", and 
a negative feedback sheet contained the following statement "The 
set did not contain the principle". The subjects were exposed 
to only one feedback sheet at a time. 
2 The term 'strategy' was used in the task instead of solution 
hypotheses so as not to confuse the sUbjects. 
220 
Three 9-point scales were presented before the first 
trial (labelled initial confidence), after the 12th trial 
(labelled middle confidence), and after the 24th trial (labelled 
post confidence). Post confidence was answered by those who 
failed to find the principle; it dealt with the degree of 
confidence in finding the principle if the number of trials 
was doubled. These scales are presented in Appendix 3. 
h. Post-Task Questionnaire 
The post-task questionnaire of the third study dealt 
solely with perception of, and reaction to, the experiment 
uS1ng a 9-point rating scale similar to that utilised in the 
first study. Subjects were asked: "How much do you think this 
was a task which depended on skill or. chance?"; "How much do 
you think your performance on the task depended on skill or chance?,,3; 
"How familiar was this task to you?"; "How difficult was this 
task for you?"; and "How interesting was the task?"o One measure 
(task familiarity) served as a treatment check to find out whether 
or not the subjects had previous experiences with a similar task. 
3 Performance perception was included to find out 
not it would yield different reactions from the 
compared to their reactions to task perception. 
perception may be more sensitive to differences 
internals and externals as it directly involves 
behaviour. 
whether or 
subjects as 
Performance 
between 
their own 
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At the end of the questionnaire the subjects were g~ven the 
option of writing down comments about the task or their 
performance. 
~. Procedure 
Subjects were tested in groups. Originally groups of 
8 subjects per session, were solicited, but this did not always 
materialise. The minimum number of subjects in a group was 4, 
and the maximum number was 8. Each testing session lasted for 
one hour. 
Subjects were tested in a communications res.earch 
laboratory which was made of a central area and 8 small cubicles, 
each equipped with a table and a chair. The central area 
allowed the experimenter to monitor each cubicle. 
When the subjects arrived, each one was seated ~n a 
cubicle and was given the following instructions to read: 
INSTRUCTIONS 
This is a learning task and not an intelligence test. On each 
page of the booklet there is a set of two numbers and two letters 
(for example DCI4). There are 24 instances of these sets (i.e. 
24 trials). An underlying principle was used in constructing 
certain sets. In other words, certain sets contain a principle 
common to all these sets. The other sets were constructed in 
such a way so as not to contain the principle. Thus each set 
mayor may not contain the principle. Your task is to find or 
learn the principle. 
Under each set the following two statements are printed: 
"This set contains the principle" and "This set does not 
contain the principle". Examine each set (one at a time) 
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and then indicate whether or not that set contained the principle 
by ticking (.J ) the space on the left hand side of one of the 
above mentioned statements. Please make sure to tick an 
appropriate space each time you examine a set. After doing so, 
please write down the strategy or strategies which you adopted 
and which made you tick one of the spaces. For example, after 
ticking "This set does not contain the principle" state briefly 
the type of strategy(s) you used and which influenced your 
decision. Once you ticked an appropriate space and wrote the 
strategy(s) adopted, turn over the page immediately. On the 
following page you will be told whether or not the previous set 
contained the principle. Thus the page will read "THE SET 
CONTAINED THE PRINCIPLE" or "THE SET DID NOT CONTAIN THE 
PRINCIPLE" • This page will be labelled the feedback sheet. 
You are not allowed to look back at a previous set once you are 
exposed to the feedback sheet. Once you have read the feedback 
sheet please turn over the page immediately. On the following 
page you will find another set. Do the same as you did for the 
previous set (i.e. ticking the appropriate space, writing down 
the strategy(s) that influenced your decision, and then turning 
over to the feedback sheet) 0 This procedure is to be repeated 
throughout the 24 trials. Please make sure to write down the 
strategy(s) adopted for each set. Remember that you cannot go 
back to a set once you are exposed to the 'feedback sheet. 
Please examine and answer each set carefully, but do not spend too 
much time on any set. When you reach the last feedback sheet 
(the one following the last - or 24th - set) indicate on that 
sheet whether or not you found the principle by ticking one of 
the spaces provided. Also please write down the nature of the 
principle in case you found it. 
If you think you found the underlying principle during the early 
stages of the trials, please continue answering each set in the 
manner described above until you reach the last trial. Do this 
even if you found the principle as early as the 5th trial. 
Are there any questions? Please do not start until you are told 
to do so. I will further explain the nature of the task before 
you start. 
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When all the subjects finished reading the instructions, 
they were gathered in the laboratory's central area and the 
experimenter showed them a sample of the booklet explaining fully 
what was expected of them. The experimenter answered all the 
subjects' questions, and the experiment proper did not commence 
until it was clear that all the subjects understood all the 
instructions. Although it was not specified in the instructions, 
that the subjects should write down "guessing", the subjects 
were verbally instructed that if they guessed to write down 
"guessing". The subjects were also made aware of the confidence 
ratings scales. Subjects were asked to remain seated and not 
make any noise even if they had deciphered the principle before 
the end of the experimental session. 
After this, subjects returned to their cubicles and 
were handed the booklets. On finishing the task, the booklets 
were withdrawn, and the subjects were given the post-task 
questionnaire4. While the subjects were answering the post-task 
questionnaire, the experimenter examined the booklets to check 
if they were answered appropriately. Subjects were then assembled 
~n the laboratory's central area and were debriefed and told not 
to discuss the experiment with their classmates. Those who 
4 If a subject finished before the others, his/her booklet 
was taken and was given the post-task questionnaire. After 
answering the questionnaire, the subject was told to rema~n 
seated and wait till all the subjects had finishedg 
volunteered had their course credit cards signed, while the 
others were paid one pound. 
6.4 RESULTS 
The third study was an attempt to continue some of 
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the findings of the first study (i.e. mode of utilising 
solution hypotheses) with tighter experimental controls (mainly 
to safeguard against the effects of delayed memory on recalling 
solution hypotheses). Indices pertaining to the subjects' 
reactions to, and perception of, the experiment were also 
included to supplement the findings on task performance. 
As in the case of the second study, a measure of task 
familiarity was taken in order to control for any past experience 
with the task. Hence, task familiarity check scores are 
presented first followed by distribution of I-E scores. Reports 
on task performance come next, and results of perception of, 
and reactions to, the experiment conclude the presentation. 
a. Task Familiarity Check 
One index of post-task questionnaire contained the 
following question: "How familiar was this task to you?". The 
mean scores of the subjects responses to the above question are 
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shown in Table 6.2. The data were analysed uS1ng a 2x2 (locus 
of control X sex) factorial design with unequal number in cells 
(least square analysis). This design was used for all subsequent 
analyses unless otherwise indicated. 
Table 6.2 
Mean ratings of the subjects' perception of the task's familiarity 
asa fu.nction'oflocus of control and sex. 
SEX 
SUBJECTS MALES FEMALES COMBINED 
Internals 8000 8.11 8.06 
Externals 8.13 8.83 8.48 
Combined 8.07 8.47 8.27 
Low score indicates fmailiarity, high score the reverse. 
Analysis of variance of treatment check scores (summary 
of which is presented in Table 6.3) did not produce any 
significant differences, and as the mean scores show (Table 6.2) 
all the subjects considered the task to be a novel one. The 
externals displayed slightly higher scores than the internals. 
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Table 6.3 
Summary of analysis of variance for the subjects' ratings of 
their·familiarity·with the task as·a fUnction of locus of control 
and sex. 
SS DF MS F P 
A (locus of control) 2.500 1 2.500 2.863 
B (sex) 1.600 1 1.600 1.833 
AB .869 1 .869 .996 
Within cells (error) 31.431 36 .873 
b. I-E Scores 
Table 6.4 reports means and standard deviations of I-E 
scores for males, females and the combined sample. 
Table 6.4 
Means and standard deviations of the I-E scores 
Internal Males 
Internal Females 
External Males 
External Females 
Internals 
Externals 
Combined 
MEANS 
7.36 
7.33 
14.75 
16.42 
7.35 
15.59 
11.47 
STANDARD DEVIATION 
2.69 
3.08 
1.83 
2.64 
2.80 
2.45 
4.89 
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Internality scores were from 3 to 11 inclusive, and 
externality scores were from 12 to 21 inclusive. It 1S 
interesting to note that the overall means of the I-E scale 
across the three studies were very similar (X = 11.42; 11.64; 
and 11.47 for the first, second and third studies respectively). 
c. Comparisons of Paid Versus Volunteer Subjects 
Since it may be argued that paid subjects (9 males and 
2 females) and volunteer subjects (10 males and 19 females) 
might have performed differently on the task, it was decided 
to compare these two groupso This resulted in a 2x2 (subjects, 
paid versus volunteer, X sex) factorial design with unequal numoer 
1n each cell (least square analysis). Mean scores and analyses 
of var1ance of number of correct trials, number of different 
solution hypotheses, and initial confidence are presented in 
Appendix 3. The analyses of variance did not result in any 
significant differences between paid and volunteer subjects 
for the aforementioned three measures o 
Since paid subjects comprised mainly internals (N = 8), 
it was decided to run the same analyses as above (subjects, paid 
versus volunteer internals, X sex) to account for any differences 
that might exist between the two groups. Mean scores and 
summaries of analyses of variance for the number of correct 
trials, number of different solution hypotheses, and initial 
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confidence are presented in Appendix 3. The analyses did not 
produce any significant effects between paid and volunteer 
internals. 
Since all the above comparisons were not significantly 
different, paid and volunteer subjects were treated as one 
group. 
A. Task Performance 
~ Decipherment of the Principle 
Since the principle was whenever 'A' and '3' were present 
~n a set, the decipherment of the principle was considered valid 
if the subject picked either 'A' ~ '3', or 'A' and '3' together 
as always being present in a positive set. 
Only 4 internals (one male and 3 females) found the 
principle (3 picked 'A' and '3', and another, a female, picked 
'A' only). Whereas 13 externals (5 males and 8 females) deciphered 
the principle (one concentrated on '3' only, and another female 
concentrated on 'A' only; all the others picked 'A' and '3'). 
In order to test whether or not this difference was significant, 
the data were arranged in a contingency table and analysed 
us~ng a X2 corrected for continuity (Siegel, 1956). Contrary 
to the expectation more externals found the principle than. internals 
(X2 = 7.53; P<o005, two-tailed). 
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The means of the number of trials on which subjects 
found the principle were 8.92 for externals, and 10 for 
internals, and the overall mean for both groups was 9.46 trials. 
Thus, in order to obtain common grounds for comparisons between 
internals and externals, two sets of analyses were carried on particular 
indices: one based on the first 6 trials, and the other based 
on the first 9 trials. Below are the indices that were used 
ln analysing subjects' performance: 
1 - Number of correct trials. 
2 - Number of different solution hypotheseso A solution 
hypothesis was defined as any attempt relating the letters to the 
numbers in a particular set, or the numbers and letters of 
, 
different sets. Thus guessing or gambler's fallacy (explained 
below) were not considered as solution hypotheses and werelabelled 
spurious solution hypotheses. 
3 - Number of trials on which subjects guessed. 
4 - Average number of trials per solution hypotheses. 
This variable was obtained by dividing the number of trials on 
which solution hypotheses were used by the number of different 
solution hypotheses used in these trials. This index measured 
the overall subjects persistence with solution hypotheses. 
5 - Maximum number of trials per solution hypothesis. 
This index measured persistence with a particular solution hypothesis. 
It was obtained by counting the number of maximum trials on which 
a subject stayed with a particular solution hypothesis. 
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~~ Comparing successful Externals to unsuccessful 
Externals 
Before compar~ng interals to externals, it is essential 
to determine whether or not externals who deciphered the principle 
(5 males and 8 females) were different from externals who did 
not find the principle (3 males and 4 females). These data were 
analysed using a 2x2 factorial design (successful versus 
unsuccessful externals, X sex) with unequal number in each cell 
(least squares analysis). Mean squares and summaries of analyses 
of variance for initial· confidence, middle confidence, average 
number of trials per solution hypothesis, maximum number of 
trials per solution hypothesis, number of different solution 
hypotheses, and number of correct trials are presented in 
.5· Append~x 3 • The analyses of variance resulted in a significant 
main effect for middle confidence (F = 7.621; d 1/16, P<.Ol), 
for the external factor, which was the only significant difference 
obtained. Inspection of the mean scores indicated that 
successful externals as compared to unsuccessful externals, 
were significantly more confident of finding the principle after 
trial number 12. This ~s expected since the mean of the number 
of trials on which 
5 Apart from initial and middle confidence, all the other 
indices were based on the first 6 and 9 trialso 
231 
externals found the principle was 8.92 trials. Therefore, 
no significant differences in performance existed between 
successful and unsuccessful externals; and the two groups are 
treated as one. 
iii Number of Correct Trials for Internals and Externals 
The number of correct trials could easily be determined 
from the subjects' booklets. In any given trial page of the 
booklet, if a subject ticked "The set contains the principle" 
and the set actually contained the principle, or he ticked 
"The set does not contain the principle" and the set actually 
did not contain the principle, then on both occasions the subject 
.. 
, 
was correct. 
The number of correct trials was analysed based on 24 
trials, the first 6 and 9 trials respectively. 
Table 6.5 
Mean scores for the number of correct trials based on 24 trials 
as a function of locus of control and sex. 
SEX 
LOCUS MALES FEMALES COMBINED 
Internals 15.00 16.78 15.89 
Externals 16.50 17.58 17.04 
Combined 15.75 17.18 16.46 
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The analysis of var1ance of correct trials for 24 trials 
produced no signi~icant effects. As the mean scores indicate 
(Table 6.5) all subjects achieved a highnumber of correct trials, 
(on the average 8 trials out of 24 were incorrect). The internal 
males had the lowest mean, while the external females had the 
highest mean. Internal females and external males were almost 
identical. 
Thus, although more externals than internals deciphered 
the principle during the early stages of the trials, they did 
not significantly exceed internals in terms of the correct 
number of trials. 
The analysis of var1ance of the correct number of trials 
based on the first 6 and 9 trials again did not result in any 
significant differences. 
Table 6.6 
Mean scores for the number of correct trials based on the first 
6 and 9 tri&lsas a function of locus of control and sexo 
SEX 
TRIALS LOCUS MALES FEMALES COMBINED 
First Internals 3.18 3.44 3.31 
6 Externals 2.50 3.42 2.96 
Trials Combined 2.84 3.43 3.14 
First Internals 5.00 5.33 5017 
9 Externals 4.50 5.00 4.75 
Trials Combined 4.75 5.17 4.96 
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The means (Table 6.6) show that the scores of internals 
and externals were generally similar, with internals exhibiting a 
higher number of correct trials in the first 6, as well as the 
first 9 trials. 
iv Solution Hypotheses 
As indicated earlier, a solution hypotheses was defined 
as any attempt at relating the letters to the numbers in a 
particular set or different sets. 
Types of Solution Hypotheses 
A set was made up of two letters and two numbers. 
The scope of solution hypotheses relating the letters to the 
numbers was rather limited. The same two independent judges 
used in the first study were assigned the task of the categorisation 
of solution hypotheses. The three judges (including the author) 
agreed unanimously on three categories in which all the solution 
hypotheses written by the subjects could fit. 
categories are as follows: 
The three 
1- Simple solution hypotheses: are those that involve 
paying attention to a letter(s) or number(s) in a set 
( e • g . ' B' or '3', or 'c' and 'D'). 
the principle was a simple one. 
In other words 
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2 - Intermediate solution hypotheses: are those 
pertaining to assigning a number to a letter or relating 
numbers and letter according to their natural sequences 
(e.g. A = 1; D = 4· , or 'A' comes before 'B' and so do 
, 3' and '4'). 
3 - Complex solution hypotheses: pertain to adoption 
of more rigorous and mathematical combinations of 
letters and numbers (e.g. dividing the numbers of a set 
by a constant, and then on the basis of the result 
establishing a relation within the set). 
The above three types of solution hypotheses contain 
within them different solution hypotheses. For example, if a 
subject was concentrating on number '4' and then shifted to '1' or 
'D', he is considered to have adopted two different solution 
hypotheses because he has shifted his attention to a different 
linking principle. On the other hand, if a subject divided 
the numbers of a set (e.g. 34) by a constant (e.g. 2) and then 
used the same constant to divide numbers of another set, he is 
considered to have used the same solution hypothesis. Delineation 
of different solution hypotheses was made easy by the fact that 
most subjects wrote under a set "as previous" indicating a 
persistence with a solution hypothesis used in previous sets. 
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The Number of Internals and Externals who employed .the 
Three TYpes of Solution Hypotheses 
1- Simple solution hypotheses~ 18 internals (8 males 
and 10 females) and 19 externals (8 males and 11 females) used 
simple solution hypotheses. Thus the number of internals 
and external utilising these solution hypotheses was almost 
identical. 
2- Intermediate solution hypotheses: almost all the subjects 
(N = 39) employed this type of solution hypothesis. It seems 
that such a type is most commonly used with the present task. 
# 3- Complex solution hypotheses: 12 internals (5 males 
and 7 females) employed complex solution hypotheses, while only 
4 externals (3 males and 1 female) used them. These data were 
arranged in a contingency table for analysis using a chi square 
test corrected for continuity in order to test the significance 
of the difference. More internals than externals employed complex 
2 
solution hypotheses (X = 6.67; df = 1, P<.Ol, two-tailed)o 
Spurious Solution Hypotheses 
Any attempts by the subjects dealing with the sets that 
did not satisfy the definition of a solution hypothesis are 
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labelled'spurious solution hypotheses~ Three types of these 
solution hypotheses emerged: guesslng, 'gambler's fallacy' and 
'negation' • 
v. Number of Internals and Externals who Guessed 
Subjects wrote down the word 'guessing' or equivalent 
under the set where they guessed whether it contained the 
principle or noto Thirteen internals (7 males and 6 females) 
guessed at least once during the 24 trials as compared to 18 
externals (10 males and 8 females). Testing this difference 
by organising the data into a contingency table, and employing a 
chi square test corrected for continuity showed that the difference 
approached significance (X2 = 2.29; df = 1, P<.lO, two-tailed). 
Thus it seems that more externals guessed over the 24 trials than 
internals. 
Number of trials on which Internals and Externals Guessed 
The number of trials on which internals and externals 
6 guessed was recorded and analysed based on 24 trials as well as 
the first 6 and 9 trials. 
6 The number of trials on which subjects guessed 1S labelled 
guessing trials hereafter. 
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Table 6. '7 
Mean scores for the number of the guessing trials based on 24 
trials asa fUnction of locus of control and sex. 
SEX 
LOCUS MALES FEMALES COMBINED 
Internals 3.29 4.00 3.65 
Externals 6025 4.10 5.48 
Combined 4.11 4.35 4.51 
Analysis of var~ance of guess~ng trials over the 24 
trials did not result in any significant differences. The 
means (Table 6.1) are generally low. External males' scores 
.were the highest, while those for internal males were the lowest. 
Internal and external females t scores were close. 
However, the analyses of variance for guessing trials 
based on the first 6 and 9 trials produced significant locus 
of control main effect (F = 6.128; df 1/36, P<.Ol; F = 5.153; 
df 1/36, P<. 02 for the first 6 and 9 trials respectively).1 Thus 
internals and externals were different in their guessing trials 
for the first 6 and 9 trials; and as Table 6.8 shows, the 
internals guessed on less trials than externals. The locus X 
sex interaction for the first 6 trials approached significance 
(F = 3.131; at = 1/36, p<.06). Investigating the means using 
Tukey's q test indicated that the external males guessed on more 
trials than internal males (q = 6.811; df 2~36, P<oOl), internal 
1 See page 229 for the rationale of these analyses. 
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Table 6.8 
Mean scores for the number of the guessing trials based on the 
first 6 and 9 trials as a function of locus of control and sex. 
SEX 
TRIALS LOCUS MALES FEMALES COMBINED 
First Internals 1000 1.44 1.22 
6 Externals 3.13 1.83 2.48 
Trials Combined 2.07 1.64 1 0 85 
First Internals 1.27 1.44 1.36 
9 Externals 3.50 2.25 2.88 
Trials Combined 2.39 1.85 2.12 
females (q = 6.161; df 2,36, P<.Ol), and external females 
(q = 4.194; df 2,36, P<.Ol)o 
All the other differences for the first 6 and 9 trials 
were not significant. 
Vl. 'Gambler's Fallacy' 
This spurious solution hypothesis is identified as 
anticipating the occurrence, or non~currence of the principle 
In a set, based on previous frequencies. It is an "if three 
sets in a row contained the principle, it is about time that the 
fourth set would not" kind of thinking. The subjects were 
explicit in stating their utilisation of this SpurlOUS solution 
hypothesis. Eight7externals (2 males and 6 females) adopted 
the 'gambler's fallacy' as opposed to 3 internals (all males) 
based on 24 trials. This difference was investigated by 
arranging the data into a contingency table and employing a 
chi square test corrected for continuity, which indicated 
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that the difference approached significance (X2 = 2 0 09, df = 1, 
P<.lO, two-tailed). Thus the findings of the first study 
regarding 'gambler's fallacy' were almost repeated. 
V~~. Negation 
Certain subjects, after failing to establish any 
relationship between the numbers and letters of a set, wrote 
"no relationship" indicating that they could not specify 
precisely the reasons for their decision. This spur~ous 
solution hypothesis was labelled 'negation'. The number of 
internals and externals employing negation was identical except 
for sex within personality (7 internal males, 3 internal females, 
4 external males and 6 external females). 
v~~~. Number of Different Solution Hypotheses, 
The ma~n aim of the third study was to extend the 
finding of the first study regarding solution hypotheses 
by controlling the effects of memory. The booklet format 
employed in the third study allowed for a more accurate measure-
ment of solution hypotheses. The number of different solution 
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hypotheses (see page 119)could be obtained easily as the subjects 
had available to them the opportunity of writing their solution 
hypotheses while forming them. 
Table 6.9 
Mean scores for the number of dif"ferent solution hyPotheses based 
on 24 trials as afUrtction of locus of control and sex. 
SEX 
LOCUS MALES FEMALES COMBINED 
Internals 4.27 4.33 4.30 
Externals 3.38 4.08 3.73 
Combined 3.83 4.21 4.02 
Analysis of" variance for the number of solution hypotheses 
based on 24 trials produced no significant effects. Subjects, on 
the whole, generated few solution hypotheses, and internals and 
externals were almost.:-;eq~~>~~ with internals using slightly 
more different solution hypotheses than externals (see Table 6.9). 
But, when the analysis was based on the first 6 and 9 trials, a 
remarkable difference occurreQ. 
For both the first 6 and 9 trials locus of control maln 
effects were highly significant (F = 19.236, df 1/36, P<.OOl; 
F = 15.762, df 1/36, P<.OOl). All the other differences were not 
significant. Inspection of the means (Table 6.10) indicatedthat 
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Table 6.10 
Mean scores for the number of different solution hypotheses based 
on the first 6 and 9 trials as a function of locus of control and 
sexo 
SEX 
TRIALS LOCUS MALES FEMALES COMBINED 
First Internals 1.09 1.92 1.16 
6 Externals 2.00 2.25 2.13 
Trials Combined 1.55 2.09 1.65 
First Internals 1.73 2.00 1.87 
9 Externals 2.75 3.42 3.09 
Trials Combined 2.24 2.71 2.48 
externals produced more solution hypotheses in both the first 6 
as well as the first 9 trials. The findings of the first study 
that externals generated and utilised more different solution 
hypotheses than internals were, therefore, strongly supported. 
The externals seem to possess the ability of generating a 
multiplicity of solution hypotheses, while internals produce a 
restricted number of solution hypotheses and explored them more fully. 
J.x. Average Number, and Maximum Number, of trials per 
Solution Hypothesis 
The first study not only demonstrated that internals 
and externals were different in the number of solution hypotheses 
they employed, but also in the way they handled these hypotheses. 
242 
Thus it was important to attempt to extend these results. 
In order to determine the way solution hypotheses were employed, 
two measures were used: average number and maximum number of trials 
per solution hypothesis. These measure persistence 
with, or frequent change,of a solution hypothesis. 
As indicated earlier the average number of trials was 
obtained by dividing the number of trials on which solution 
hypotheses were used by the number of solution hypotheses (note that 
spurious solution hypotheses were not included in these measures). 
Table 6.11 
Mean scores for the avera e number of. trials er solution h othesis 
based on the first and 9 trials as a function of locus of control 
and sex. 
SEX 
TRIALS LOCUS MALES FEMALES COMBINED 
First Internals 4.14 3.28 3.71 
6 Externals 1.16 1.32 1.24 
Trials Combined 2.65 2.30 2.48 
First Internals 4.64 4.00 4.32 
9 Externals 1.63 1.72 1.68 
Trials Combined 3.14 2.86 3.00 
Analysis of var1ance of the average number per solution 
hypothesis scores for both the first 6 and 9 trials produced 
highly significant locus of control main effects (F = 62.050, 
df 1/36, P<.OOl; F = 31.906, df 1/36, P<.OOl for the first 6 and 
9 trials respectively. No other significant effects were obtained. 
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As the mean scores clearly demonstrate (Table 6.11) the 
externals stayed with a particular solution hypothesis for fewer 
trials than did internals. 
A more direct assessment of high persistence versus low 
persistence with a solution hypothesis is the maximum number of 
trials per hypothesis. This index is obtained simply by counting 
the number of trials On which a subject stayed with a solution 
hypothesis (and not with a spurious hypothesis). 
Table 6.12 
Mean scores for the maximum number of trials per solution 
hypothesis based on the first 6 and 9 trials as a function of 
locus of control and sex. 
SEX 
TRIALS LOCUS MALES FEMALES COMBINED 
First Internals 4.18 3.33 3.76 
6 Externals 1.38 1.67 1.53 
Trials Combined 2.78 2.50 2.65 
First Internals 5.73 5.11 5.42 
9 Externals 2.50 2.58 2.54 
Trials Combined 4.12 3.85 3.98 
The analysis of variance of max:unum. number of trials per 
hypothesis for both the first 6 and 9 trials resulted in exactly 
the same significant effects as those of average number of trials 
per solution hypothesis. Highly significant locus of control 
main effects were obtained (F = 45.361, df 1/36, P<.OOl; 
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F = 36.048, df 1/36, P<.OOl for the first 6 and 9 trials 
respectively), which were the only significant differences. The 
mean scores (Table 6.12) indicate that internals persisted more 
with a hypothesis than externals. 
It is clear that the findings of the first study regarding 
the more frequent mobility by externals among solution hypotheses 
were supported and clarified. Externals, relative to internals, 
not only returnd to already utilised hypotheses more frequently 
(first study), but they also persisted less with them. The 
internals, on the other hand, rarely used old hypotheses (first 
study) and persisted much longer (in terms of trials) with an 
hypothesis. Thus the results of the first and third studies 
complement each other. 
Summary of Task Performance Results 
Subjects perceived the task as being unfamiliaro Paid 
subjects and volunteer subjects did not differ in their performance 
on the task. With respect to decipherment of the principle the 
externals outperformed the internals. Externals who found the 
principle were not significantly different from externals who did 
not find the principle except ln middle confidence. Successful 
externals were more confident than unsuccessful externals. 
Internals and externals did not differ significantly in the 
number of correct trials (based either on the whole trials, or the 
first 6 and 9 trials). More internals employed complex solution 
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hypotheses than externals. Although internals and externals 
did not differ significantly in the number of guessing-trials 
when considering their performance over the 24 trials, externals 
did exceed internals for guessing-trials in the first 6 and 9 trials. 
Externals also displayed a tendency to employ gambler's fallacy 
behaviour. 
As regards the number of different solution hypotheses, 
the internals and externals exhibited similar scores when their 
performance over the 24 trials is considered. However, in 
the first 6 and 9 trials the externals produced significantly 
more different solution hypotheses. The externals, relative 
to internals, also used much fewer trials per solution hypotheses 
during the first 6 and 9 trials. Thus, the findings of the 
first study regarding the problem solving behaviour of internals 
and externals were supported. 
It is interesting to note that all the variability was 
caused solely by locus of control (except in guessing-trials 
where it interacted with sex). 
Confidence Ratings 
The experimental booklet contained three confidence 
rating scales in an attempt to measure the subjects'confidence 
before, during, and after their performance on the task. Subjects 
responded to the following question: "How confident are you of 
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finding the principle?". Confidence was an important index 
for establishing the subjects belie~s in their abilities and 
may help to explain the differences between internals and 
externals in ~witching back, as found in the second study. 
1. Initial Confidence 
This index measured the subjects' confidence ~n finding 
the principle before starting to solve the task. 
Table 6.13 
Mean ratings of the subjects' perception of. their initial confidence 
of finding the principle as a function of locus of control and sex. 
SEX 
LOCUS MALES FEMALES COMBINED 
Internals 5.73 4.00 4.87 
Externals 3088 2.92 3.40 
Combined 4.81 3.46 4.14 
Low score indicates low confidence, high score the reverse. 
Analysis of var~ance of initial confidence scores resulted 
inahighly significant locus of control main effect (F = 15.320, 
df 1/36, P<.OOl)and asex main effect (F = 9.980, df 1/36, P<.003). The 
locus X sex interaction was not significant. The means (Table 6.13) 
show that, as predicted, internals were more confident than externals 
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of finding the principle. Further, males were more confident 
than females. It should be stated that these differences were 
relative ·to each other, as all the means were low. The int ernal 
males scored the highest, while external females s.cored the lowest. 
2. Middle Confidence 
Subjects responded to another confidence rating scale 
following the 12th trial •. 
Table 6.14 
Mean ratings of the subjects' perception of their middle 
confidence of finding the principle as a function of locus 
of control and sex. 
SEX 
LOCUS MALES FEMALES COMBINED 
Internals 4.00 4.00 4.00 
Externals 3.63 4.17 3.90 
Combined 3.82 4.09 3.95 
Low score denotes low confidence, high score the reverse. 
Analysis of var1ance of middle confidence scores did 
not produce any significant effects. The combined mean scores 
(Table 6.14) are all low, and lower than for initial confidence 
(cf. Table 6.13), indicating that the subjects' confidence 
tended to decrease as trials 
.. 
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went on. Thus, although most of the externals found the 
principle before the 12th trial, their confidence following 
that trial was not alteredo However, as indicated earlier, 
since the successful externals were more confident than unsucc-
essful externals following the 12th trial, a further analysis of 
variance for middle confidence score was carried out (successful 
externals (N = 13) versus unsuccessful internals (N = 16)). 
Table 6.15 
Mean ratings· of the subjects' perception of their middle 
confidence of findin the rinci Ie as a function of successful 
externals(succ~ ext. versus unsuccessful internals unsecc. int.) 
SEX 
LOCUS MALES FEMALES COMBINED 
Succ. Ext. 4.10 3.83 3.92 
Unsucc. Int. 4.00 5.38 4069 
Combined 4005 4.61 4.31 
Low score indicates low confidence, high score the reverse. 
Again the analysis did not result in any significant 
differences. The means (Table 6.15) are low. External females 
had the highest scores and internal females the lowest scores. 
In order to investigate whether or not externals' 
confidence increased after the 12th trial relative to their 
initial confidence, a 2x2x2 split-plot factorial design (locus 
of control X sex X confidence (initial versus middle)) with repeated 
measures on the last factor was performed. 
Table 6.16 
Mean ratings of the subjects 'perception of their initial and 
middle~ortfidence of finding the principle as a function of 
locus of corttroland sex. 
INITIAL CONF. MIDDLE CONF. 
Internal Males 5.73 4.00 
Internal Females 4.00 4000 
External Males 3.88 3.63 
External Females 2.92 4017 
Males 4.81 3.82 
Females 3.46 4.09 
Internals 4.87 4.00 
Externals 3.40 3.90 
Low score denotes low confidence, high score the opposite. 
The summary of' the analysis of' variance for initial versus middle 
confidence scores is presented in Table 6.17. The significant 
locus of control main eff'ect indicates (see Table 6.16) that overall, 
the internals were more confident than externals. Investigation of' 
the locus X confidence and sex X confidence interactions using 
Tukey's q tests indicatedthat: internal males decreased their 
confidence following the 12th trial as compared with their initial 
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Table 6 0 17 
Summary of analysis of variance of the subjects' ratings of their 
initial versus middle confidence of finding the principle as a 
function of locUs of control and sex. 
VARIATION SS DF MS F P 
Between·PeoE1e 137.801 39 
A (locus of control) 14.450 1 14.450 4.503 <.03 
B (sex) 50708 1 5.708 1.779 
AB 2.093 1 2.093 .652 
Subj. w. Groups 115.550 36 3.209 
Within PeoEle 134.034 40 
C (confidence) .450 1 .450 .150 
AC 12.800 1 12.800 4.267 <.05 
BC 12.121 1 12.721 4.240 <.05 
ABC .063 1 .063 .021 
C X Subj. W. Groups 107.970 36 3.00 
confidence (q = 4.436, P<.Ol); external females increased their 
confidence following the 12th trial relative to their initial 
confidence (q = 3.205, P<.05); and males (as a whole) decreased 
their confidence after the 12th trial in comparison to their 
initial confidence (q = 3.414, P<.05). Thus it was mainly the 
external females' confidence that was affected by their success 
at deciphering the principle. It is interesting to note that 
the internal females' initial and middle confidence ratings were 
identical. 
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3. Post Confidence 
The subjects who failed to find the principle rated 
their confidence in finding the principle if the trials were 
doubled. It was expected that this index would measure persistence 
and yield some differences between internals and externals. 
Table 6.18 
Mean ratings of the subjects' perception of their post confidence 
of finding the principle as a fUnction of "locus of control and sex. 
SEX 
LOCUS MALES FEMALES COMBINED 
Internals 3.40 2.67 3.04 
Externals 3.33 2.25 2.79 
Combined 3.37 2.46 2.92 
Low score indicates low confidence, high score the reverse. 
Analysis of variance of post confidence scores produced 
no significant differences. The means (Table 6.18) are very 
low indicating that failure had affected the confidence of all 
those who failed. Internal males had the highest scores while 
external females had the lowest scores. 
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B. Perception of, and Reaction to, the Experiment. 
The post-task questionnaire of the third study was 
concerned with the subjects reaction to, and perception of, the 
experiment. These indices were measured using a 9-point rating 
scale, and it was expected that they would complement the results 
of the task performance. 
1. Task Perception 
The mean scores of the subjects' response to the question 
"How much did you think this was a task which depended on skill or 
chance?", are presented ~n Ta1?,le 6.19 
Table 6.19 
Mean ratings of the subjects' perception of task control as a 
fUrtctionoflocu8of'control and sex. 
SEX 
LOCUS . MALES FEMALES COMBINED 
Internals 6.36 6.33 6.35 
Externals 4.75 5.58 5.17 
Combined 5.56 5.96 5.76 
Low score indicates chance control, high score skill control. 
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Analysis of varlance of task perception scores produced 
a marginally significant locus of control main effect (F = 3.601;-
df 1/36, P<.07). The other differences were not significant. 
Inspection of the means (Table 6.19) using Tukey's q test indicated 
that internals viewed the task to be more skill controlled than 
externals (q = 4.069, P<.Ol). The externals' scores were around 
the scale's middle point while the internals were one point above 
the middle point. In general, subjects were not quite sure that 
the task was purely skill determined. 
2. Performance Perception 
It was expected that" the subjects perception of the agency 
of control of their performance might fUrnish more differences 
between internals and externals than task perception since it 
involved their own behaviour. Subjects responded to the question 
"How much do you think your peformance on the task depended on 
skill or chance?". 
Analysis of varlance of performance perception scores 
resultedinasignificant locus of control main effect (F = 5.365; 
df 1/36, P<.03) which was the only significant difference. The 
means (Table 6.20) are generally low with the highest score 
(internal males) just above the middle point. The internals 
construed their performance to be more controlled by their own 
skill than externals. Thus although the externals were more 
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Table 6.20 
Mean ratings of the subjects t perception of their performance control 
as a function of locus of control and sex. 
SEX 
LOCUS MALES FEMALES COMBINED 
Internals 5.55 5.00 5.28 
Externals 4.63 3.42 4.03 
Combined 5.09 4.2l 4.66 
Low score denotes chance control, high score skill control. 
successful than internals in deciphering the principle, they 
nonetheless perceived their performance as controlled by chance. 
3. Task Difficulty 
The subjects responded to the question "How difficult 
was this task for you?". The means of task difficulty scores 
are presented in Table 6.21. 
The analysis of variance of task difficulty scores did 
not result in any significant differences. The means are low 
and very close indicating that all the subjects considered 
the task to be fairly difficult. The lowest ra t:'!:gs were by 
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Table 6.21 
Mean ratings of the subjects 'perception of the task's difficulty 
as a function of locus of control and sex. 
SEX 
LOCUS MALES FEMALES COMBINED 
Internals 3.36 3.22 3.29 
Externals 3.75 3.83 3.79 
Combined 3.56 3.53 3.54 
Low score indicates high difficulty, high score the reverse. 
internal females and the highest by external females. 
4. Interest ln the Task 
Table 6.22 presents the mean scores of the subjects' 
response to the question "How interesting was the task?" 
Table 6.22 
Mean ratings of the subjects' interest in the task as a function 
of locus of control and sex. 
SEX 
LOCUS MALES FEMALES COMBINED 
Internals 7.55 7.00 7.28 
Externals 5075 6.17 5.96 
Combined 6.65 6.59 6.62 
Low score denotes disinterest, high score the opposite. 
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Only the locus of control main effect produced a signi~icant 
difference as a result of analysis of variance of interest 
scores (F = 6~345; df 1/36, P<.02). The means (Table 6.22) 
show that internals found the task to be more interesting than 
externals. The externals' mean was reasonably close to the 
mid-point of the scale, while the internals' mean is near to the 
high interest pole. Thus although internals, relative to 
externals, were less successful in their performance, they 
nonetheless were more interested in it. It seems that the 
internals were more motivated in the task. 
Number of Subjects who wrote Comments 
• 
At the end of the post-task questionnaire, subjects 
were g~ven the option of writing down any comments about the 
task or their performance. Seventeen internals (6 males and 
11 females) and 11 externals (5 males and 6 females) wrote 
comments. In order to test this difference the data were 
. 2 
arranged in a contingency table and analysed us~ng a X corrected 
for continuity. The difference between internals and externals 
approached significance (X2 = 3.247, df = 1, P<.lO, two-tailed). 
The finding of the second study regarding the number of internals 
and externals who wrote comments was almost repeated. Most of 
the comments were about the task (e.g. those who deciphered the 
principle, and wrote comments, saw the task as trivial, while 
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those who did not find the principle were anx~ous to know it). 
Summary of Confidence Indices, Perception of, and Reactions 
to, the Task Results 
Internals displayed higher initial confidence than 
externals. Only external females increased their middle 
confidence relative to their initial one. No significant 
differences were found between internals and externals in 
middle and post confidence ratings. 
Internals tended to construe the task and their own 
performance as skill determined more than externals who 
perceived the task and their performance to be under chance 
control. All subjects considered the task to be difficult. 
With respect to interest in the task externals found the task 
less interesting than internals. 
More internals than externals wrote comments ~n the 
post-task questionnaire, although the difference only approached 
significance. 
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6.5 DISCUSSION 
The third study was developed mainly out of the first 
study with more stringent control on the method of assessing 
subjects' utilisation of solution hypotheses. A major finding 
of the study was the decipherment of the principle as a function 
of locus of control. In both the first and second studies 
internals and externals did not differ in the solution of the 
task. In the present study, and contrary to much previous 
research, it was the externals who were more successful in 
finding the principle than internals. Below is a summary of 
the other findings of the third study. 
1. All subjects perceived the task to be completely 
unfamiliar to them. 
2. Externals, as compared to internals, used more 
solution hypotheses, changed them more frequently 
(i.e. lower persistence), guessed on more trials, 
and used less complicated solution hypotheses. 
Moreover, there were no significant differences 
between the two groups in the number of correct 
answers over the twenty four trials. 
3. Internals rated themselves as being more confident 
than externals (initial confidence). No significant 
differences in either middle or post confidence 
ratings between the two groups were obtained 
(both manifested low confidence). 
4. Internals, relative to externals, perceived the 
task and their performance to be significantly 
more controlled by skill, and were significantly 
more interested in the task. There were no 
significant differences between the two groups 
regarding: 
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a. task difficulty (both groups perceived the task 
to be difficult); and 
b. number of subjects who wrote comments about 
the experiment (although more internals than 
externals wrote comments). 
As in the previous discussion sections, task performance indices 
are discussed first, followed by those for the confidence.ratings, 
perceptions of, and reactions to, the task. The discussion 
focuses on the performance of subjects on the first nine trials 
as a compar1son of the different approaches to finding the 
principle. It will be remembered that most of the externals 
had found the principle by the ninth trial. The overall 
performance of internals and externals for the twenty four trials 
will also be considered. 
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a. Task Performance 
Before discussing the deciphering of the principle by 
externals it is important to present the consistency of cognitive 
responses displayed by internals and externals across the three 
studies. 
Internals and externals approached the third task 
differently, and in a manner very similar to their approaches 
to the task in the first study. The externals produced 
relatively more solution hypotheses, did not persist with a 
solution hypothesis for long, and changed their hypotheses 
frequently. The internals, on the other hand, generated fewer 
solution hypotheses, persisted longer with a solution hypothesis 
8 
and were less mobile among hypotheses • The externals were 
adopting a "butterfly" approach (i.e. flitting from one solution 
hypothesis to another), while internals follow a more systematic 
and persistent approach. These cognitive responses were also 
evident in the second study; the less thorough and systematic 
process~ng of information by externals required them to use 
more switchbacks than internals. Moreover, the externals in 
the third study reacted in a less thorough fashion than internals 
8 It is very important to note that in both studies reinforcement 
(i.e. number of correct trials) did not affect internals and 
externals differently as no significant differences in the 
number of correct trials was found. Thus the differences in 
the number of solution hypotheses and the way in which they 
were used were a result of the different approaches to problem 
solving by internals and externals. 
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by guesslng on more trials, and in the second study their less 
thorough and less systematic response was also shown by low 
correlations between their preparation time and switchbacks. 
Thus over three different tasks, three different groups of 
internals and externals exhibited similar cognitive responses. 
Therefore, following Warr's (1970) definition of a cognitive 
style as a generalisable cognitive response, internals and 
externals seem to be characterised by different cognitive styles. 
The second significant finding is that the externals 
were more successful in deciphering the principle than internals. 
The externals adopted a "carefree" approach (guessed on more 
trials and engaged in 'gambler's fallacy,9 behaviour) and used 
less complex solution hypotheses. The internals were less 
carefree and utilised more complex solution hypotheses, yet 
they were less successful than externals in identifying the 
principle. Possible reasons for these results are discussed 
below. 
It had been demonstrated that externals, relative to 
internals, require more explicit cues as a prerequisite to 
efficient problem solving (Lefcourt, 1967; Lefcourt and Wine, 
1969; second study; Wolk and DuCette, 1974). The externals 
employed the same cognitive style in both the first and the 
third studies. Such a style was not efficient in deciphering 
the principle of the first study as the task employed in that 
9 This difference between internals and externals approached 
significance. 
262 
study was too difficult, or, in other words, the nature of that 
task was such that it was less sUSceptible to the externals' 
cognitive style. The principle used in the present study was 
not as difficult to discover. Indeed independent judges classified 
solution hypotheses that concentrated on a letter or a number 
(i.e. ones typically used by externals) as "simple". It is 
argued that the principle in the present study was a relatively 
"salient" one; and since externals' problem solving ability ~s 
enhanced the more salient information becomes, then their 
performance on this task is understandable. Many of the 
externals who found the principle said that they suddenly 
"saw" the recurrence of 'A' and '3' in positive sets. It ~s 
not as if they were searching thoroughly and systematiCally for 
the principle but just engaging in the production of many 
solution hypotheses, changing them frequently and then hitting 
on the principle. This activity of the externals may indicate 
creativity or divergent thinking (see Guilford, 1956), as 
compared to the more deliberate and structured style of 
internals which may reflect convergent thinking (see Guilford, 1956). 
Although such an argument seems reasonable based on the above 
data, a study by Lotsof and Steinke (1973) failed to establish 
any relationship between locus of control and divergent thinking 
(as measured by Guilford's unusual uses tests). 
What is not so readily understandable is why 
internals were less successful at deciphering the principle 
if the principle was more "salient" than in the first study. 
The cognitive style of internals, which has been described as 
more thorough and systematic, is not always more efficient 
because internals were not successful in finding the principle 
in both the first and third studies o It seems that when faced 
with a relatively simple principle they masked its simplicity 
by looking for complex hypotheses. As explained earlier, 
complex hypotheses pertain to more complicated mathematical 
combinations between the numbers and letters within a set. 
WasonQ960 ; 1968), who used a seemingly trivial rule In a 
task, found that the subjects who used complicated hypotheses 
failed to find the rule. 
The internals' persistence with a solution hypothesis 
and the tendency not to return to solution hypotheses may be 
indicative of cautious and calculated behaviour. Internals, 
relative to externals, have been shown to display less risk 
taking behaviour (DuCette and Wolk, 1912), and more persistence 
and endurance on a vigilance task (Sanders et al 1916). 
Persistence and endurance may not always result in efficient 
problem solving. Gavurin and Murgatroyd (1914) regarded 
endurance as synonymous with perseveration which, they argued, 
hindered problem solving. They found a significant negative 
correlation between solving anagrams and endurance. It lS 
interesting to present what Gavurin and Murgatroyd meant by 
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endurance: 
" ••• to keep at a job until it is finished, 
to work hard at a task, to keep at a puzzle 
or problem until it is solved, to work at a 
single j?b before taking o~ others, to stay 
up late 1n order to get a Job done, to put 
in long hours at work without distraction , 
to stick at a problem even though it may seem 
as if no progress is being made, to avoid 
being interrupted while at work." 
(page 100 (extracted from 
Edwards, 1959)). 
The above attributes seem to fit the internals who, in another 
study, described themselves as being " ••• enthusiastic . . . 
assertive ••• deliberate, persevering, hard headed ... (and) . .. 
stubborn" (Hersch and Scheibe, 1967, p.612). 
The task performance of subjects also needs to be 
discussed with reference to task difficulty. By any standards 
the first task was difficult, whereas the second proved 
relatively easy for subjects. It was expected that the third 
task would be of intermediate difficulty. But the internals 
rated it as very difficult and skill determined: was this 
because they were unable to find the principle, or were they 
unable to find the principle because they assumed the task to 
be difficult and therefore proposed complicated solution 
hypotheses to solve it? The data available do not answer 
the question, however, the fact that initially they were more 
confident regarding task performance than externals suggests 
that at the outset, internals did not perceive it to be a very 
difficult task. It may be that the nature of the task used 
in the first and third studies provides particular difficulties 
for internals as they appear to have set about solving the 
third task, if not the first, using more complicated hypotheses 
than were necessary. 
To summarise: what these data indicate is that when 
the task was easy and perceived as such, internals outperformed 
externals; but when the task became difficult, or was 
perceived to be difficult, differences in task performance 
between internals and externals were removed, and even reversed. 
One final point regarding the performance of internals 
on the third task merits attention, namely, that over the twenty 
four trials the number of correct answers they obtained was not 
significantly different from the number obtained by externals, 
even thought the latter discovered the principle while most 
of the internals did not. Furthermore, the mean number of 
correct answers for internals (mean = 15.89) was much higher 
than would have been expected on the basis of chance (i.e. a 
mean of 12). This suggests that the internals were able 
to identity positive sets, but were not able to identify the 
principle which underlined the construction of these sets. It 
is not surprising that many of them spent at least an hour on 
the task while the externals typically finished within fifteen 
or twenty minutes. 
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The fact that externals were better able to discover 
the principle than internals may seem to contradict the 
findings of previous studies which have reported 'superior' 
problem solving by internals (e.g. DuCette and Wolk, 1973; 
Hickey, 1976; Lefcourt et al, 1973). A discussion of these 
studies is in order. 
DuCette and Wolk (1973) employed a task which depended, 
for solution, on subjects' identifying cues emitted by the 
experimenter holding a card. It can be argued that the 
presence of the experimenter motivated the internals to search 
for the emitted cues. After all,Lefcourt and Wine (1969) have 
shown how more inquisitive the internals, relative to externals, 
became when a person's behaviour was rendered less predictable. 
Moreover, the nature of the task employed by DuCette and Wolk may 
have suited the internals'cognitive style. The task was 
composed of two cards containing either 'A' or 'B' and the 
subject, looking at the blank side of the card, had to detect 
which letter was on the other side of the card by observing 
non-verbal cues emitted by the experimenter. 
Using the same argument it is maintained that the 
more structured and systematic cognitive styles of internals 
facilitated their problem solving in Hickey's (1976) study. 
Hickey employed anagrams which requirErlefficient structuring 
of stimuli that had to be preceded by higher degrees of 
concentration. In these situations the externals' cognitive 
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style is relatively less effective than the internals' style. 
Hickey also found, however, that externals, relative to 
internals, performed better on nonsense anagrams which demanded 
less concentration and a less syste~tic approach than word 
anagrams. Problems that require minimum structuring (like 
the one in the third study) may be more suitable for the 
externals' cognitive style. 
As regards Lefcourt et aI's (1973) study, the task 
used was a ribald one o The subjects were presented with 
stimulus words in a double entendre word association list. 
The rule was to discover words bearing sexual connotations 
(e.g. rubb~, prick, blow, screw etc •• ). The response 
measures were delay of response time and frequency of smiles 
and laughs. Lefcourt et al found that internals were faster 
than externals in noticing the sexual connotations. Do 
internals pick up cues better than externals, as Lefcourt et 
al suggest, or are internals simplY less inhibited and/or more 
experienced sexually than externals? A clear answer is not 
possible because of the ambiguity of the task ~mployed. Such 
. " .. a task may not be sUltable for the measurement of cognltlve 
activity" as the problem solving skills involved are not clear. 
b. Confidence Ratings, and Perception of, and 
Reactions to the Experiment Indices 
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The results of the initial confidence measure upheld 
the prediction; internals' initial confidence was higher than 
that of the externals' indicating the internals' belief in 
their problem solving abilities o Scores for middle and post 
task confidence were relatively low for both groups. As far as 
the internals are concerned such typical shifts are expected 
(i.e. lowering of confidence following failure). However, it 
is surprising that the externals did not increase their 
confidence sharply after their success (middle confidence). In 
fact it was only the external females who exhibited a significant 
increase in confidence. It may be that externals thought that 
what they discovered was not the principle since it appeared 
trivial once it had been identified; or it may be that they 
believed that the task was difficult and that they had only 
discovered the principle by chance. 
It should be mentioned that some sex differences were 
found for initial confidence, males being more confident than 
females. This is to be expected in a culture where 
'masculinity' is typically associated with strength, independence 
and confidence, while 'femininity' lS typically characterised 
by passivity and dependence. 
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The internals, besides feeling more confident 
of finding the principle, rated the task and their performance 
as being more controlled by skill than externals. The internals 
seem to believe more in mastering their environment by viewing 
events as a challenge to their own capabilities. Indeed the 
concept of personality locus of control was derived from studies 
uSlng tasks which induced skill or chance control (e.g. Phares, 
1957; Rotter et al, 1961). The internals preference to 
construe events as self determined reflects their sensitivity 
to intrinsic motivation as opposed to the externals' susceptibility 
to extrinsic motivation (Baron and Ganz, 1972; Baron et aI, 
1974; Kumchy and Rankin, 1975). Perhaps it is this degree 
of motivatiQn and the sense of challenge which triggered the 
• internals into adopting complex solution hypotheses which in 
turn masked the otherwise simple principle. 
The externals' perceptions of the task and especially 
their performance as chance oriented, even though they were more 
successful than internals in discovering the principle, is 
interesting and consistent with the cognitive style attributed 
to them and with their perceptions of the nature of behaviour-
reinforcement contingencies. According to Rotter (1966) one 
of the main agents of externality is the failure of the 
individual to perceive behaviour-reinforcement contingencies. 
In the present study, externals did not attribute success to 
their own ability. It appears that ·externals not only view 
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external variables as responsible for their failure (Phares et 
aI, 1971), but also for their success. 
As regards task difficulty, both internals and 
externals construed the task as being very difficult. This 
behaviour is expected of the internals since they were unable 
to decipher the principle. As has already been suggested, 
the externals' responses can also be viewed as 'expected' as they 
felt that they only discovered the principle by chance. 
The internals, especially those who did not find the 
principle, were perplexed after being told of the nature of 
the task during the debriefing session. It seemed as if they 
never thought the concept could be so straightforvrard. Such 
reactions lend more support to the contention put forvrard earlier 
that internals approached the task with a high sense of 
challengee Such an approach instead of facilitating problem 
solving inhibits it on this kind of task. Yet the internals 
rated the task as being more interesting than externals. These 
reactions were similar to those displayed by Wason's (1960) 
SUbjects. Those who found a seemingly simple rule viewed the 
task as being meaningless and trivial, while those who failed 
to pick the rule were bemused by their shortsightedness. 
More internals wrote comments about their performance 
and/or about the task, but such difference only approached 
significance. Thus although this finding failed to replicate 
that of the second study, it was, nonetheless, in the same 
direction. Such a finding is interesting s1nce, besides 
employing different tasks, the two studies produced different 
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performances for internals and externals. In the second study 
both internals and externals were equally successful in naming 
the correct objects, while in the third study the internals were 
less successful than externals in finding the principle. Moreover, 
the sample size of the third study was smaller than that of the 
second study. DuCette and Wolk (1973) suggested that internals 
are more motivated to do well under congruent as well as under 
incongruent conditions (i.e. with respect to their generalised 
beliefs about control) because of their desire to do well. In 
the light of the findings from the first study regardin~ the 
nature of 'chance' situations it might be more accurate to say 
that internals, relative to externals, seem to be more involved 
in situations they are in, despite the irregularity of rewards 
they receive from such situations, so long as they perceive the 
situation to be skill determined. 
c. Conclusions 
Internals and externals appear to be 'characterised' 
by different cognitive styles. The way in which they handle 
solution hypotheses is not the same. The internals' style is not 
always more efficient in problem solving than that of the externals. 
The relatively 'carefree' approach of the externals can certainly 
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be fruitful depending on the problem at hand. These different 
cognitive styles beg the question of the nature of locus of 
control.as a personality variable. 
in the next, and final,chapter. 
This issue 1S discussed 
CHAPTER 7 
SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The a~ of this final chapter is two-fold: to 
summarise and discuss the results of the three studies; and to 
examine their broader implications. The chapter is accordingly 
divided into two sections. 
The first section attempts: to clarifY the nature 
of the "cognitive activity" of internals and externals; to 
relate their cognitive styles to other social-cognitive 
research; and to examine the interpersonal behaviour of 
internals and externals. It has been noted that the three 
studies were more cognitively than socially oriented, S1nce th~ 
molecular approach to the study of the behaviour of internals 
and externals had produced-more consistent data than the molar 
one. Since this thesis is more 'cognitive' than 'social', 
discussion of the social implications will be mainlyofaspeculative 
nature, but it may nevertheless provide suggestions for future 
research. 
In the second section, a discussion of the relevance 
of the results of this research to Rotter's (1954) social 
learning theory is presented in an attempt to establish a 
cognitive-social framework for understanding the behaviour of 
internals and externals. 
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The developing focus of this research was to identify 
the distinctive cognitive styles that characterise internals 
~ 
from externals rather than the cognitive responses of limited 
generalis ability found in previous studies. The research showed 
that internals and externals approached the problem of the three 
studies using different strategies of handling solution hypotheses, 
and processing information. The first study was also successful 
~n differentiating the 'chance' condition of previous research 
into 'quasi' versus 'pure' chance conditions. Before go~ng 
any further it will be useful to summarise the results of the 
three studies. 
In the first study the subjects perceived the skill, 
. 
chance 1 (quasi chance) and chance 2 (pure chance) differently. 
However, it was only the internals who evidenced different 
reactions to chance 2 as compared to their reactions to skill or 
chance 1. Both the internals and the externals were unable to 
decipher the principle. Externals, relative to internals, used 
and generated more solution hypotheses; changed them more 
frequently; returned more times to already utilised solution 
hypotheses; and employed more 'gambler's fallacy' behaviour 
(left-right sequences of the response cards). Moreover, under 
skill, internals found the task more interesting and exerted 
more effort than externals who displayed the same trend in 
chance 2. No significant differences between the two groups 
under chance 1 were found. Further, the externals rated the 
chance 2 situation as being more comfortable than internals. 
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In the second study the subjects construed the task to 
be completely unfamiliar. Both the internals and externals 
were successful in naming most of the correct objects. Externals, 
as compared to internals, had longer initial preparation time, 
total preparation and solution times ,and switchbacked more 
frequently. Internals made more half switchbacks than 
externals who employed more standard, double and double plus 
switchbacks. The correlations between total preparation and 
solution time and switchbacks were not significant for externals, 
but were highly significant for internals. Both groups found 
the task to be interesting and worked hard on it, however, 
internals perceived the task as being more skill controlled 
than externals. Further, more internals wrote comments about 
their performance and/or the task. 
The externals, in the third study, were more successful 
than internals in finding the principle. Moreover, relative 
to internals, they, produced more solution hypotheses; 
persisted less with a solution hYpothesis (in terms of number of 
trials); guessed on more trials and adopted'gambler's fallacy' 
behaviour (the difference though only approaches significance). 
Both internals and externals construed the task as being skill 
oriented, although the internals' ratings were more extreme. 
Further, the internals viewed their performance on the task to 
be determined by skill whereas the externals regarded it as being 
influenced by chance. Externals, relative to internals, were 
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less interested in the task, and initial confidence was higher 
for the internals than externals. There were no significant 
differences between the two groups in middle and post confidence 
(both had low scores); in rating task difficulty (both found the 
task very difficult); and in writing comments about their 
performance and/or the task (although more internals wrote 
comments). The task was perceived as being completely 
unfamiliar to internals and externals. 
1. Reactions to Chance 1 and Chance 2 Conditions 
An important finding of the thesis was that 'chance' 
conditions of different natures produced different responses 
from sUbjects. The first study demonstrated that when the 
chance elements of the task were defined by the high level of 
task difficulty, the subjects did not perceive the task as 
being totally controlled by chance. On the other hand, when 
the nature of the task was intrinsically chance controlled, 
subjects perceived it as such. Thus some of the inconsistencies 
of the research on personality-situation locus of control were 
the result of confounding quasi chance conditions (i.e. the 
element of chance is extrinsic to the task) and pure chance 
conditions (i.e. the element of chance is intrinsic). Moreover, 
the first study also showed that externals were motivated under 
the pure chance condition, while internals were more motivated 
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under the skill condition. It appears that in terms of 
motivation, the personality-situation locus of control congruency 
model is plausible, but in terms of performance of successful 
solutions (i.e. the idea that externals solve problems better 
under pure chance conditions) is still far from being clear. 
Although research indicates that internals tend to produce 
better results than externals under skill (e.g. Lefcourt et aI, 
1968; DuCette and Wolk, 1973) the reverse was true in the third 
study. Furthermore, almost all the studies dealing with 
personality-locus of, control congruency do not report better 
solution of the problem by externals over internals in chance 
conditions (.e.g DuCette and Wolk, 1973; Lefcourt et aI, 1968; 
1 McDonald et aI, 1968) • Since internals and externals do not 
differ from each other on intelligence tests (Rotter, 1966) or 
academic performance (Eisenman and Platt, 1968; Hjelle, 1970; 
Warehime, 1972), then externals' ability to solve problems is 
not necessarily greater or less than internals under skill or 
chance respectively. It would seem that a model to predict 
the performance of internals and externals should not only take 
account of the skill-chance dimension but should also allow 
for such variables as task difficulty and the nature of the task. 
1 An exception is Bronzaft (1972) who showed that externals 
were able to find their own pictures in an extra sensory 
perception task. Bronzaft, however, did not employ the 
standard I-E scale but a shorter one instead. 
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The present research has indicated that with certain kinds of 
tasks externals can outperform internals even under skill 
conditions. 
2. The NatUre of the Cognitive Activity as a Function 
of Locus of Control 
In the three studies differences due to locus of control 
were highly significant. Sex differences were minimal and 
did not seriously complicate the data. An important finding 
was the extent in which internals' and externals' cognitive 
responses ln each study were generalisable to the other studies. 
What render-s these findings significant is the fact that in 
the three studies different samples of subjects and different 
tasks were used. The subjects of the first study were Open 
University students who represented a highly heterogeneous group. 
Although the subjects of the second and third studies were first 
year psychology students,they, nonetheless, belonged to 
different academic sessions. The tasks employed in the three 
studies were of various natures. The first study included 
a purely verbal concept task where the subjects had to determine 
the principle relating a word on one of two response cards,to a 
word on the stimulus cards, each of which contained five words. 
The task of the second study involved lists of characteristics 
describing objects and the subject had to pick the object best 
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described by the characteristics from a list of objects. In 
the third study a concept formation task made up of a series 
of sets containing two numbers and two letters per set was used. 
Thus despite the varying nature of subjects and tasks, distinctive 
cognitive styles Characterising internals and externals emerged. 
These cognitive styles of handling solution hypotheses add 
valuable information to the mode by which internals and externals 
approached problems. Internals appeared to be more cautious in 
formulating and testing their solution hypotheses and processed 
information more thoroughly. The externals, on the other 
hand, were more casual in the generation and testing of solution 
hypotheses, and processed information less thoroughly. An important 
finding of this thesis is that the cognitive styles of internals 
and externals each seem particularly suited to dealing with certain 
kinds of tasks. The effectiveness of each group becomes evident 
when they are confronted with the tasks most suited to them. 
The great difficulty of the task employed in the first study 
rendered both styles ineffective. The task of the second study 
provided the internals with an opportunity to display their 
efficiency at processing simultaneously different aspects of 
the task; whereas the externals seemed unable to do this 
without relying heavily on the use of switchbacks. The 
principle of the task of the third study was deciphered more 
successfully by externals apparently because their simple 
"butterfly" approach enabled them to discover the key letters 
and/or numbers, whereas the internals' more systematic and 
complicated approach tended to obscure the principle. 
Lefcourt (1976) and Phares (1976), after reviewing 
the molecular research on locus of control, conceptualised 
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the internals as being more cognitively 'active' than externals. 
However, in the context of these laboratory tasks it is clear 
that both internals and externals were cognitively active, 
the difference lying in the way this activity was executed. 
Furthermore, internals and externals were not consistently 
distinguished by their ability to solve the problems successfully. 
3. Cognitive Structures and other Cognitive Styles 
The present research was concerned with the cognitive 
styles of internals and externals, the emphasis being on the 
characteristic ways information was processed by these two 
groups, on different tasks. However, the way persons assimilate 
and process information also reflects the way they organise 
their cognitions, that iS,it reflects what have been called 
their cognitive structures (cf. Bieri, 1955, 1961; Scott, 1969) 
or cognitive or belief systems (cf. Harvey, Hunt and Schroder, 
1961; Rokeach, 1960, 1968). The research of these and other 
social psychologists has been concerned with the influence of 
the structure of individuals' cognitive systems on the way they 
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construe and act upon their social environment. These 
investigators distinguished between those individuals whose 
cognitive systems are more "open", "abstract" or "complex" and those 
whose cognitive systems are more "closed", "concrete" or "simple". 
Superficially, the internals' more thorough and systematic 
cognitive style may seem related to cognitive complexity and 
abstractness; while that of the externals' to be more related 
to cognitive simplicity and concreteness. However, while this 
may seem an elegant way of relating these two areas of research 
it is an empirical issue as to what the exact relationship is, 
and the limited evidence at present available is not encouraging. 
Firstly, these different measures of cognitive structures do not 
correlate well with each other (cf. Ostell, 1974), thus 
internality could be associated with abstractness but not 
complexity. Secondly, poor correlations have been found 
between internality and the "openness¥of a belief system 
(Clouster and Hjelle, 1970; Pawlicki, 1972 ) and internality 
and field independence (Chance and Goldstein, 1971; Deever, 
1968; Lefcourt and Telegdi, 1971; McIntyre and Dreyer, 1973). 
However, one dimension has been identified which bears 
some resemblance to the cognitive styles of internals and 
externals. Kagan (1965) has described a dimension ranging 
from impulsivity (inclination toward quick and often simplistic 
processing of information), to reflectivity (tendency toward 
slower, more cautious and filtered processing of information). 
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Although no study, as far as the present author is aware, has 
investigated the relationship between the I-E scale and Kagan's 
dimension,the cognitive styles of internals and externals may 
well correlate with reflectivity and impulsivity, respectively. 
This may be an avenue for future research. 
It is interesting to note that Greene (1975) in 
rev1ew1ng the research on concept formation, identified a 
selection of cognitive styles commonly manifested by subjects 
working on concept formation tasks. Two of these styles are 
of particular interest to us: a) conservative focusing which 
requ1res the persistent testing of few solution hypotheses; 
and b) succeSS1ve scanning where the subject changes hypothese 
every time they are disconfirmed. These styles are ~imilar to 
those displayed by internals and externals in this research. 
Thus, the internals' style comes closer to a "conservative 
" . focusing" one, while the externals' style resembles a succeSSl.ve 
scanning" one. 
4. Interpersonal Behaviour and Cognitive Styles of 
Internals and Externals 
So far, the whole emphasis in this thesis has been on 
. . 
the cognitive processing of internals and externals,by eXaml.nl.ng 
their cognitive styles in solving problems. In this 
section a brief outline of the way internals and externals react 
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ln social situations is presented in an attempt to relate these 
"social" styles to their cognitive counterparts. 
Internals, as compared to externals, have been shown 
to be less conforming to group pressures (Crowne and Liverant, 
1963; Tolor,1971); less susceptible to influence (Biondo 
and MacDonald, 1971; Jones and Shrauger, 1968; Ritchie and 
Phares, 1969; Ryckman, Rodda, and Sherman, 1972; Sherman, 
1973); and to respond more to the informational demands of the 
task rather than to its social demand aspects (Pines, 1973; Pines 
and Julian, 1972). These differences between internals and 
externals were considered by the authors involved as reflecting 
a greater desire to control social outcomes on the part of 
internals,and lack of confidence in achieving success alone,on 
the part of externals. Moreover, a great deal of research 
supports the contention that externals manifest greater anxiety 
than internals (e.g. Hountras and Scharf, 1970; Levenson, 1973b; 
Nelson and Phares, 1971; Platt and Eisenman, 1968). The 
internals were also shown to react in a more constructive manner 
to frustration (Brissett and NowiCki, 1973) and to stress 
(Wolk and Bloom, 1978) than externals. Thus internality seems 
to be related to more adjusted and psychologically 'healthy' 
behaviour than externality. Moreover, as mentioned in the 
introduction to the first study internals, relative to externals, 
attribute success and failure to themselves. How, if at all, 
do the above differences relate to the cognitive styles of 
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internals and externals? 
Recently, a number of investigators have advocated a 
direct relationship between cognitive processing and social 
behaviour in an att~mpt to explain the way such processing affects 
interpersonal interaction (Berkowitz, 1975; Greene, 1976; 
Simon, 1976; Shaver, 1975; Spivack, Platt, and Shure, 1976; 
Stotland and Canon, 1972). In fact Lefcourt (1976) argues that 
the differences in cognitive responses between internals and 
externals determine their different responses to social 
pressure and attempts to influence their behaviour. 
Externals have been shown to be more attuned to the 
social demands of a situation than internals (Pines, 1973). 
This may be due to the fact that externals feel that success 
in that situation will not be contingent on their efforts 
alone. Why? Internals seem to pay more attention to task 
relevant information than externals (Lefcourt et aI, 1968; Phares, 
1968; second study) while externals are more sensitive to 
salient cues of information (third study; Wolk and DuCette, 
1974) • Thus externals seem unable to distinguish relevant 
from irrelevant information but react to salient cues, even 
though they may not be appropriate ones. To some extent this 
explains why externals seem less able to identify significant 
causal relationships among variables, and it is precisely 
this ambiguity in establishing the causal relationships of 
behaviour-reinforcement contingencies,which makes generalised 
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expectancies more external and makes externals more susceptible 
to influence from others. 
Joe (1971) raised the question whether externals were 
more anxious than internals due to their generalised expectancies 
regarding control, or whether such expectancies were external 
because of their high levels of anxiety. It is argued here 
that the more thorough and organised cognitive functioning of 
internals renders the causal relationships among variables In 
their environment more comprehensible,and hence they avoid high 
levels of anxiety, and are better able to reduce anxiety when 
it is aroused. Externals, on the other hand, due to their 
less thorough and organised cognitive styles may fail to grasp 
the true relationships among events around them,so that they 
do not know how to respond to some situations, or their 
responses prove inappropriate. This may lead, to use Seligman's 
(19~5) terminology, to feelings of helplessness, and increase 
anxiety. 
It lS interesting to note that internals, relative to 
externals, tend to repress failure (Efran, 1963); tend to 
deny a disability when having one (Lipp, Kilstoe, James, and 
Randall, 1968); and repress negative information concernlng 
personal problems (Phares, Ritchie, and Davis, 1968). It could 
be speculated that although internals are more confident about 
their abilities (Johnson and Kilmann, 1975; third study), and 
are more achievement oriented (Wolk and DuCette, 1973) than 
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externals, they nonetheless seem to be more prone to engage 
in 'face saving' behaviour than externals. The internals' 
more thorough and systematic cognitive styles may function most 
smoothly when the information in the environment is congruent 
with their basic personal and social beliefs. If so, it is 
not very surprising that they resist attempts to influence 
their beliefs more than externals. 
5. Broader Implications of the Cognitive Styles of 
Internals and Externals 
The high degree of specifity with which the cognitive 
.. styles of internals and externals have been treated in this thesis 
should not mask their relevance to Rotter's social learning 
theory. According to that theory the role of locus of control 
is mediated by other variables such as the nature of the situation 
and reinforcement value. This research has shown that the 
effectiveness of the cognitive styles, in terms of finding the 
correct solution, depends on the nature of the task at hand (and 
on task difficulty). The value of reinforcement was held more 
or less constant over the three studies in that subjects found 
the three tasks interesting and internals and externals had 
approximately the same number of correct answers in each study. 
The findings of this research raise an interesting 
question: What exactly constitutes a "genuine" internal or 
"external"? Is it his generalised beliefs about behaviour-
reinforcement contingencies, or his cognitive style? People 
are typically classified as an "internal" or an "external" 
depending on their scores on the I-E scale. The present 
research suggests that cognitive styles can also be used as 
stable measures of "internality" and "externality". 
As indicated in Chapter 2, the I-E scale measures 
the contemporary beliefs of an individual. There is some 
evidence suggesting a positive relationship between internality 
and chronological age (Penk, 1969). Moreover, group therapy 
can induce shifts toward internality as measured by the I-E 
scale (Diamond and Shapiro, 1973; Dua, 1970; Foulds, 1971; 
Foulds, Guihan, and Warhime, 1974; Nowicki and Barnes, 1973). 
However, these changes in beliefs may not have been associated 
with actual and significant behavioural changes. Further, 
people endorse internal or external items on the I-E scale 
for different reasons. Individuals may believe in internal 
control because they value hard work (Clark, 1976), or they 
may select the external items because they cannot cope with 
the competition around them (Hersch and Scheibe, 1967). Thus 
beliefs per se do not delineate the nature of internality and 
externality as well as cognitive styles do, and they are 
probably less stable than these styles. 
Although it is difficult to specifY unambiguously which 
comes first, beliefs or cognitive styles, it is argued here that 
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the way persons process information seems to engender the kind 
of beliefs they have about the world. Moreover, this relation-
ship is mediated by experiences of success and failureo For 
example, when a person after appraising some situation takes 
action which subsequently proves successful, then this experlence 
will strengthen certain responses associated with that situation 
and could also engender a belief in his autonomy. These beliefs 
are only properly assimilated, however, if the person perceives 
the causal relationship between the success experience and his 
behaviour. The external may fail to perceive such a 
relationship (cf. third study). The author is arguing that 
the internal perceives this relation~ip which engenders beliefs 
in his personal autonomy, thus reinforcing his tendency to appraise 
and react to situations in the manner he does. Thus the way 
people process information about situations influences their 
reactions to, and consequently, their beliefs about these 
conditions. 
Internals relative to externals, assimilate, organlse 
and process information more quickly, thoroughly and systematically. 
Thus, producing a shift towards internality on the I-E scale is 
not a sufficient condition for developing internality. Individuals 
need to be able to identifY the important variables operating In 
their environment; they need to become aware of, or able to 
discover, the causal relations among variables and learn how to 
respond to situations to achieve their purposes; if they are 
to develop internality in its fullest sense. 
Our ability to negotiate our environment effectively 
is determined to a large extent by our ability to process 
relevant information in our environment. As we do this 
successfully our beliefs regarding internal control begin to 
take shape. Experience, beliefs and cognitive styles are 
closely interwoven: we are, ln a sense, the way we process. 
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APPENDICES 
First Study 
Materials and Additional Data 
A) The materials used in the first study are presented in 
the following order: 
1.1 Rotter's Internal-External Scale (Rotter, 1966) which 
is made up of 29 forced choice items of which 6 are 
filler items. l 
1.2 The concept formation task which consists of 50 trials 
each made up of 5 stimulus words and 2 response words. 
1.3 The post task questionnaire. 
Additional data pertaining to the number of quasi solution 
hypotheses and the number of trials on which the subjects 
guessed, are presented in Section B. 
1 Since the I-E Scale had been used in the three studies, it 
will not be mentioned in subsequent appendices. 
1 
2 
APPENDIX 1 
1.1 Rotter's Internal-External Scale 
NA~: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • DATE: 
(Block Capitals) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
AGE: • • • • • • • • •• (years) 
• • • • • • • • (months) SEX: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
This is a questionnaire to find out the way in which certain 
important events in our society affect different people. Each 
item consists of a pair of alternatives lettered a or b. Please 
select the one statement of each pair (and only one) which you 
more strongly believe to be the case as far as you are concerned. 
Be sure to select the one you believe to be more true rather 
than the one you think you should choose or the one you would 
like to be true. This is a measure of personal belief: 
obviously there are no right or wrong answers. 
Indicate our answer for each item b drawi a circle around the 
letter a or b next to the statement ou select. Please answer 
these items carefully but do not spend too much time on anyone 
item, and" please give an answer for every item. 
In some instances you may discover that you believe both statements, 
or neither one. In such cases select the one statement which is 
the most acceptable, or least unacceptable, belief as far as you 
are concerned. Try to respond to each item independently when 
making your choice; do not be influenced by your previous 
choices.2 
1. a Children get into trouble because their 
them too much. 
parents punish 
FJ 
b The trouble with most children nowadays is that their 
parents are too easy with them. 
2 These instructions were slightly modified from the original 
to render the Scale more comprehensible to the subjects of 
this research. 
J Indicates the filler item and is added by the author of this 
thesis. 
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2. ~ Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are partly 
due to bad luck. 
b People's misfortunes result from the mistakes they make. 
:3. a One of the major reasons why we have wars is because 
people don't take enough interest in politics. 
b There will always be wars, no matter how hard people 
try to prevent them. 
4. a In the long run people get the respect they deserve in 
this world. 
b Unfortunately, an individual' s worth often passes 
unrecognised no matter how hard he tries. 
5. a The idea that teachers are unfair to stUdents is 
6. 
nonsense. 
b Most stUdents don't realise the extent to which their 
grades are influenced by accidental happenings. 
a Without the right breaks one cannot be an effective 
leader. 
b Capable people who fail to become leaders have not taken 
advantage of their opportunities. 
7. a No matter how hard you try some people just don't like 
8. 
you. 
b People who can't get others to like them don't 
understand how to get along with others. 
a Heredity plays the major role in determining one's 
personality. 
b It is one's experiences in life which determine what 
they're like. 
F 
9. a I have often found that what is going to happen will 
happen. 
b Trusting to fate has never turned out as well for me as 
making a decision to take a definite course of action. 
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10. a In the case of the well prepared student there is 
rarely if ever such a thing as an unfair test. 
b Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated to 
course work that studying is really useless. 
11. a Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luck has 
little or nothing to do with it. 
4 
b Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right 
place at the right time. 
12. a The average citizen can have an influence in government 
decisions. 
b This world is run by the few people in power, and there 
is not much the little guy can do about it. 
13. a When I make plans I am almost certain that I can make 
them work. 
b It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many 
things turn out to be a matter of good or bad fortune 
anyhow. 
14. a There are certain people who are just no good. 
F 
b There is some good in everybody. 
15. a In my case getting what I want has little or nothing to 
do with luck. 
16. 
b Many times we might just as well decide what to do by 
flipping a coin. 
a Who gets to be the boss often depends on who was lucky 
enough to be in the right place first. 
b Getting people to do the right thing depends upon 
ability, luck has little or nothing to do with it. 
17. a As far as world affairs are concerned, most of us are 
the victims of forces we can neither understand, or 
control. 
b By taking an active part in political and social affairs 
the people can control world events. 
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18. ~ Most people don't realise the extent to which their 
lives are controlled by accidental happenings. 
b There really is no such thing as "luck". 
19. a One should always be willing to admit mistakes. 
F 
b It is usually best to cover up one's mistakes. 
5 
20. a It is hard to know whether or not a person really likes 
you. 
b How many friends you have depends upon how nice a 
person you are. 
21. a In the long run the bad things that happen to us are 
balanced by the good ones. 
b Most misfortunes are the result of lack of ability, 
ignorance, laziness, or all three. 
22. a With enough effort we can wipe out political corruption. 
b It is difficult for people to have much control over the 
things politicians do in office. 
23. a Sometimes I can't understand how teachers arrive at the 
grades they give. 
b There is a direct connection between how hard I study 
and the grades I get. 
24. a A good leader expects people to decide for themselves 
what they should do. F 
b A good leader makes it cleax to everybody what their 
jobs are. 
25. a Many times I feel that I have little influence over the 
things that happen to me. 
b It is impossible for me to believe that chance or luck 
plays an important role in my life. 
6 
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26. a People are lonely because they don't try to be friendly. 
b There's not much use in trying too hard to please 
people, if they like you, they like you. 
27. a There is too much emphasis on athletics in school. 
28. 
29. 
F 
b Team sports are an excellent way to build character. 
a What happens to me is my own doing. 
b Sometimes I feel that I don't have enough control over 
the directions my life is taking. 
a 
b 
Most o~ the time I can't understand why politicians 
behave the way they do. 
In the long run the people are responsible for bad 
government on a national as well as on a local level. 
The uncleYline:: i tens 2T8 the exte::,::.=-~2. i t~';.=. 
T:1e sco~e is tl-:e nunber of these i terns. 
7 
Appendix 1 
1.2 Task Employed in the First Study 
Below is a list of all the items comprising the task. 
Numbers adjacent to response cards denote the number of letters 
of the correct response words which correspond to the number of 
letters of the second word on the stimulus card. The location 
of the numbers varies from left to right of a response word 
indicating the correct one. 
Trials Stimulus Card Response Response Card 1 Card 2 
• 1 capital time street ape paper knife face 4 
# 
2 uncle society half studio fat 7 embassy marriage 
:3 nun flat object property station 4 wine . cJ.nema 
4 pencil bed postage glass book :3 leg tree 
5 east lecture gun skill danger 7 luggage tooth 
6 leaf theory hydro act company 6 church balance 
7 war collea.gle pint umbrella truth king journal 7 
8 food key building straw window stone ice 3 
9 machine red ladder shop radio 3 cat lorry 
10 week hospital box nerve boiler 8 feedback soldier 
11 romantic screen defence saint blue base degree 6 
12 mountain net line shadow journey :3 hat market 
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Trials stimulus Card Response Response Card 1 Card 2 
13 . sand boy gesture river mJ..rror record word 
14 aim birthday test rocket theme 8 pharmacy spirit 
15 computer bell candle toy cover bicycle body 4 
16 juice nose actress random tin 4 rest science 
17 game instinct fellow gas brain shirt chairman 8 
18 age earth neutron flower norm 5 novel doll 
19 blouse delegate may group plug exit pleasure 8 
20 pump fever crystal illusion orange 5 eagle fog 
21 chair jam method theatre coat 3 sky silver 
22 sister bread industry wax film 5 house eye 
23 out school harvest music festival 6 father lady 
24 iron national power service aid fair cylinder 8 
25 green pyramid wood napkin crockery oil library 7 
26 campaign cycle natural cold jacket 5 table terminal 
27 set metal matrix economy bone exchange black 5 
28 lake art jewel airport statue bridge cup 
29 south needle fork approach tug odd centre 6 
30 pad life attitude brown memory product knob 4 
31 sound rod calendar tape stable letter pen 3 
32 beer globe ear lounge stadium 5 small question 
33 picture spring wall model man arm person 6 
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'lriaJ.s stimulus Card Response Response 
Card I Card 2 
34 funeral prospect guide door axe 8 commerce race 
35 ordinary court rent law border 5 honey business 
36 bee compact seed press modern end mixture 7 
37 job measure board editor ball 7 channel sun 
38 old cotton town style pattern 6 golden map 
39 spoon play fragment gallon far culture bird 4 
40 hair future clear railway tropical jet campus 6 
41 emotion text hermit hen value 4 duck raw 
42 scale pig blue island problem 3 jaw husband 
, 
43 stUdent hut trait dice action 3 ray medicine 
44 result fight goal finance pub one water 5 
45 number complex need rum blind 7 graphic office 
46 price discount tar team belief bed accident 8 
47 million family back motor rat concert budget 6 
48 bath social fan money director 6 amount seat 
49 gum hope judgement decade rally occasion idea 4 
50 land clerk physics ant league preface judge 5 
The distribution of the number of letters of the correct 
word is as follows: 
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9 instances of a three letter word 
9 " " " four " " 
9 " " " five " " 
9 " " " . " " sJ.X 
7 " " •• seven n " 
7 •• " an eight " It 
When the correct response word was a three letter word, the 
distribution of the wrong response words was as follows: 
1 four letter word 
2 five " words 
4 six " " 
1 seven It 
1 eight It " 
and this would add up to the 9 instances associated with the 
correct three letter words. 
When the correct response word was a four letter word, the 
wrong response words were distributed as follows: 
1 three letter word 
1 five n It 
2 . n words S1X 
4 seven " .. 
1 eight .. word 
11 
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When the correct response word was a five letter word the 
following was the distribution of the wrong response words: 
4 three letter words 
o four .. .. 
0 . .. .. Sl.X 
1 seven " word 
4 eight .. words 
If the correct response word was a six letter word, the 
distribution of the wrong response words was as follows: 
4 three letter words 
.. 
3 four It 
o five It •• 
2 seven .. It 
o eight II .. 
If the correct response word was a seven letter word, the 
wrong response words were distributed as follows: 
3 three letter words 
1 four It word 
1 five It II 
1 six " .. 
1 eight " .. 
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1fuen the correct response word was an. eight letter rfOrd, the 
following was the distribution of the wrong response words: 
1 three letter word 
3 four 
1 five 
1 six 
1 seven 
" 
" 
It 
" 
words 
word 
It 
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1.3 The Post Task Questionnaire 
Please print 
Name: · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Sex: · . . . . . . 
Age: · . . . . . . (years) • . . . . (months) 
occupation: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Educational qualifications already obtained: 
Intended degree: ••.••.•••.•.•• 
• 
14 
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A(l) How many different strategies4 did you use in trying to 
discover the underlying principle which related the correct 
word on the response card to the stimulus card? If you 
only used one strategy write the number 1 in the space 
provided; if you used more than one strategy, put down the 
number of strategies you used; if you simply guessed leave 
the space blank: 
A(2) Below, there is a list of different strategies which 
people possibly might have used in trying to discover the 
underlying principle. Examine the list carefully. I 
want you to do two things: 
(a) If, and only if, you have used one or more 
strategies not mentioned in the list below, write 
them down in the space provided. Do not write down 
strategies you have not used. If you did not use any 
specific strategy, or the strategy(ies) is (are) 
included in those mentioned below, do not add anything 
to the "list. 
(b) Now look at the list again, and try to think 
which strategy you used first and then put the number 
1 against that strategy in the space provided in the 
left hand column. If the first strategy did not work 
and you tried a different one then put the number 2 
IleXt to tha t strategy and so on. HOl-Tever, if, and 
only if, you returned to a strategy after having 
already rejected it, put down another number against 
that strategy. The numbers should be separated by a 
Qy'phen. For example, the numbers 2-4 next to a 
strategy indicate that that particular strategy was 
tried second and then fourth respectively; similarly 
the numbers 1-3-5 (for example) would indicate that 
4 The term "strategy" instead. of "solution hypothesis" 
was used in the questionnaire in order not to confuse the 
subjects. Therefore, the term strategy here will always 
denote solution hypothesis. 
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the strategy was tried first, and then third and then 
fifth respectively. If you did not use any specific 
st:ategy, put down the number 1. against the strategy 
"s~mply guessed the correct word". If you used (say) 
two different strategies and then simply guessed for 
the remaining trials, put 1 next to the strategy 
"simply guessed the correct word". 
Please do not put a number against a strategy unless you 
have used that strategy. You are not being compared with 
others, so please respond in a manner which truly reflects 
your actual performance on the task. 
STRATEGIES YOU MAY HAVE USED TO 
DISCOVER THE PRINCIPLE RELATING 
THE RESPONSE WORD TO THE STIMULUS 
CARD. 
Simply guessed the correct word. 
Looked for a relationship in terms of similar 
meaning between the word on the response card and 
the stimulus card. 
Looked for a relationship in terms of opposite 
meaning betHeen the word on the response card and 
the stimulus card. 
Looked for a relationship in terms of the same 
number of letters of the word on the response 
card and a word on the stimulus card. 
Looked for a relationship in terms of a co~~on 
category (e.g. the word on the response card and 
the words on the stimulUS card belonged to the 
same category such as "fruits", "wooden objects", 
.t animals" etc.). 
Looked for a relationship in terms of letter 
seguence (e.g. the word on the response card 
contained the same letter(s) as the one(s) 
prominent in the words on the stimulus card). 
16 
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B Some subjects, when they cannot find the correct principle, 
resort to guessing. Some resort quickly, others take more 
time, and others do not resort to guessing at all. 
Indicate on the line below, by circling the appropriate 
trial, the approximate point at which you adopted the 
guessing strategy (do this only if you actually started 
guessing). If you resorted to guessing more than once, 
then circle the appropriate trials at which guessing 
started (e.g. if you started guessing on (say) trial 20, 
and then on trial 30 you rejected guessing, but resorted 
to it again on (say) trial 40, then circle trials 20 and 
40 respectively and so on). If you persisted to find the 
correct principle over the 50 trials and did not resort to 
guessing at all then tick (J) the box below trial 50: 
, I I , t , , I , I I I I I \ I I ; I ! I I I I I , , , 'I I I , , 
5 10 15 20 25 
o 
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C Below you find a number of questions about your reaction to 
the experiment. Please answer each question by drawing a 
circle around the number on each scale which truly reflects 
your opinion or performance: 
D(l) 
How much did you like 
the task? I 
disliked 
the task 
very much 
When trying to discover 
the underlying 
principle, how hard did 
2 ~ 4 .2 6 Z 8 9 
liked the 
task very 
much 
you try? I 2 J 4 .2 6 7 8 9 
did not 
try at 
all 
tried as 
hard as I 
could 
How interested were 
you in the task? I 2 J 4 .2 6 Z 8 9 
not inter-
ested at all 
very much 
interested 
How much do you think 
this was a task which 
depended on skill or 
chance? I 2 J 456 Z 8 9 
purely a 
matter of 
chance 
Did you find the underlying principle? 
purely a 
matter of 
skill 
Yes 0 I NoD 
(tick one box) 
(2) For how many trials did you find the correct word? (Please 
give an answer out of 50) 
18 
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(3) Think back over your performance and then indicate on the 
scales below how much you think each of the factors listed 
influenced your performance on the task: 
1 2 345 6 789 
The task was 
too easy for me 
The task was too 
difficult for me 
1 2 345 6 789 
I am not 
competent at 
such a task 
I wasn't feeling 
comfortable at 
all during the 
experiment 
1 
I 
testing situation 
distracted me 
very much 
2 :2 4 
2 :2 4 
:2 6 Z 8 
:2 6 7 8 
I am highly 
competent at such 
a task 
9 
I was feeling very 
comfortable during 
the experiment 
9 
I wasn't distracted 
at all by testing 
situation 
Finally, please add any other comments you wish about 
your performance or any aspects of the task: 
p.t.o.; 
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THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR CO-OPERATION. AS OTHER 
PEOPLE ARE STILL GODfG TO BE TEsrED, PLEASE DO NOT 
DISCUSS THIS EXPERD1ENT WITH THE OTHERS. THANK YOU. 
19 
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B Additional Data: 
1.4 Number of Quasi Solution Hypotheses 
Subjects were asked to write down the number of the 
solution hypotheses they used over the 50 trials. The mean 
scores for the number of quasi solution hypotheses are presented 
in table 1.1. 
Table 1.1 
Mean scores for the number of quasi solution hypotheses as a 
function of locus of control, sex, and conditions 
Conditions 
Combined. 
Subjects Skill Chance 1 Chance 2 Conditions 
Internals 3.67 4.47 2.16 3.43 
Externals 7.08 4.50 3.37 4.98 
Males 3.25 5.07 2.87 3·73 
Females 7.50 3·90 2.66 4.69 
Combined sample 5.38 4.49 2.77 4.21 
The data were then analysed using A 2 x 2 x 3 (locus of 
control x sex x conditions) factorial design with unequal number 
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in cells (least square analysis). This design is also used for 
the subsequent analysis. Summary of the analysis of variance of 
the number of quasi solution hypotheses is reported in table 1.2. 
Table 1.2 
Summary of analysis of variance of the number of auasi solution 
hypotheses as a function of locus of control, sex, and conditions 
Variation SS DF !vIS F p 
A (Locus of control) 40.500 1 40.500 3.143 
B (Sex) 14.222 1 14.222 1.104 
C (Conditions) 88.694 2 44.347 3.441 <,.038 
AB 19.199 1 19.199 1.490 
AC 42.031 2 21.016 1.631 
BC 99.477 2 49.739 3.860 (.026 
ABC 13.978 2 6.989 .542 
vIi thin cells (error) 773.176 60 12.886 
Locus of control main effect almost reached significance, 
and table 1.1 shows that externals wrote down more quasi solution 
hypotheses. The highly significant conditions main effect 
indicates that skill, chance 1 and chance 2 produced different 
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responses among sUbjects. Table 1.1 shows that subjects in 
skill and chance 1 wrote down more quasi solution hypotheses as 
compared with subjects under chance 2. 
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The significant sex x conditions interaction was 
investigated using Tukey's HSD test (q) for ~ posteriori pairwise 
comparisons between the means, as the interaction had not been 
predicted. The q values show that under skill females wrote 
down more quasi solution hypotheses than did the males 
(q = 3.896, df 2/60, P(.Ol); no significant differences for the 
other conditions were found. 
1.5 Number of Trials on which Subjects Guessed 
The subjects were required to circle the number of trials 
on which they guessed on a 50 point line (each point standing for 
a trial). Table 1.3 presents the means of the number of trials 
on which subjects guessed. 
Summary of analysis of variance (shorm in table 1.4), 
resulted in significant locus of control and conditions main 
effects and locus of control x conditions interaction. As 
table 1.3 shows the internals guessed more than externals, and 
subjects reactions were greatly dependent on the conditions (the 
highest number was in the chance 2 condition). 
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Table 1.3 
Mean scores for the number of trials on which subjects guessed 
as a function of locus of control and conditions 
Conditions 
Locus of 
Control Skill Chance 1 Chance 2 Combined 
Internals 1.33 2.47 19.33 7.71 
Externals 3 • .58 3.47 6.33 4.46 
Combined 2.46 2.97 12.83 6.09 
As the locus of control x conditions had not been 
predicted, Tukey's q test for a posteriori pairwise comparisons 
between the means was employed. The q values revealed that 
under chance 2 internals guessed on more trials than did 
externals (q = 8.287, df 2/60, P~Ol); no significant 
differences existed for the other conditions. 
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Table 1.4 
Summary of the analysis of variance of the number of trials on 
which subjects guessed as a function of locus of control, sex, 
and conditions 
Variation S5 DF MS F p 
A (Locus of control) 378.125 1 378.125 6.487 < .013 
B (Sex) 86.681 1 86.681 1.487 
C (Conditions) 2266.694- 2 1133.Y+7 19.444 (, .001 
AB 2.907 1 2.907 .050 
AC 1331.735 2 665.867 11.424 <. .001 
BC 56.848 2 28.424 .488 
ABC 3.992 2 1.996 .034 
Within cells (error) 3497.338 60 58.289 
Haterials 
APPENDIX 2 
Second Study 
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The materials employed in the second study consisted of 
the follol-ring: the concept formation task (made up of 24 trials 
each comprised of a certain number of characteristics - ranging 
from 3 to 9 inclusive - and 5 objects); and the post task 
questionnaire. 
2.1 Task em~loyed in the Second Study 
Below is a list of all the items comprising the task. 
The number on the right hand side of the characteristics denotes 
the number of characteristics of a given trial. The two zero 
trials preceding the first trial are the preparatory trials. 
The asterisk adjacent to an object in any trial indicates the 
correct object. 
Trial Characteristics Objects 
0 Reeled 1 Film 
Playable ~2 Tape 
Magnetic 3 Disc 
Recording 4 Ribbon 
5 Cord 
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Trial 
o 
1 
Characteristics 
Wearable 
Paired 
Laced 
Sharp 
StFaight 
Cutter 
Dangerous 
Solid 
Pointed 
Hetallic 
Sheathed 
3 
8 
Objects 
1 Socks 
2 Gloves 
3 Ear muffs 
;;4 Shoes 
5 Slippers 
1 Sickle 
2 Saw 
3 Claw 
4 Javelin 
~5 Knife 
26 
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Trial Characteristics Objects 
2 Amorphous I Iceberg 
Hard· ~2 stone 
Solid 3 Monument 
Unpolished 7 4 Concrete 
Natural 5 Mountain 
Moveable 
Opaque 
3 Open I Globe 
Flat 2 Signpost 
Descriptive ~3 Map 
Readable 4 Dictionary 
Scaled 8 5 Notice 
Directional 
Representative 
Geographical 
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Trial Characteristics Objects 
4 Hard I Teeth 
White ~ Bone 
Supportive 5 3 Skull 
Living 4 Tusk 
Calcified 5 Chalk 
5 Breakable I Ice 
Insulator 3 2 Bottle 
Transparent 3 ~~ind-screen 
, 
;(4 Glass 
5 Goggles 
6 Traversable I Dome 
Joining 2 Tunnel 
Suspended ;(3 Bridge 
Solid 4 Road 
Pillared 9 5 Vault 
Crossing 
Arched 
Constructed 
Communicating 
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Trial Characteristics Objects 
7 Coloured ~l Car];>et 
Soft 2 Curtain 
Covering J Blanket 
Flat 8 4 Coat 
Woven 5 Towel 
Fitted 
Patterned 
Insulator 
8 Horizontal I Cabinet 
Fixed 4 2 Hanger 
Flat J Wall 
Supportive 4 Bench 
~5 Shelf 
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Trial Characteristics Objects 
9 'vater-proof 1 Parachute 
Protective 2 Tent 
Spoked 3 Raincoat 
Portable 7 ~4 Umbrella 
Compact 5 Wheel 
Light 
Collapsible 
, 
10 Inflatable ~l Balloon 
Thin 2 Bubble-gum 
Expansible 5 3 Dinghy 
Rubbery 4 Bag 
Coloured 5 Tube 
11 Tailored 1 Apron 
Light 2 Jacket 
Collared ;(3 Shirt 
Textured 7 4 Jeans 
Buttoned 5 Skirt 
Wearable 
Tailed 
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Trial Characteristics Objects 
12 Opener 1 Lever 
Releaser 2 Tin-opener 
Light 3 Release mechanism 
Flat 4 Instrument 
Metallic 9 ~5 Key 
Portable 
Small 
Handled 
Serrated 
I) Woven 1 Cotton 
Textured 2 Wool 
Fibrous 6 3 Silk 
Tailorable 4 Rubber 
Wearable ~5 Cloth 
Coloured 
-
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Trial 
14 
15 
16 
Characteristics 
Spherical 
Inflatable 
Bouncy 
Twistable 
!1etallic 
Rounded 
Projecting 
Solid 
Lumpish 
~loven 
Crowning 
Brimmed 
Concave 
3 
6 
4 
Objects 
1 Bubble 
2 Tyre 
J Rubber 
4 Racket 
;(5 Ball 
1 Button 
;(2 Knob 
J Handle 
4 Steering wheel 
5 Hook 
1 Hood 
2 Bonnet 
J Scarf 
~4 Hat 
5 Crown 
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Trial Characteristics Objects 
17 Necked 1 Jar 
Brittle ~2 Bottle 
Hollow 3 Mug 
stoppered 7 4 Pan 
Pourer 5 Cylinder 
Upright 
Flat-bottomed 
18 Nibbed I Pencil 
Refillable 3 2 Brush 
1iriter ~3 Pen 
4 Quill 
5 Ink 
19 Metallic 1 Chain 
Flexible 2 Arial 
Coated 6 ~3 Wire 
Insulated 4 Iron 
Manufactured 5 Cord 
Conductive 
Appendix 2 
Trial 
20 
21 
22 
Characteristics 
Smooth 
Pointed 
Metallic 
Headed 
Flat 
Handled 
Portable 
Shallow 
Container 
Transportable 
Personal 
Capacious 
Handled 
Hollow 
Lockable 
Hinged 
4 
4 
8 
Objects 
I Hook 
x2 Nail 
3 Screw 
4 Spear 
5 Rivet 
~l Tray 
2 Basket 
3 Trolly 
4 Coffin 
5 Box 
I Carrybag 
~2 Suitcase 
3 Satchel 
4 Cupboard 
5 Drawer 
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Trial Characteristics Objects 
23 ~ynthetic 1 Nylon 
Pliable 3 2 Leather 
Oil-based 3 Aluminium 
~4 Plastic 
5 Tarpaulin 
24 Magnifying Xl lens 
Convex 2 Binoculars 
Polished 3 Camera 
Zooming 4 Magnifying glass 
Small 9 5 Telescope 
Precision-made 
Detachable 
Glass 
Photographic 
25 Coloured 1 Fossil 
Breakable 2 Lead 
Dusty 5 3 Crayon 
Light 4 Clay 
Alkaline ~5 Chalk 
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Trial Characteristics Objects 
26 Covering 1 Label 
TranspOrtable 2 Folder 
Light 5 ~3 Envelope 
Flapped 4 Pad 
Gummed 5 '<[rapper 
27 Container 1 Purse 
Folding 2 Hand-bag 
Compartmented 3 Case 
Personal ~4 Wallet 
Light 9 5 Money-bag 
Flat 
Stitched 
Valuable 
Hasculine 
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Trial Characteristics Objects 
28 Metallic I Pliers 
Portable 2 Sparmer 
strong 6 x) Scissors 
Cutter 4 Sword 
Pivoted 5 Knife 
Adjustable 
38 
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2.2 The Post Task Questionnaire 
Please ;print 
Name: • • • • • • • . . • • • . . . • . • . • 
Sex: . . . . . . . . . . 
Age: • • • • • • • • • • 
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Below, there is a list of different strategiesl which 
people possibly might have used in trying to solve the task. 
Examine the list carefully. 1! you have used any strategies 
listed, put a cross against that strategy in the space provided 
in the left hand column; otherwise leave the space blank. 
Tended to conceptualize the appropriate object 
while examining the characteristics' list, and 
before looking at the objects' list. 
Used the above strategy for all the objects 
(i.e. in all the trials). 
Used the above strategy for the obvious objects 
only. 
In addition to matching the appropriate object 
with the characteristics, I tried to compare all 
the five objects with each other. 
Below, you find a number of questions about your reaction 
to the experiment. Please answer each question by drawing a 
circle around the number on each scale which truly reflects 
your opinion or performance: 
How interested were you 
in the task? I 2 345 6 789 
39 
not inter-
ested at all 
very much 
interested 
1 The term "approach" as used in the text was considered to 
be more appropriate than "strategy" in order to alleviate 
any confusions with the way a strate~J was defined in the 
first study. 
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1tThen trying to name 
the correct object, 
how hard did you try? 
How much did you like 
the task? 
How much do you think 
this was a task which 
depended on skill or 
chance? 
40 
I 2 345 6 789 
did not 
try at all 
tried as 
hard as I 
could 
I 2 3 456 789 
disliked 
the task 
very much 
liked the 
task very 
much 
I 2 3 4 5 6 789 
purely a 
matter of 
chance 
purely a 
matter of 
skill 
Think back over your performance and indicate on the scales 
belovT how much you think each of the factors listed influenced 
your performance on the task: 
the task was too 
ea.sy for me 
I 2 ~ 4 ~ 6 Z 8 9 
the task 
was too 
difficult 
for me 
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1 2 345 6 789 
I lack the 
ability to perform 
such a task 
I am very 
able to 
perform 
such atask 
Finally, please add any other comments you wish about your 
performance or any other aspect of the task: 
APPENDIX 3 
Third Study 
Materials and Additional Data 
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A - the materials of the third study are presented in the 
following order: 
3.1 The concept formation task (a booklet presenting 
24 trials of sets of the two numbers and two 
letters). 
3.2 Post task questionnaire. 
Section B contains data of the comparisons in task 
performance between paid versus volunteer subjects; paid versus 
volunteer internals; and successful externals versus 
unsuccessful externals. 
, 
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3.1 The Task 
The task was presented in a booklet. form (each page of the 
booklet measured 21 x 15 cm). After the title page, the 
following confidence rating scale was presented: 
Please circle the number on the scale below which truly 
reflects your opinion: 
How confident are you of finding the underlying principle? 
1 2 3 456 789 
Not confident 
at all 
very much 
confident 
A sample of a trial page is presented below: 
This set contains the principle 
This set does not contain the principle 
Please write down the strategy(ies) that you used: 
Belo~T is a list of all the sets (24) used in the task. 
Each set is presented in a trial page. 
A postive (+) sign next to a set indicates that that 
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particular set contains the principle. A negative (-) sign 
indicates that the set does not contain the principle. 
Trials Sets 
1 BA43 + 
2 BC24 
:3 DA23 + 
4 BA36 + 
5 AC13 + 
6 DB21 
7 • DA32 + 
8 CD42 
9 DB 54 
10 AC23 + 
11 AB13 + 
12 Am3 + 
13 BA:39 + 
14 CD26 
15 CA36 + 
16 BC12 
17 DB16 
18 DA53 + 
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Trials Sets 
19 CA32 + 
20 AD35 + 
21 DB45 
22 AC31 + 
23 DClS 
24 BA34 + 
Four letters (A to D inclusive) and 8 numbers (1, 2, 3, 4, 
5, 6"S and 9) were used in constructing the 24 sets. In all 
there were 48 letters and 48 numbers distributed as follows: 
15 As; 11 B s; 10 C s; l2 D s; 7 ones; 9 twos; 15 threes; 
7 fours; 4 fives; 4 sixes; 1 eight; and 1 nine. 
After each set a feed back sheet stating "THE SEl' 
CONTAINED THE PRINCIPLE" or tiTHE SET DID NOT CONTAIN THE 
-
PRINCIPLE" was presented. Following trial number 12 another 
confidence scale (similar to the one shown above) was presented. 
The last two pages of the booklet (following trial number 24) are 
shown below respectively: 
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and 
THE SEl' CONTAINED THE PRINCIPLE 
Did you find the principle? 
Yes 
No 
If you ticked yes, please state the nature of the 
principle: 
If you ticked no, please turn over the page. 
If you did not find the principle, how confident are you 
of finding it if the number of the trials was doubled? 
Please circle the appropriate number on the scale below: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
not confident 
at all 
7 8 9 
very much 
confident 
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3.2 Post Task Questionnaire 
Name: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Below, you find a number of questions about your rec.ction 
to the experiment. Please answer each question by 
drawing a circle around the number on each scale 'Hhich 
truly reflects your opinion or performance: 
HOlf much do you think' 
this was a task which 
depended on skill or 
chance? 1 2 345 6 789 
purely a 
matter of 
chance 
purely a 
matter of 
skill 
Hm'l much do you think 
your performance on 
this task depended on 
skill or chance? I 234 5 6 789 
HOl'l familiar was 
this task to you? 
How difficult was 
this task for you? 
purely a 
matter of 
chance 
purely a 
matter of 
skill 
I 2 345 6 789 
too 
familiar 
not 
familiar 
a.t all 
I 2 345 6 789 
too 
difficult 
too 
easy 
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How interesting 1-Tas 
the task? 1 2 3 456 789 
not 
interesting 
at all 
very 
much 
interestjng 
Finally, please add any other comments you wish about your 
performance or any other aspects of the task: 
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B. Additional Data 
As indicated in the results section of the third study, 
comparisons between paid versus volunteer subjects, paid 
internals and volunteer internals, and successful externals 
versus unsuccessful externals were carried out to determine the 
49 
degree of discrepancy between them. All the data were analysed 
by 2 x 2 factorial design with unequal number in cells (least 
square analyses). The first factor refers to either paid versus 
volunteer subjects or successful versus unsuccessful externals, 
and the other factor is sex. A sample of the breakdown of the 
sums of squares is presented in table 3:1. The remaining 
tables contain the means for each index of comparison. There 
were no significant differences due to the first factor in all 
1 the analyses. Sex main effects were found only for initial 
confidence with males being significantly more confident than 
females (the same differences were obtained in the main results). 
1 Except for successful versus unsuccessful externals in 
their ratings of middle confidence. As indicated in the 
results section, the unsuccessful externals ~ere less 
confident than successful externals following the 12th 
trial. 
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Table 3.1 
Summary of analysis of variance of the number of correct trials 
as a function of paid versus volunteer subjects and sex based on 
24 trials 
Variation 
A (Subjects) 
B (Sex) 
AB 
Within cells (error) 
Table 3.2 
SS 
9.655 
49.728 
8.943 
567.649 
DF 
1 
1 
1 
36 
MS 
9.655 
49.728 
8.9-1-3 
15.768 
F 
.612 
3.154 
.567 
Mean scores for the number of correct trials as a function of 
paid versus volunteer subjects and sex 
Subjects 
Paid subjects 
Volunteer subjects 
Combined 
Males 
16.44 
14.90 
15.67 
e: The scores are out of 24 
Sex 
Females 
21.00 
16.84 
18.92 
Combined 
18.72 
15.87 
17.30 
P 
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Table 3.3 
Mean scores for the number of solution hYpotheses as a function 
of paid versus volunteer subjects and sex 
Subjects 
Paid subjects 
Volunteer subjects 
Combined 
Table 3.4 
Males 
4.44 
3.40 
3·92 
Sex 
Females 
4.00 
4.21 
4.11 
Combined 
4.22 
3.81 
4.02 
Mean ratings of initial confidence as a function of paid versus 
volunteer subjects and sex 
Sex 
Subjects Males Females Combined 
Paid subjects 4.78 3·00 3.89 
Volunteer subjects 5.10 3.42 4.29 
Combined 4.94- 3.21 4.09 
e: Lm'l score indicates low confidence, 
high score the reverse 
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Table 3.5 
Mean scores for the number of correct trials as a function of 
paid versus volunteer internals and sex 
Internals 
Paid internals 
Volunteer internals 
Combined 
Males 
15.67 
14.20 
14.94 
e: The scores are out of 24 
Table 3.6 
Sex 
Females 
21.00 
15.57 
18.29 
Combined 
18.34 
14.89 
16.62 
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f.1ean scores for the number of solution hypotheses as a function of 
~aid versus volunteer internals and sex based on 24 trials 
Internals 
Paid internals 
Volunteer internals 
Combined 
Males 
4.33 
4.20 
4.27 
Sex 
Females 
4.00 
4.43 
4.22 
Combined 
4.17 
4.32 
4.25 
Appendix 3 
Table 3.7 
Mean ratings of initial confidence as a function of paid versus 
volunteer internals and sex 
Internals 
Paid internals 
Volunteer internals 
Combined 
Males 
5.67 
5.80 
5.74 
Sex 
e: Loll score denotes low confidence, 
high score the reverse 
Table 3.8 
Females 
3·00 
4.29 
3.65 
Combined 
4.34 
5.05 
4.70 
Mean ratings of initial confidence as a function of successful 
versus unsuccessful externals and sex 
Sex 
Externals Males Females 
Successful externals 4.00 
Unsuccessful externals 3.67 
Combined 3.84 
e: LOH score indic8,tes low confidence, 
high score the reverse 
2.75 
3·25 
3·00 
Combined 
3.38 
3.49 
3.42 
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Table 3.9 
Mean ratings of middle confidence as a function of successful 
versus unsuccessful externals and sex 
Sex 
Externals Males Females Combined 
Successful externals 4.00 5.38 4.69 
Unsuccessful externals 3·00 1.75 2.38 
Combined 3·50 3·57 3.54 
Table 3.10 
Mean scores for the average number of trials per solution 
hYpothesis as a function of successful versus unsuccessful 
externals and sex based on the first 6 and 9 trials 
Sex 
Trials Externals !1ales Females Combined 
First Successful externals 1.26 1.29 1.28 
6 Unsuccessful externals 1.00 1.38 1.19 
Trials Combined 1.13 1.38 1.24 
First Successful externals 1.92 1.61 1.77 
9 Unsuccessful externals 1.13 1.93 1.53 
Trials Combined 1.53 1.77 1.65 
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Table 3.11 
Hean scores for the maximum number of trials per solution 
hyPothesis as a function of successful versus unsuccessful 
externals and sex based on the first 6 and 9 trials 
55 
Trials Externals Males 
Sex 
Females Combined 
First Successful externals 1.40 1.38 1.39 
6 Unsuccessful externals 1.33 2.25 1.79 
Trials Combined 1.37 1.82 1.59 
First Successful externals 3·00 2·50 2.75 
9 Unsuccessful externals 1.67 2.75 2.21 
Trials Combined 2.34 2.63 2.48 
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Table 3.12 
}1ean scores for the number of solution hYpotheses as a function 
of successful versus unsuccessful externals and sex based on the 
first 6 and 9 trials 
Trials Externals 
First Successful externals 
6 Unsuccessful externals 
Trials Combined 
First Successful externals 
9 Unsuccessful externals 
Trials Combined 
Males 
2.40 
1.33 
1.87 
3·20 
2.00 
2.60 
Sex 
Females 
2.25 
2.25 
2.25 
3.63 
3.00 
3.32 
Combined 
2·33 
1.79 
2.06 
3.42 
2·50 
2.96 
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Table 3.13 
Mean scores for the number of correct trials as a function of 
successful versus unsuccessful externals and sex based on the 
first 6 and 9 trials 
57 
Trials Externals Males 
Sex 
Females Combined 
First Successful externals 2.60 3.38 2.99 
6 Unsuccessful externals 2.33 3.25 2.79 
Trials Combined 2.47 3.32 2.89 
'First Successful externals 5.00 5.13 5·07 
9 Unsuccessful externals 3.67 4.75 4.21 
Trials Combined 4.34 4.94- 4.64 
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